Population Trends. Trends in growth, composition and migration @ www.population-growth-migration.info

After major revision, this page was updated end of October 2006, with further update of the UK section of the page, mainly its section h), end of November and early December 2006.

On this page we present details of population and population related trends. References are indicated R1, R2, etc. In the past (up to early 2005) this page had only two sections, Global and United Kingdom (UK). We have now added a European section. All three sections are separately referenced. The three sections run in the order Global first, European second, and UK last. To go to either the European section or the UK section directly, click on the appropriate button:

Global

a) Past World Population Growth

The present world population is vastly greater in size than it has been during nearly all of the history of mankind. It is only comparatively recently that the population entered into the phase of continued and accelerating population growth that has now brought the population to over 6 billion persons. In the Paleolithic Age the population was probably only around 1 million, in the Neolithic Age around 10 million, and in the Bronze age around 100 million. But during these ages, periods of population growth alternated with periods of stagnation and decline (R1).

The growth of the world population in the last two thousand years is depicted in Fig. 1. Except for recent times, data is scanty and population estimates are conjectural. There were various population fluctuations such as that caused by the plague in Europe in the 14th century, but these are ignored in the graph which simply shows the overall population trend.

The twentieth century saw the largest total century population increase ever. At the start there were 1.6 billion people. At the end there were 6.1. billion people. There was however a big difference in population growth between more developed regions and less developed regions. In the former the population more than doubled, but in the latter the population more than quadrupled (R2).

b) The world population in 2006

The world population in October 2006 was around six and a half billion. The U.S. Census bureau puts it at 6,554 million (R3). The Population Reference Bureau (PRB) puts it at 6,555 million (R4). Both these estimates are mid-year. The PRB gives this data on the 10 countries with the largest populations (millions):

The AIDS epidemic has had massive demographic consequences. In countries worst affected by the epidemic, there has been a massive increase in mortality, and a corresponding fall in life expectancy. In terms of world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa has been the worse hit region. Here the countries with the highest percentages of the population affected by HIV/AIDS are: Swaziland (33.4 per cent of the population), Botswana (24.1 %), Lesotho (23.2 %), Zimbabwe (20.1 %), Namibia (19.6 %) South Africa (18.8 %), Zambia (17 %), Mozambique (16.1 %) (R4).
The next most affected region of the world is the Caribbean. So the two most affected regions of the world are those where Black populations predominate.

c) The Demographic transition

Since about 1750, the world population has grown massively, at an increasing rate until recently, from some size of the order of 500 million, to over 6 billion now. In the 'industrialised' or 'developed' world, during this period of population growth, national populations have largely completed going through what is called the 'demographic transition' (see graph above). This is the transition from a largely rural agrarian society with high fertility and mortality rates, to a predominantly urban industrial society with low fertility and mortality rates.

In the industrialised countries, generally speaking, the transition began with a large drop in mortality rate. Only much later did fertility rate decline, so the decrease in mortality rate allowed a massive population explosion. Then with the later decline in fertility rate, the population growth slowed down and has or will soon cease (we ignore here the effect of possible high future immigration). It can be seen then that there are two key transitions within the 'demographic transition' - first a mortality transition and second a fertility transition.

The underlying causation of the demographic transition was complex; various factors were involved, such as changes in modes of agricultural production and improvements in hygiene. The timing and details of the transition however, varied considerably between countries, and in Europe, between different regions. And in France, where fertility declined relatively early, there was no big time gap between the onset of mortality decline and the onset of fertility decline (R5).

It is worth noting at this point the meaning of two much used demographic terms. First, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). This is the number of children that would be born to a woman if current patterns of childbearing persisted throughout her childbearing years (usually considered to be ages 15 to 49). Second, The Replacement Fertility Rate (RFR). The RFR is the fertility rate that will ensure that each woman will be replaced by one daughter in the next generation (it is only women that add the males as well as the females to the population!). In developed world countries the RFR is a little over two rather than two because, first, slightly fewer girls are born than boys, and second, some baby girls do not survive to reproduce. But in the developing world, the RFR is usually higher, sometimes much higher, because in some countries there is a relatively high likelihood that newborn girls will not survive to their own reproductive age; also, if in a country many women undergo abortion to avoid the birth of unwanted daughters, this will also affect RFR. To bring fertility rate down to about two in these countries it would be necessary to lower the number of abortions and lower the high death rate amongst girls and young women.

What then has been happening, and what is likely to happen in future, in developing countries? As far as mortality is concerned, after World War Two, mortality declined considerably in developing world countries; this was mainly a consequence of public health action that reduced the impact of infectious diseases. But in recent decades improvements levelled off, the HIV pandemic playing a major role. With the worsening environmental conditions in some regions, and the likelihood of further worsening through the effects of climate change, further mortality reductions are not guaranteed.

And while fertility has generally been declining in developing world countries, there has been a considerable variation in the time of onset, rate, and extent of this fertility decline. Bongaarts considers that two of the key facts that emerge in his study of the fertility transition in developing countries are (R6 and see also R7):

1. Taking together those countries where fertility decline has proceeded for a long time with a considerable reduction in fertility, the decline of fertility slowed down in later stages of the decline (interestingly, the United Nations in its projections for future fertility change assumes for most countries that the rate of decline of fertility will be constant throughout the fertility transition rather than slowing down later on in the transition). In a few countries the slowing was dramatic in the 1990s and is now close to stalling or has stalled. The fertility transition stalled in Argentina and Uruguay; here the transition began in the first half of the twentieth century, with fertility reaching about 3 in the 1950s. But since then, there has been little change in fertility and it was still above 2.5 in 1995-2000. With Kenya there was a dramatic fall in fertility rate, but the fall stalled in the early years of the present century and births per woman remained at around 4.8 (R8). Other countries where the fertility decline stalled were Bangladesh, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Peru and Turkey (R7).

2. A certain level of human development must be reached (in particular improvements in both health and education) for any fertility transition to occur at all. Key indicators of human development here are life expectancy and literacy. And it seems likely that life expectancy needs to rise to above 70 and literacy to above 90 if fertility rate is to come down to replacement level in the near future. “Since the large majority of developing countries fall well short of these levels of human development, considerable progress will have to be made before near-replacent fertility becomes widespread”. And we add that the HIV/AIDS crisis of the last 25 years has halted or reversed much of the life-expectancy gains of earlier decades in many African countries (R9).

So it is quite possible, we think, that some developing countries may never achieve a massive reduction of fertiltiy to replacement level, and so never complete the demographic transition. As Jones wrote quite a long time ago now:
“But although the early stages of demographic transition may be observed in the Third World, there is no assurance that later stages will replicate European experience and achieve, through fertility regulation, environmentally sustainable population levels” (R10).

Nevertheless the United Nations and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis think average regional TFR will eventually reduce to below replacement level, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region where fertility has declined the least (R11).

d) The Second Demographic Transition

Since very roughly 1960, presently developed countries have been going through further demographic changes. The degree of commonality of these changes has led some experts to think these countries have been going through what they term the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). The SDT has the following features:
A decline of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) not just to replacement level (2.1), but to well below replacement level, an upward trend in divorces, the postponement of marriage and parenthood, the substitution of cohabitation for marriage, an increase in extra–marital and extra cohabitational childbearing and increase in non–family living. The adoption of modern contraception, especially the pill, has played a catalytic role, giving individuals the possibility to almost completely control their reproduction (R12, R13).

These demographic changes have coincided with, and have been driven by, socio–economic trends:
Increased secularisation, an increasing number of young people enrolled in secondary and tertiary education, growing emancipation and labour participation of women, the growth of the service economy, the expansion of the welfare state, and the development of what are sometimes referred to as post material values, emphasizing self–realisation and autonomy (R12, R13).

However, when the demographic changes are examined in detail, it appears that developed countries can be divided into groups which differ in some demographic features. While some convergence of trends has occurred between all developed countries, convergence between the above mentioned groups, has been incomplete. Thus, taking all developed nations together, the average TFR fell steadily from about 2.8 in 1964 to under 1.5 in 2000. However, in 1995, while the average TFR for all developed countries was 1.58 (very much below replacement level), Southern Europe had an even lower average TFR of 1.28. And at the end of the 1990s, some countries of Europe had a TFR 60% higher than in some others (R14).

In the USA while TFR fell below replacement level in the 1970s, it later increased again and since about 1990 has been roughly around replacement level (R5). In Sweden the TFR dropped from almost 2.5 in the mid–1960s to about 1.7 around 1980, and then increased again to above the replacement level in 1990, after which it fell back to below 1.7 over the subsequent six years (R6). There has also been variation between nations in sociological variables. For example, Mediterranean countries have relatively low levels of cohabitation (R12)

e) International migration in recent times

Over the last 35 years, the number of international migrants worldwide has more than doubled. And at the start of the 21st century, one out of every 35 persons worldwide was an international migrant. In 2002, almost one in every 10 persons living in the more developed regions of the world was a migrant (R16 & 17). Indeed, since 1960, the more developed regions of the world have experienced a gain in population through net immigration from the less developed regions, and this net gain increased over this period (net immigration is the balance of gross immigration and gross emigration). By the 1990–2000 period, the more developed regions were gaining about 2.6 million persons annually through net international migration (RR15) and this migration was accounting for two thirds of the population growth in these regions (R16 & 17).

f) The future

The growth of the world population is now slowing down, but the total population will still increase massively in the near future.

The world population is projected to increase by 2.6 billion from 2005, to reach 9.1 billion in 2050. This additional population is equivalent in size to the combined present day populations of China and India! During this period there will be little change in the population of the more developed regions of the world, most of the population growth taking place in developing countries. By 2050, 86 per cent of the world population is expected to be living in the less developed regions of the world (R15). Now the UN prepares various projections of future population growth, which have different assumptions about fertility, mortality and migration. The above information comes from the medium variant which is considered to be the variant which is most likely to correspond to future population changes.

The urban population of the world is continuing to grow faster than the total world population. In 2003 about 48 per cent of the world population lived in urban settlements. By 2030, the world urban population, 3 billion in 2003, is expected to grow to five billion. In contrast, the rural population during the same period is expected to decline slightly from 3.3 billion to 3.2 billion (R18).

International migration is projected to remain high during the first half of the present century, although after 2010 net migration to the more developed regions of the world is expected to continue at a lower level than recently, around 2.1 million a year instead of the high 2.6 million experienced in the 1990–2000 period. The more developed regions are expected to remain net receivers of international migrants, the major net receiving countries being (annual numbers) USA (1.1 million), Germany (204,000), Canada (201,000), the UK (133,000), Italy (120,000) and Australia (100,000). The countries with the greatest net emigration are projected to be China (–333,000), Mexico (–304,000), India (–245,000), the Philippines (–180,000), Pakistan (–173,000) and Indonesia (–168,000) (R15).

R2. Population Reference Bureau Staff (2004). Transitions in world population. Population Bulletin 59, 1.

R6. Bongaarts, J. (2002). The end of the fertility transition in the developing world. Working Paper 161. Population Council.

R7. Bongaarts, J. (2005). The causes of stalling fertility transitions. Working Paper no. 204. Population Council .

R8. Westoff, C. F.& Cross, A. R. (2006). The stall in the fertility transition in Kenya. USAID.

R9. Ashford, L.S. (2006). How HIV and AIDS affect populations. PopulationReference Bureau.

R11. Lutz, W. et al (eds) (2004). The end of world population growth in the 21st century. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

R12. Lesthaeghe, R. (1995).The second demographic transition in western countries: an interpretation. In Mason, K.O. & Jensen, A.M. (eds.). Gender and family change in industrial countries. Clarendon press, Oxford pp. 17–62.

R13. Sobotka, T. et al. (2003). Demographic shifts in the Czech Republic after 1989. A Second Demographic Transition view. European Journal of Population 19: 249–277.

R14. Coleman, D.A. (2002). Populations of the industrial world – a convergent demographic community? International. Journal of Population Geography 8:319–344.

R17. International Organization for Migration (2003). Migration policy issues no.2.

Europe

a) Introduction

This section of the page deals with the countries which belong to the European Union (EU). Information will sometimes cover the old 15 member EU (referred to as EU–15) and sometimes the new 25 member EU (referred to as EU–25).

b) The global context

The EU–25 share of the total world population fell from 12.4 per cent in mid-1960 to 7.3 per cent in mid-2002. The total fertility rate (TFR) in the EU-25 is now amongst the lowest in the world, and the EU-25 contribution to annual world population increase dropped from well over 2 per cent in 1960 to below 1 per cent by 2002. While since the early 1960s the total world population had more than doubled (3 to 6.2 billion), the EU-25 population increased by 75 million only (R1).

In mid-2002, with an estimated population of 453 million, the EU-25 had a far smaller population than both China (1,279 million) and India (1,034 million) (R1).

c) Population size and density

At the beginning of 2004, there were 458.6 million people living in EU–25, 384.5 in the EU-15, and 74.1 million belonging to the ten new member states (R2).
It is estimated that by the beginning of 2005, the total EU-25 population had increased to 459.5 million, the EU-15 population to 385.4 million, but the number of people belonging to the ten New Member states remained at 74.1. Germany was the country with the largest population (82.5 million), followed by France (60.6 million), the UK (60 million) and Italy (58.5 million). Of the new member states Poland made the biggest contribution to the total EU population (38.2 million) followed by the Czech Republic (10.2 million) and Hungary (10.1 million). And it is estimated that by the beginning of 2006 the total EU-25 population had risen further to 461.5 million (R3).

In 2000, the population densities (persons per square kilometre) of Western, Southern, Northern (which includes the UK) and Eastern Europe were 168.6, 112.5, 57.2 and 16.4 respectively, compared with a global average of 46.5.
Within the EU, by far the most densely populated country was Malta (1216). But in mainland Europe the highest densities were The Netherlands (469), Belgium (339), UK (243) Germany (236). The least dense countries were Sweden (22), Finland (17), Norway (15) (R4, R3 tables 13 & A16).

d) Non-national populations in the EU member states

The total number of non-nationals living in the European Union (EU) is very large - around 25 million in 2004, but this is only about 5.5 percent of the total population. Actually, the percentage of the total population varies from less than 1 percent in Slovakia to 39 percent in Luxembourg; but most countries have between 2 and 8 percent.

With the exception of Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland and Cyprus, the majority of foreigners in EU states are citizens of non-EU-25 countries. The number of citizens from the 10 new member states that live in the EU-15 is, in percentage terms, very small - about 0.2 percent of the total EU-15 population; the largest proportion is in Germany - about 0.6 percent.

The size and composition of the foreign populations in EU states strongly reflect geographical proximity, recent labour migration and political developments, and historical links. For example, the largest non-national group in Germany is Turkish, in Portugal it is citizens of former colonies (R5).

e) Past population growth

Between 1960 and 2003, the EU–25 population grew by 77.3 million people. Of this total, the EU–15 countries account for 64.7 million, the ten new Member States, 12.6 million. And as we mentioned earlier, In January 2004, the EU-25 population stood at 456.9 million (R6).

However, between the 1960s and the second half of the 1980s the annual population growth strongly declined, with this decline being stronger in the EU–15 than in the ten new Member States. Of the two causes of population increase, natural increase (excess of births over deaths) and net international migration, up to the 1990s, natural change was by far the major component of population growth in EU–25. So the decline of population growth was entirely due to the decrease in natural growth. After 1990, net migration became the major component of population growth (R1).

f) Net migration into the EU–15 and the EU-25

Net migration as far as EU–15 is concerned, was almost zero in 1960. Then during the 1960s, gross emigration increasingly came to exceed gross immigration. Then this tend was reversed. By the mid 1970s gross immigration was exceeding gross emigration. This net immigration (inward migration) then continued to grow during the rest of the 20th century and is continuing in the present century. Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK received 71 per cent of the net inflow in 2003:

This Pie Diagram is reproduced from page 53 of R8 (Eurostat yearbook 2004), by kind permission from the Copyright Office of the European Communities, for which we are very grateful.

Net immigation into the EU-25 is estimated to have been 1.707 million in 2002, 2.092 million in 2003 ,1.852 million in 2004, and 1.691 million in 2005, i.e. slightly less than in 2004 (R3 and R8).

For a detailed study of international migration between the rest of the world and Europe and within Europe, see R9.

g) International labour migration

It has proved difficult to classify the large variety of labour migration. Also there is some lack of between–country comparability of statistics, and emigration statistics are frequently absent. And then there is illegal immigration, about which Salt and Clarke write: "no one knows the size of the illegal population stocks or flows across Europe or in individual countries" (R10). Note, in the following brief account 'foreign' persons may either be persons from another country within the European Union, or from further afield.

Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that the inflow of foreign labour into Western European Countries has increased in most (not all) countries since 1995, with Germany and the UK showing large individual increases (table 1.1 in (R11). Thus for Germany the inflow (in thousands) was 270.8 in 1995, rising to 275.5 in 1998 and 333.8 in 2000 (no data given beyond 2000). For the UK the figures for 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 were 51.0, 68.0, 86.5 and 99.0 respectively. However, according to this set of data, the inflow has apparently fallen in Spain from 126.4 in 1996 to 91.6 in 1999 (the last year for which information was given).

In the absence of good comprehensive figures for labour flows, statistics on the flows of working–age persons may be used as a proxy. A study was made of percentage change per annum of immigration of the working–age foreign population in 12 countries (from the EU–15 plus Iceland and Norway, unfortunately not including Germany and the UK), over a period which varied form country to country, from the mid 1990s to between 1998 and 2001. This showed there was an increase in most countries. However there were large increases in only three countries (by far the biggest increase was in Spain), and three countries showed a decrease (Table 1.5 in R10).

There are significant differences between the picture given by the labour migration figures, and the picture given by the working–age figures (e.g. Spain). The authors give reasons for these differences, and they are inclined to think the working–age figures may give the better indication of the real scale of labour migration.

Now in all countries foreigners have a significantly higher rate of unemployment that the native peoples. Wanner (R11) considered that this "questions the capacity of European States to enable their migrants to integrate professionally and socially in the host country". Further, inequalities of employment access between nationals and immigrants, "can lead to social segregation of certain migrant populations following from problems of poverty".

Details of demographic trends such as fertility can be found in R1 and R12, the latter having excellent supporting coloured maps. Some breakdown of foreign labour is given in terms of whether or not it originated in the European Economic Area (R10) or in terms of nationality or world region (R11). Estimates of the foreign component of national labour forces 2000 -2001 are given in R13.

h) The future change in size of the European population

There are considerable uncertainties about future population trends. A significant factor here is the increasing difficulty of actually counting the existing population as population movement (to and from the EU and between member states of the EU) is greater than ever before (R14).

The European Union (EU) produces projections of possible future population growth in the European Union (R15). For these projections assumptions are made about the three determinants of population size change, namely fertility, mortality and migration. For example, with migration, account is taken of the likely impact of EU enlargement. But the projections do not take account of possible future measures that might influence demographic trends (for example, if the EU was to introduce some programme to deliberately encourage larger families). Collectively the projections are named 'trend' and the seven individual projections are called 'variants'. These variant projections differ from each other in the assumptions made. The projection period is up to 2050.

The variants all show the total EU population continuing to increase slowly for a while, then all except one variant show the population entering into decline during the projection period. Starting with the EU-215 population at the beginning of 2004 of 456.8 million, the spread of population sizes between the variants at 2050 is from 388.1 million to 529.0 million.

Of the two causes of population growth, natural change (the balance between births and deaths) continues at present, but sooner or later, deaths will come to outnumber births so natural change will then take a negative value. The other cause of population growth, net international migration, is currently playing an increasing role in causing total population growth, but in the EU's view, while it will postpone the eventual total population decline for a while, it will not continue to do so indefinitely.

i) The changing age composition of the population

It is people within the working age groups who are the principle drivers of the economy. At the same time, younger people, and old people, require the support of the working people. So changing age composition has important economic implications. It is important here to be clear on the terminology used in studies of age composition of any population.
For a view on the implications of changing age structure in populations see our essay "The demographic dividend" attached to the analysis section of our Comment and Analysis page. For an assessment of the issues associated with population ageing see R16.

While of course not all people of working age are actually employed, the change of age composition in a population is usually expressed in terms of the relative size of the working age population (sometimes defined as 15–64, sometimes as 20–59) to the size of the younger, and the older age groups. Ratios commonly calculated are the young age dependency ratio (YDR), and the old age dependency ratio (ODR).
The European Commission defines the two terms as follows.
The young age dependency ratio (YDR) is the number of people aged under 20, expressed as a percentage of the population aged 20–59.
The old age dependency ratio (ODR) is the number of people aged 60 and over, expressed as a percentage of the population aged 20–59.
If we add up the young age and old age dependency ratio, we get the total age dependency ratio (TDR), i.e. the number of people aged 0-19 and 60 and over expressed as a percentage of the population aged 20-59.

Sometimes the relationship between working age and older age populations is expressed as the potential support ratio (PSR). Thus if we take the working aged population to be 15–64, the PSR is the ratio of the number of people in the working age groups (15–64) to people who are 65 or over (population 15–64 divided by population 65+).

The European population has been getting older in the sense that old people are becoming a larger percentage, and young people a smaller percentage of the the total population. We focus first on older persons and more particularly those aged 65 and over. In very recent times the share of the total population of persons aged 65 and over in the EU-25 increased from 15% in 1995 to 17% in 2005. In 2005, Germany and Italy had the highest proportions - both 19%, Ireland the lowest - 11%. Projections have the number of persons aged 65 and over in the EU-25 increasing to about 30% by 2050 (R1 and R17). The actual number of older persons is projected to double between 1995 and 2050, to reach 135 million (R17). Turning to the young population, the population aged up to 14 years decreased from 18.8% in 1993 to 16.5% in 2004 (R8).

At the beginning of 2003, the population of the ten new member states was slightly younger, on average, than in the EU-15 countries. Consequently the accession of the ten new member states has had a small rejuvenating effect on the total EU-25 population. The accession caused the proportion of young people aged under 20) to rise from 22.4 to 22.8%, and the proportion of elderly people (aged 60 and over) declined from 22.2 to 21.5% (R1).

Looking now at the situation in terms of dependency ratios, in the European Union, the YDR has been decreasing, while the ODR has been increasing. With the YDR, the decrease has been in both the former EU–15 and the new Member States.
Between 1970 and 2003 the YDR fell from 64 to 40 per cent, and from 68 to 44 per cent in the EU–15 and the new Member States respectively. Within the EU–25, the YDR is at present highest in Cyprus and Ireland (both 51 per cent) and lowest in Italy (35 per cent) (R1).

In contrast to the YDR, the ODR has been rising. Between 1960 and 2003 the ratio went up from 29 to 40 per cent, and 22 to 32 per cent in the EU–15 and the new Member States respectively. So the ratio is significantly higher in the former EU–15 than in the new Member States (R1).

For the countries that now make the EU-25, the TDR has decreased from nearly 100 in the mid 1970s to a level below 80 in 2003. It seems that Sweden now has the highest (87 per cent) followed by the three Baltic States. The lowest ratios are in the Czech Republic (70 per cent) and Slovenia (71 per cent) (R1).

R1. Eurostat (2004). Theme 3 population and social conditions. Population Statistics.

R7. Eurostat (2004). Eurostat yearbook 2004. The statistical guide to Europe. Data 1992–2002.

R9. Salt, J. et al (2000). Patterns and trends in international migration in Western Europe. Eurostat theme 3. European Commission.

R10. Salt, J. & Clarke, J. (2004). International labour migration towards and within Europe. In J. Salt et al “International labour migration”. Coucil of Europe Publishing.

R11. Wanner, P. (2004). Migrants in the labour force. In J. Salt et al “International labour migration”. Coucil of Europe Publishing.

R12. Council of Europe Publishing (2003). Recent demographic developments in Europe.

R13. Münz, R. & Straubhaar, T. (2006). Migrants and the European labor market. In Papademetriou, D. G. (ed) “Europe and its immigrants in the 21st century”. Migration Policy Institute.

R14. Jones, J. & Chappell, R. (2004). European wide issues in population statistics. Population Trends 118: 17–22.

R16. De Santis, G. (2001). Population ageing in industrialized countries: challenges and issues. Policy and research paper no. 19, International Union for the scientific study of population. (IUSSP).

Population Growth and Migration: the United Kingdom

NB. Late October 2007. The demographic picture of the future UK population has changed considerably since this page was last updated at the end of 2006 (see for example, the news item on our News page for 23-10-07). This UK section of the page will be revised during the winter 2007–2008.

a) Introduction

The basic source of information here is the Office for National Statistics (ONS). See the Population and Migration section of the web site http://www.statistics.gov.uk The ONS produces press releases, brief summary reports, and more in depth regular publications such as Population Trends, the Series PP2 National Population Projections and the Series MN International Migration.

In the following account, note that some records refer to Great Britain (GB), that is England, Scotland and Wales, others to the United Kingdom (UK), that is Great Britain together with Northern Ireland. Note however, that in terms of total numbers, the vast majority of people in the UK live in GB. For example, estimates of the 2001 population put the UK and GB populations as, respectively 59.1 million and 57.4 million (R1).

Note also that ONS sometimes uses mid-year population estimates, sometimes end of year estimates. It is important to bear this in mind. For example, in Population Trends 123 (Spring 2006) and the article there on national population projections, there is a figure 1 which graphs total net migration over a period of years. Later in the same volume there is a table 7 that gives actual data on total net migration. If one plots the data in this table as a graph, the shape of the graph does not coincide exactly with the shape of the graph in figure 1, although the general trend of total net migration is the same. The reason for the discrepancy is that figure 1 uses mid-year population estimates, whilst table 7 uses end of year estimates.
To illustrate the differences that occur between between graphs based on the alternative sets of data, we show, in the Appendix, population projection graphs based on mid-year and end of year data.
Finally, population projections normally work in terms of mid-year data.

b) Key Points

a) The UK population grew from about 22.3 million in 1851 to 60.2 million in 2005.

b) 73 per cent of the growth of the GB population 1991–2001 was caused by the non–white (minority) populations.

c) The total ethnic minority population of GB, while still comparatively small, has grown massively in the last half century from 0.2 million in 1951 to 3.0 million in 1991, and as a proportion of the total GB population, from 0.4 per cent in 1951 to 5.2 per cent in 1991, and it continues to grow. And the increase in the numbers of people from different ethnic backgrounds and countries is one of the most significant changes in Britain since the 1991 Census.

d) Considering age groups in England, with the young age groups (0-15 years), what stands out most is the much higher percentage of the population in these age groups in all the 'Mixed' ethnic groups compared with the White groups. All the Asian groups also have a higher proportion of their populations in these age groups compared with the White groups, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups a much higher proportion.

e) All the non-White ethnic groups have a greater proportion of the population in the 15-44 year age groups ('breeding age groups') than the White: British group. Considering the older age groups (65/60+), the White: British has the largest percentage of its population in these groups than any other group apart from the White: Irish group

f) Migrants have a younger age profile than the resident population, around a half of international migrants are aged between 25 and 44, so they fall within the working and breeding age groups.

g) Fertility rate varies considerably between ethnic groups. The White: British fertility rate is well below replacement level. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups have a very high fertility rate, well over replacement level (and the Pakistani group is one of the largest of the non-White groups). These two groups are predominantly Muslim. Now Muslims in Britain tend to retain their religious affiliation over generations, and religious people tend to have larger families than non- religious families or families with weak religious affiliation.

h) Both inward and outward international migration have increased over the last two decades, during which time there has been a net outflow of British, and a net inflow of non–British persons.

i) During the last decade, international migration has become increasingly significant as a cause of UK population growth; in the year to mid-2004, it contributed about two-thirds of the UK's annual population increase, and its contribution was slightly higher during each of the previous five years.

j) The UK population is forecast to continue to grow up to 2071, by which time it will have reach 70.5 million.

k) During the next several decades, continued net immigration will prevent the decline of the UK population that would otherwise have taken place, a decline that is desirable on carrying capacity grounds.

l) For a long time, there has been a substantial movement of people from more urban areas towards more rural areas.

m) For decades there has also been a significant movement of people from the north to the south in England, although this has varied considerably between years, and recently the trend was reversed.

n) The various movements of population within England, and international migration, are all causally linked, with London having a pivotal role.

o) London and its surroundings has so grown physically and in terms of economic importance, that England may now be conceptualised as consisting of a Greater London in the south and a provincial archipelago of city islands to the north.

p) The UK population is getting older and will continue to do so.

q) Fears of ethnic replacement (swamping), and loss of social cohesion, national identity and sovereignty, are unjustifed in the short term, justified in the long term.

r) Persons belonging to terrorist networks are now present throughout the UK.

c) Population growth in the past

Up to about the middle of the 18th century, the population of GB had grown at a low rate, with various fluctuations. Then around the middle of the 18th century the growth of the population accelerated (R2–4). We know that the UK population was roughly 22.3 million in 1851, 38.2 million in 1901, 50.2 million in 1951 (R5) over 59 million in 2001, and in mid-2005, 60.2 million, of which 50.4 million lived in England (R6).
Fig.1 above shows the population growth in recent decades.

Now, a report by R. Lupton and A. Power notes that considering the GB population, the total population grew by 4 per cent in the 1990s. But if population is disaggregated by ethnic group, the report shows that 73 per cent of this total GB population growth came from the growth of the non–white populations.(R7). We return to ethnic population growth in section (h) below.

Now national population growth is caused by natural increase (excess of births over deaths) and net international migration. And the main cause of the increase in the UK population has been natural increase, immigration from outside the British Isles, at least between the 11th Century and the Second World War, playing only a minor role in the development of the total population size despite a few notable immigration episodes (R8). Actually from the 17th to the mid–20th Century, the UK has been a nation of emigrants, not immigrants; this then changed (R8–10). And during the recent decade the UK has been gaining population through net migration (gross immigration minus gross emigration) as well as through natural increase (R11). See Fig.1 above and the next section). In fact, “in the year to mid-2004 international migration contributed approximately two-thirds of the UK's annual population increase; this is slightly less than each of the previous five years”(R55).

d) Recent international migration

Migration estimates are based on the International Passenger Survey (interviews with a small percentage of persons entering or leaving the UK), data on migration between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and information from the Home office on expected numbers of asylum seekers granted leave to remain in the UK.

Both inward and outward international migration have increased in recent years, but immigration has come to exceed emigration, i.e. in recent years there has been net immigration (R14, R15 and see Fig. 1 above). And over the decade to 2002, gross immigration was 3.9 million people while gross emigration was 2.8 million people; so there was a net inflow of over one million (R13). Here are figures for net international migration in recent years, using end of year data (R14 and R15, table 2.1; see also R.32 and R 51).

Now on the second of November 2006, the official international migration estimates for 2005 were released (R53) . An estimated 185,000 more people entered than left in 2005, i.e. the net migration was 185,000. This is, on average, equivalent to the addition of 500 people a day. This net inflow was lower than the estimate for 2004, as can be seen by comparison with the 2004 figure in the above table, but it was still higher than all the other years since the current method of estimating total international migration began in 1991. The recent increase in net international migration to the UK has caused migration to become much more important in determining UK population increase.

The estimated gross inflow and gross outflow in 2005 were 565,000 and 380,000 respectively. In terms of citizenship, the pattern seen in recent years of net in-migration of foreign citizens and net out-migration of British citizens (see section h3 below) continued. An estimated 198,000 British citizens emigrated from the UK in 2005.

In May 2004 ten countries joined the European Union. Of these, the following are generally referred to as the 'A8':

This enlargement of the EU had a very significant effect on recent international migration. The estimated number of A8 citizens migrating to the UK for a period of at least a year increased from 52,000 in 2004 to 80,000 in 2005. The explanation given for this is that the year 2005 was the first full calendar year after the May accession for which migration by A8 citizens could be estimated. Analysis showed that with long-term immigration of A8 citizens since the second half of 2004, there has been a fairly consistent inflow of about 40,000 every six months. In terms of net inflows, In 2005, 64,000 more citizens of the A8 countries migrated long-term to the UK than left, and this was a clear increase from 2004 (49,000) (R53).

Now prior to the enlargement, the UK Home Office (HO) forecasted that the effects on immigration would be “relatively small, at between 5,000 and 13,000 per year up to 2010” (R16). How wrong the HO was! The actual influx was mainly from Poland - estimated to have been more than 350,000 in 2004 and 2005. David Coleman, Professor of Demography at Oxford University is reported to have said “from one country in a very short space of time, it must be the largest influx we have ever seen”. Other east European nationalities have also been arriving, in quite large numbers - Slovaks (36,355), and Lithuanians (44,715). It is noteworthy that while most EU countries blocked citizens of the new member states from migrating in search of work until 2009, Britain opened its doors (R12). It should however be emphasised that many of the people from east European countries did not stay long (R49).

Finally, the figures for net immigration given earlier ignore illegal immigration, for the simple reason that no accurate figures are available for such immigration. However, the HO, in 2005, did finally produce an estimate of the total illegal migrant population in 2001 (R18). The components of this total population were 1) illegal entrants, 2) persons who exceeded their valid 'leave to remain' period, and 3) failed asylum seekers who did not comply with instructions to leave the UK. The HO gave a 'central' estimate of 430,000, within a range of 310,000 to 570,000. This same report gave an estimate of the total foreign-born population in the UK in April 2001 of 3.6 million.

e) Projections of future population growth and net immigration

A preliminary note on the nature of projections and forecasts. One can never know exactly how many people there were in the UK in past years. But the population can be estimated. As far as future populations are concerned, it is possible to estimate what the population size will be (or the net migration will be) if we make any particular set of assumptions about natural increase (fertility and mortality) and migration. But one can make many such estimates, since one can make various alternative assumptions. So there is no one 'estimate' of population size or net migration for any particular year. It is important to realize the limitations of medium term (such as up to say 2040 in the present case), and especially long term, population projections.As one demographer put it in 1981, we can think of useable forecasts for the next five to 20 years, but virtually no information at all on populations 100 years hence (R20).
Strictly speaking, a projection is a set of calculations which show how a population will develop when certain assumptions about the future course of fertility, mortality and migration are made. A forecast, on the other hand, is a projection in which assumptions are chosen which it is thought will yield a realistic picture of the probable future development of the population (R21).

The latest set of population projections (R22) have the population of the United Kingdom (UK), 59.8 million in 2004, rising to reach 67.0 million by 2031, an increase of over seven million. Beyond 2031 the population is projected to continue to rise, but at a lower rate of growth, reaching 70.5 million in 2071 (table 1.1 in R22), a masive increase of 10.7 million from 2004!

Now as we noted earlier, population growth is caused by natural change (excess of births over deaths) and net international migration. Now 57 per cent of the population growth 2004-2031 is attributable to net international migration. But towards the end of the projection period, deaths will come to exceed births, continued population growth then being maintained only by net international migration.

The figures given so far belong to what is termed the Principal Projection, but variant projections have also been prepared that make different sets of assumptions. Even by 2031, these variant projections give the total population as between 64 million and 72 million, a very wide range of possibilities.

Now the current projections, published this year (2006) are 2004 data based. These follow interim 2003-based projections published in 2004, and 2002-based projections published earlier in 2004. Each projection has 'upped' the future population growth as can be seen from the following table which gives estimates of the 2031 population ('principal projection' data from ONS 'Population Trends' 115, 118 and 123).

And the following graph gives the 2002-based and the 2004-based principal projections.

Now there were clearly changes in assumptions made between these two projections. These are stated as follows:
“...in the medium term, the main change is an increase in the assumptions made about future net migration. But, beyond 2029, changes made to the long-term mortality assumptions become of gradually increasing significance” (R22 page 13).

The changes in assumptions between the interim 2003-based projections and the 2004-based assumptions are stated elsewhere as:
“The projected population of the UK at 2031 is 1.3 million (2.0 per cent) higher than in the 2003-based projections. This is due to a combination of more migrants, more births and fewer deaths” (R23, page 17).

Fig.3 gives details of estimated past, and projected future net UK international migration.

Now at the time when the 2002-based projections were made, it was assumed that net immigration would reduce to 130,000 per year from 2003-2004 onwards (R1), although, as we noted in our previous (2005) version of this page, the trend for the past decade was upwards (see graph). When the 2004-based projections were produced, this long term net migration was 'upped' from 130,000 to 145,000 (R23).

f) Changing population distribution within the UK

A useful introduction is provided by the report of Champion et al (1998) on migration flows in England (R42). A prominent trend in recent decades has been what has been termed the counter–urbanisation cascade, the flow of people towards a more rural environment. People have migrated from inner cities to suburbs, large cities to small towns, urban areas to rural areas. Another important trend has been the migration of people from the north to the south of Britain, although the magnitude of this trend has fluctuated over the years, and we look later at the flow in recent years where there has been a reversal of this trend.

Of all regions in England, the South East Region with Greater London has seen the highest level of both in and out migration, but with a net outflow. Net international immigration has come to make a very significant contribution to migration flows. It seems to have been “highly focused on the inner areas of London, and a relatively small number of other places that in turn are losing population to other areas through internal migration”.

The report concludes that the various population movements in England are all linked together: “There is clear research evidence of the various population movements being linked together to form a single national urban system, notably in the form of London's pivotal role and in terms of the counterurbanisation cascade. This is a system in which international migration appears to be playing an increasingly crucial role”.

The inter–relationships of international migration and inter–regional migration (migration between the 11 standard statistical regions of GB) were investigated by Hatton and Tani (R25). They conclude that "immigration to a region of foreign nationals generates between a third and two thirds as much out–migration to other regions". They further conclude that this varies across regions – the effect seems to be larger for the southern regions, especially London, the same regions where the inflow of foreign nationals is greatest. The authors interpret their results in terms of British labour market adjustments.

A recently published study by D. Dorling and B. Thomas, based on the 1991 and 2001 censuses, paints a fascinating but very complicated picture of changes in distribution of population, household types, employment, occupation, health, poverty, car ownership and other matters between these two dates (R.26). The information is primarily presented in a series of very detailed maps of the UK.

There has been much talk in recent years of what has been called the north–south divide in England: a poorer north and a wealthier south. Associated with this has been the north to south movement of population already mentioned. The authors of the present report conclude that the north south divide has increased. They identify the dividing line as roughly running from the Severn to the Humber estuaries – it is shown in red on the map on page 187. They conceptualise things in this way. We used to think of the north and south as each consisting of a group of cities, towns, villages and countryside. The divide was to a large extent just a regional one.

Now however, the boundary lies between two places even more dissimilar from each other, a Greater London to the south and the rest. The authors use the term city structure: a dense urban core, suburbs, parks, and a rural fringe. To the south the city structures are converging as a single great metropolis (centering on London), while the north is a "provincial archipelago of city islands". So for example, the old counties of Gloucestershire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Lincolnshire are no longer counties, but rather city limits of London. And the commuter belt of the metropolis extends up to the ends of the M3 and M11, up to Leamington Spa on the M40 and to Chepstow on the M4. Half the population of the UK now lives within the immediate influence of Greater London. "Built–up Greater London now extends as far north as its suburbs of Leicester and Northampton, as far west as its edge suburbs of Bristol and Plymouth. Between these places are green fields, but they are now the parkland of this city. Hardly anyone living near those fields works on the land".

The pattern of population movements is complicated. However, the population of the metropolis has grown, and the population of the UK is slowly moving south. Thinking in terms of population density (number of people living in a district for every hectare in that district), population density has grown nationally. However, as people have moved south, densities have increased most in London and the South East. In contrast, almost all the falls in density in the UK have been outside the South East, with the largest fall being in Manchester in the north.

The economic needs of London drive the whole population and economic system. In the metropolis are found the most qualified people and the fewest with no qualifications. Indeed the centre of the metropolis swarms with university graduates. The metropolis is the financial centre, employs the bulk of managers and is the workplace of preference for professionals.

"Almost no one in the metropolis is sick or disabled in comparison with the archipelago". And "it is in the archipelago islands that people are most likely to need to care for family or friends who are ill", "where most lone parents without work are found, and where the fewest households have two earners". Yet there are fewer doctors and dentists per head in the archipelago than in the metropolis. The employment picture is complicated, but it is the north that has suffered the great upheaval of the decline in coal mining. The number of people working in skilled trades has declined, mainly in the north. Likewise the number of machine operatives have fallen, also mostly in the north.

Finally, we return to the flow of people between the north and the south. We noted at the beginning of this section, that in recent decades, the dominant trend has been a movement from the north to the south. However, in some very recent years, this trend has been reversed, and Champion (R54) gives details in his survey of the north-south flows from 1971 to 2003 to which we now turn.

Champion notes that the net north to south flow dates back at least to the early 1930s and the Great Depression, and the net flow continued in subsequent decades. In recent decades, the process has fluctuated considerably. The biggest net north to south flows occurred in the late 1970s and most of the 1980s. This was followed by a few years(1989 to 1992) where north–south and south–north flows were roughly in balance – i.e. very little net migration either north or south. Then in the 1990s the net flow north to south developed again, although net flows were not as large as they has been in in the 1970s–1980s. Then in 2001–2003 there was a significant reversal of net flows. And the north's net gain in 2003 was a little over 35,000 people.

We return to the subject of changing population distribution in the UK when we look at the distribution of ethnic minority populations in section (h) sub-section 5 later.

g) The ageing of the population and associated problems

People are living longer, and at the same time, the number of children born has declined, so the population in ageing. The proportion of the population aged 65 and over increased from 13 per cent in mid–1971, to 16 per cent in mid–2003. At the same time, during the same period, the proportion of young people, that is the population below the age of 16, has declined from 25 per cent to 20 per cent (R27). And in GB, the number of people aged 90 and over was 380,000 in 2002, more than triple the number in 1971 (R.23).

Curent projections have the number of older people increasing significantly relative to the number of younger people, with the mean age of the population rising from 39.5 years in 2004 to 43.3 years by 2031. Considering the number of children under the age of 16, this is projected to fall by 4 per cent 2004 to 2014, then slowly rise until the late 2020s. As for people of working age (16-64 for men, 16-59 for women), the number is projected to rise by 3.1 percent 2004-2010. Continuing to rise until 2020, the working age population is projected to then remain at the 2020 level (R22).

The ageing of the population is sometimes quantified using the Potential Support Ratio (PSR)(defined earlier in the European section as the ratio of the number of people in the working age groups (15–64) to people who are 65 or over). During the last (20th) century, in the UK, the PSR has fallen considerably. At the beginning of the 20th century it was 13.3. By 1950 it was down to 6.2. By 1995 it was down to 4.1. And projections tell us that under present conditions, the support ratio will fall steadily further for some time to come (R24).

Age pyramids help us to visualize changing population age distribution. In such pyramids, a population is divided into 5–year age groups stacked one above the other, with the youngest age group (0–4 year olds) at the bottom. The essay "the demographic dividend" attached to our Comment and Analysis page provides examples of age pyramids.

Now the ageing of the population has raised concerns about how to provide for the needs of older people. More specifically, how can we maintain or increase the relative size of the working age population – the backbone of economic activity – and hence the support for older people. Various approaches have been considered here. One way that has been much discussed in recent years is to increase immigration flows, because immigrants are more concentrated in the working age groups than the population as a whole, as we will now discuss.

As explained in the European section of this page, besides the potential support ratio, a commonly used ratio for expressing the relative size of the older population groups to the working age groups is the old age dependency ratio (ODR). This, in effect, is the number of older persons expressed as a percentage of the size of the working–age population. A recent study gave estimates of this ratio for the total UK born population (all ethnic groups), the total overseas–born population and various components of the overseas–born population defined in terms of geographical areas (R28). The authors here defined the older population as the pension age population, which is 65 years old and over for men and 60 years and over for women. The ODR for the UK–born population and the total overseas–born population were respectively 30.7 and 23.1 (there were big variations between different immigrant groups but that need not concern us here).

However, we need to be careful not to exaggerate the significance of migration flows to maintaining support for the aged. For immigrants are not very much younger on average than the populations they are moving into – roughly ten years on average (R.29). To bring and keep the support ratio even at its 1995 level of 4.1 would require 59.8 million migrants between 1995 and 2050, on average slightly more than a million a year, rates far in excess of what we have experienced in the past. The overall population would reach 136 million in 2050, so our population would more than double (R27). So maintaining this support ratio is a wholly unrealistic scenario (R27, R25, R30 ). See also our essay "What policy should the UK Government adopt towards immigration?" which is attached to our Comment and Analysis page.

For another brief discussion of the possible rejuvenating effect of ethnic minority immigration see the discussion on p.140 of R31.

Now there is another problem with immigration flows. Immigrants themselves age and join the old age groups so an immigration stream needs to be maintained indefinitely, with obvious consequences in terms of population growth, and therefore carrying capacity, not to mention possible adverse effects on social cohesion.

However, in considering population ageing we need to consider outward as well as inward migration. And the recent study mentioned above (R28) provides useful information. This report focuses on an analysis of the overseas–born UK population.

The report notes that by no means all immigrants stay in the UK. Many repatriate to country of origin or emigrate elsewhere. Overall, as many as 29 per cent of overseas–born immigrants emigrate within two years of arrival, and 46 per cent within five years. This significant amount of return migration coupled with continued immigration means, the authors argue, that the overall overseas–born population ages more slowly than does the UK–born population (remember that immigrants are concentrated in younger age groups). They say that this implies "the currently observed processes of immigration and emigration among UK's overseas–born immigrants will lower the UK's old–age dependency ratio in the long run as well as in the short run". The authors do not however go on to quantify this statement. And although current migration may improve the support ratio, we should not forget the basic fact that average gross immigration into the UK in the last decade has been of the order of three to four hundred thousand per year, whereas the number needed to maintain the earlier high support ratio would be about a million per year as mentioned earlier.

For an earlier discussion of the implications of immigration for the support ratio and government policies in developed (industrial) countries see the papers in the journal Population and Environment volume 22, number 4, March 2001, and R29.

h) Changing size, composition and distribution of the UK ethnic minority population.

There has been a massive increase in the total ethnic minority population in the last half century. Before the 1950s the number of non–whites in the UK was negligible, perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 people (R9).

For GB, here are some estimates of the total ethnic minority population size (in millions) and its size as a percentage of the total population over the period 1951 to 1991 (R39 and R40; see also R33):

It is clear that the total ethnic minority population has grown massively between 1951 and 1991, both in terms of its total size, and in terms of its percentage of the total population.

Turning now to changes in GB during the 1990s, as noted in section (c) earlier, the total GB population grew by 4 per cent in the 1990s. But if population is disaggregated by ethnic group, the report by R. Lupton and A. Power (R7) shows that 73 per cent of this total GB population growth came from the growth of the minority populations.

The most noticeable change was in the Black African population, which, changing from 212 thousand in 1991 to to 485 thousand in 2001, more than doubled its population – an actual percentage increase of a staggering 128.7 per cent. In terms of percentage change, during the same period, the second biggest change was in the Bangladeshi population (73.7 per cent) – an increase from 163 to 283 thousand, followed by the Pakistani population (56.7 percent) – an increase from 477 to 747 thousand. In contrast, the Indian population grew by just 25.2 per cent. But in sharp contrast to all these changes, the White population grew by a mere 1.2 per cent, although being by far the largest population initially, its numerical growth was greatest.

For the UK as a whole, in 2001, 4.64 million people belonged to non–White ethnic groups, which is 7.9 per cent of the total population. Leaving out the Mixed group ethnic categories, the remaining non–White groups comprise 3.96 million, 6.7 per cent of the total population (R13).

In terms of the categories used in the 2001 census, the size of the various minority groups in the UK from the largest to the smallest in 2001 were: Indians, Pakistanis, mixed ethnic backgrounds (four sub-categories), Black Caribbeans, Black Africans, Bangladeshis, Other Asian, Chinese, Other Black. This leaves out a category "any other ethnic groups" which has a size a little smaller than Chinese. In terms of broader categories, comparing Asians (Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and "Other Asian" groups), and Blacks (Black Caribbean, Black African, Black Other), we find the Asian population is over twice the size of the Black population (4.4 per cent of the total UK population compared with 2 per cent). Without the small Chinese group, the Asian percentage becomes 4 per cent. This is a reversal of the relative sizes of the Asian and Black populations of a few decades ago.

On the basis of the Annual Local Area Labour Force Survey, 2001/02 (R41), the percentage sizes of the different ethnic group populations were as follows.

Ethnic minority populations are made up of persons who have been born in the UK together with persons who were foreign-born. As far as the latter component is concerned, Rendall and Salt (2006) give sizes of different groups in 2001 (R 52):

Rendall and Salt note that the total foreign born population of the UK more than doubled between 1951 and 2001 - from 2.1 million to 4.9 million.

Rees and Butt (2004) - see R. 51 and the presentation by P. Rees - gave details for the pace of ethnic change 1981 to 1991 and 1991 to 2001 . Here the ethnic groups are classified into just the following categories: White, Black, South Asian, Chinese and Other

For both periods the percentage change for the White category was zero. But for the other groups, the pace of upward change was great. For the two periods it was (percentages):
Black: 30, 40
South Asian: 44, 41
Chinese and Other: 51, 32

We turn now to the amount of change and average annual growth rate 2001-2004. The information comes from “Population estimates by ethnic group” (PEEG), the work of P. Large and K. Ghosh in what the ONS terms 'experimental statistics': “This means that they have not yet been shown to meet the quality criteria for National Statistics, but are being published to involve users in the development of the methodology and to help build quality at an early stage”. “The acknowledged limitations of the methodology must be borne in mind when interpreting the estimates. In particular, the methodology is based on reliance on 2001 Census data for parameter estimation” (R35). The methodology is detailed in Reference 17. The estimates, for 2001–2003, were originally released in January 2006 and form the basis for Reference 35. Subsequently , after some alteration of methodology, revised estimates (now 2001–2004) were published in August 2006 (R 50, which also has details of the revised methodology).

The table below shows changes mid-2001 to mid-2004 (from data in the EE1 Tables of reference 50). The original 2003 estimates from the January data (R35) are also included to give some indication of the scale of differences between the January and August estimations.

What stands out most from these estimates is that while the White: British decreased massively during the 2001-2004 period, all the other groups increased, in most cases massively, during the same period, except for the small White: Irish group.

Large and Ghosh, commenting on the earlier (January) data that covered just 2001-2003 noted that if all the 15 non-'White British' ethnic groups are lumped together, there was a pronounced difference in amount of change and average annual growth rate between the large White British group on the one hand and the non-'White British' on the other hand. The former had an average annual growth rate of -0.1 percent (minus 0.1 ) over the 2001-03 period, while the figure for the latter was 3.8 per cent. The absolute change for these two groupings were (in thousands): -100 ( minus 100) and 507.

With the revised (August) population estimates, revised average annual growth rate figures were produced. For the whole 2001-2004 period, the figure for the White British group was -0.2% (minus 0.2%). The figure for the non-'White British' was raised from 3.8% to 4.2%.

The growth rates for alll individual groups 2001 to 2004 produced with the revised methodology are given in the following table (source: “Population Estimates by Ethnic Group: 2001 to 2004: Commentary” in reference 50).

There is clearly much variation between ethnic groups. The Chinese or other ethnic group categories stand out as having by far the highest growth rates. Of more interest as far as the future is concerned are changes for the larger ethnic groups. In order of decreasing population size, and leaving out the White: British group, these are Other White; Indian; Pakistani; African; Irish. Here the African group stands out as having the the highest growth rate.

Considering the two causes of population growth, natural increase (excess of births over deaths) and migration, the relative importance of these two causes varied considerably between ethnic goups. With the January based estimates, in the Mixed groups, growth was caused mainly by natural increase. With the Asian groups, growth of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups was primarily caused by natural increase; in contrast, the growth of the Indian and Other groups was primarily caused by net international migration. Within the Black Groups the Black African group had a high growth rate, mainly caused by international migration, while the Black Caribbean group had a low growth rate caused about equally by natural change and international migration (R.35). The August based estimates generally paint the same picture, although with the Mixed: White and Black African group international migration was almost as important as natural increase.

It is interesting to note the significance of asylum seekers for the general picture. As was noted for the January estimates, about half the growth of the Other Asian group was caused by flows of asylum seekers from Iraq and Iran. With the Black African group, more than a third of the growth was caused by asylum seekers from Somalia, Zimbawbe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone.

Finally, we end with a conclusion of Lupton and Power (R7):
“The increase in the numbers of people from different ethnic backgrounds and countries is one of the most significant changes in Britain since the 1991 Census”.

Having examined the growth of ethnic minority populations, we now turn to causes of this growth, beginning with international migration.

Rendall and Ball (R28) studied migration streams in the 1980s and 1990s. They found there was considerable complexity in the composition of migration streams in terms of nation of origin of immigrants, the date of their arrival, and the extent that immigrants remained in the UK. We focus here on short term immigration and nation of origin.

The report shows that short–term immigration is commoner for people from some countries than for others. A rough generalization is expressed by the reports authors in terms of wealth: short term immigration is more associated with higher–income countries than with low–income countries.

Immigrants from the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA have relatively high rates of subsequent emigration, over 50 per cent emigrating again within five years. These are the higher–income countries. In contrast, the corresponding figure for the Indian sub–continent is well under twenty per cent. What the authors of the report do not draw our attention to however, is the long term consequences in terms of changing ethnic composition of our population. For instead of talking in terms of income, we can talk in terms of ethnic groups and re–phrase the authors conclusion: Return migration is commonest with people who originated in countries where White ethnic groups predominate, groups all of which have their cultural roots in Europe. In contrast, migrants from the Indian sub–continent have a greater tendency to stay in the UK, and they belong to non-White ethnic groups. These results have clear implications for the changing relative size in the UK of groups with a European heritage and groups with a non-European heritage.

We now leave aside the distinction between short and long term migration, and look at total migration flows into and from the UK. Two publications (R14, R15) together give us the information for the years 1993-2004. The migrant flows are divided into the categories British and non–British. The non–British are divided into the categories: European Union, Old Commonwealth, New Commonwealth, and Other Foreign (the Old Commonwealth consists of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa; the New Commonwealth includes all other Commonwealth countries, notably the countries of the Indian sub–continent, former British Africa and Caribbean territories). The two tables below give some basic data. The first quantifies the changes with all non–British groups combined together. The second table shows the estimated migration flows of different citizen categories during 2004. The data for the tables comes from table 2.1 in R14 and R15.

A striking feature of the flows estimated is that throughout the period 1993–2004 there has been a net outflow of British, and a net inflow of non–British persons. In terms of the flows of the different non–British categories, note, in the second table, the small outflow compared to the large inflow, of New Commonwealth citizens, which the publications show was characteristic of the whole 1993–2004 period (although the difference between inflow and outflow was not so pronounced in the other years). This ties in with what was said earlier about short–term immigration.
Information for the earlier period of 1981 to 1993 is given by Dobson et al (R56). Usually, in these earlier years, there was also a net outflow of British, and a net inflow of non- British citizens. And yearly outflows of New Commonwealth citizens were always much smaller than inflows. Both inward and outward gross migration have increased in the last two decades (R. 55).

Another publication that gives details of international migration by citizenship, with details of inflows, outflows and net immigration, for the period 1993-2004, is R51.
And finally, the massive net immigration into the UK in 2004, 223,000 to the nearest thousand, was “ the highest since the present method of estimation began in 1991” (R32).

The change in size of the UK population and of individual ethnic groups within that population depends not only on migration but also on natural increase (fertility and mortality) and age structure. Mortality rate is generally low, so the focus in considering natural increase is fertility. And fertility varies between ethnic groups. Age structure is also important: Consider two populations of equal size and equal total fertility rates (TFR). Population A is a relatively young population - the greater part of that population consists of young and working age persons. Population B has a much smaller proportion of people in such groups, and a much bigger proportion of elderly people. Now it is the working age groups that supply the breeding females, so Population A has more of these than population B. There is also a correlation between religion and fertility. We will now consider fertility, age structure and religion in turn.

How then does fertility differ between ethnic groups? Generally speaking, the main minority ethnic groups have had higher fertility than the White population in the past (R.33). A recent (2002) paper by R. Penn and P. Lambert (R34) presents data from an analysis of the 1991 census by Murphy in 1996. Not only do Penn and Lambert conclude that this data shows all the main ethnic minority groups in Britain had higher fertility than the White population, but also that this difference was particularly noticeable with people whose familial origins were in the Indian sub–continent (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi). They go on to find collaborative evidence for these conclusions in a 1997 paper by T. Modood and colleagues.

The main subject of the Penn and Lambert paper is the attitudes of people to ideal family size. The study ran from 1997 to 2000 and involved the collection of information on young people aged 16–25 in Britain, France and Germany, respondents being asked to comment on ideal family size. In Britain, there were clear differences between ethnic/nationality groups. The long–term indigenous population respondents expressed a preference for two or fewer children, Indian and Pakistani respondents expressed “a far stronger preference for more than two children” although looking at the figures suggests this may possibly apply more to the Pakistani group than the Indian. The authors also write “it is generally accepted that attitudes towards ideal family size closely correlate with actual patterns of fertility”.

The more recent publication by Large and Ghosh using the January experimental statistics (R.35) dealing with populations mid-2003 paints a partly different picture They give fertility in terms of Total Period Fertility Rate (TPFR). This is similar to the Total Fertility Rate and the replacement level of the TPFR is 2.1. According to this publication, of the three Indian sub-continent groups, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups have relatively high fertility rates; however the Asian Indian group has a fertility rate lower than that of the the White British (see Fig.4a below). This finding for Indians is surprising in view of the fact that according to Penn and Lambert, as we have already noted, “it is generally accepted that attitudes towards ideal family size closely correlate with actual patterns of fertility”, and these authors report that 56 per cent of Indian respondents gave their preferred number of children as more than two. Now fertility estimates for the year to mid 2004, made using a revised methodology, and kindly supplied to us by P. Large, do decrease the difference in TPFR between the White British and the Asian Indian group by about half:

However, this change does not alter the fact that the estimate for the Asian Indian group is way below that for the other two groups from the Indian subcontinent. So the difference of the conclusion of Penn and Lambert from that of Large and Ghosh largely remains. We are unable to resolve the problem of this difference. As the limitations of the 'experimental statistics' of Large and Ghosh we mentioned in sub-section 2 above, and the methodology of the fertility estimation, are highly technical matters, we will not discuss them here. Rather we put some notes on these matters in the Appendix at the end of this web page.

Three final comments. First, a major cause of the massive increase in fertility rate 2003-2004 (black rectangles in Fig. 4a) with the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups was the improvements in fertility estimation methodology between the January and August estimations (“Population estimates by Ethnic Group: 2001 to 2004: Commentary”, accessed from reference 50).

Second, Large and Ghosh (R 35) write that TPFR changed over the period of study. Referring to earlier work of theirs that used similar methods, they find that there had been an overall rise in TPFR between 2001 and 2003, each ethnic group sharing in this rise.

Third, the reported difference betwen India on the one hand and the other two Indian sub-continent countries is interesting because this separates a predominantly Hindu nation from predominantly Muslim nations. We will see later that religion has an effect on fertility.

Fig. 4. England. Fertility and age composition of ethnic groups

Fig. 4a. Estimated Fertility of Ethnic Groups 2003 and 2004

Colour Key. Original Estimates for 2003: red, green, purple, ochre, blue, grey. Increases for 2004: black

Ethnic group KEY
'ALL': All people 1: White: British 2: White: Irish 3: White: Other White 4: Mixed: White and Black Caribbean 5: Mixed: White and Black African 6: Mixed: White and Asian 7: Mixed: Other Mixed 8: Asian or Asian British: Indian	9: Asian or Asian British: Pakistani 10: Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi 11: Asian or Asian British: Other Asian 12: Black or Black British: Caribbean 13: Black or Black British: African 14: Black or Black British: Other Black 15:Chinese or other Ethnic Group: Chinese 16: Chinese or other Ethnic Group: Other Ethnic Group
The ethnic classification is the one used in the 2001 Census
Fig. 4b. Percentage Age Composition of Ethnic groups 2004

Colour Key. Red: All groups. AGE GROUPS: ochre: 0-15; blue: 16-64/59; grey: 65/60+
Sources for Fig. 4
Fig. 4a. Data sources for the histogram. 2003 estimates: Large, P. and Ghosh, K. (2006). “Estimates of the population by ethnic group for areas within England”. Population Trends 124, ONS. 2004 estimates: Data kindly supplied to us by P. Large
Fig. 4b. The histogram is based on data in “Population estimates by ethnic group 2001-2004” Table “EE2: Estimated resident population by ethnic group, age and sex, mid-2004 (experimental statistics)”. ONS

4b. Age Structure
Turning to age structure (fig.4b above), we look first at the young age groups (0-15 years). What stands out most is the relatively high percentage of the population in these age groups in all the Mixed ethnic groups. All the Asian groups have a higher proportion of their populations in these age groups compared with the White groups, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups a much higher proportion. We note that the Pakistani group has the second largest total population of the non-White groups, much larger than any of the Mixed groups, so its relatively young age structure has obvious implications for the future changes in the ethnic composition of England. Now it is worth noting that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are predominantly Muslim peoples, and we see the significance of religion in the next sub-section.

With the working age groups (16-64/59), there is considerable variation between non-White ethnic groups. However, the the Mixed groups all have a lower percentage than the White: British, while the Black Caribbean, Black African and especially the Chinese: Chinese and the Chinese: Other have a much larger percentage. Of particular interest for future changes in ethnic composition in England are the percentages in what we may term the 'breeding age groups'. For present purposes we will take these to include the 15-19 age group through to and including the 40-44 age group. This grouping is not shown in the above figure. However, examination of Table EE4 for 2004 and just considering females (only females produce offspring!) shows that all of the non-White ethnic groups have a higher proportion than the White: British, usually a much higher proportion.

Considering the older age groups (65/60+), the White: British has the largest percentage of its population in these groups than any other group apart from the White: Irish group. In terms of larger group categories (White, Mixed, Asian, Chinese and other) the Mixed group stands out as having the lowest percentage of its population in this age group.

Finally: “Migrants have a younger age profile than the resident population, around a half of international migrants are aged between 25 and 44” (R19), so they fall within the working and breeding age groups.

4c. Religion
A recent government article (R37) states:
“Families headed by a Muslim are more likely than other families to have children living with them. Nearly three quarters (73 per cent) had at least one dependent child in the family in 2001, compared with two fifths of Jewish (41 per cent) and Christian (40 per cent) families. Muslim families also had the largest number of children. Over a quarter (27 per cent) of Muslim families had three or more dependent children, compared with 14 per cent of Sikh, 8 per cent of Hindu, and 7 per cent of Christian families” (our bold text).

The article goes on the say that while the larger proportion of families with children and larger family sizes partly reflects the younger age structure of the Muslim population (see also R36), it may also reflect the intention of Muslims to have larger families (our bold text). Noting that many Muslims have a Pakistani or Bangladeshi background, the article says that these ethnic groups intend to have on average three children, while the White population intend two.

Now Eric Kaufmann of Birkbeck College, University of London has been studying secularisation in Europe (R38). He notes that religious people tend to have a higher fertility than non-religious people. And in an analysis of data from ten west European countries for the period 1981-2004, Kaufmann found that next to age and marital status, it was a woman's 'religiosity' (it would be better we think to use the less judgemental term 'strength of religious affiliation') that was the strongest predictor of the number of offspring she produced, and he states that many other studies have reached the same conclusion. He also argues that immigrants into Europe tend to be more religious than the host population and he states that several other studies have drawn this conclusion. Moreover, there seems to be little or no decline in 'religiosity' between immigrants and their first and second generation descendants, especially with Muslims.

As far as the native Christian population is concerned, secularisation seems to be levelling out. Turning from the Christian population to the overall religious population, Kaufmann argues that there will be a growing religious population well before 2050. This will be through a virtual cessation of apostasy from religion among those born after 1945, Muslim immigration and retention between generations of their 'religiosity', the fertility difference between secular and religious populations, and finally, females are over–represented among those under 45 who remain religious.

But the effect on ethnic proportions will be an increase in the Muslim proportion of the population in several western countries so that by 2104 non-Whites may form half the population. Austria is one of the few European countries that collect religious data in their censuses, and a recent projection of the Austrian population to 2050 concluded that the Muslim population will increase from 4.6 per cent in 2001 to between 14 and 26 per cent by 2051.

Population Trends. Trends in growth, composition and migration

Global

a) Past World Population Growth

b) The world population in 2006

c) The Demographic transition

The Demographic Transition

Time in years

Births and Deaths per Year and Total Population Size

d) The Second Demographic Transition

e) International migration in recent times

f) The future

Europe

a) Introduction

b) The global context

c) Population size and density

d) Non-national populations in the EU member states

e) Past population growth

f) Net migration into the EU–15 and the EU-25

g) International labour migration

h) The future change in size of the European population

i) The changing age composition of the population

Population Growth and Migration: the United Kingdom

a) Introduction

Fig.1

The growth of the United Kingdom population and the Net International Migration (that is the difference between gross immigration and gross emigration)

b) Key Points

c) Population growth in the past

d) Recent international migration

e) Projections of future population growth and net immigration

f) Changing population distribution within the UK

g) The ageing of the population and associated problems

h) Changing size, composition and distribution of the UK ethnic minority population.

Fig. 4. England. Fertility and age composition of ethnic groups

Fig. 4a. Estimated Fertility of Ethnic Groups 2003 and 2004

Fig. 4b. Percentage Age Composition of Ethnic groups 2004