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ArchiveThe most recent major alterations to the web site other than the addition of news items have been: 9th July 2010. Other Literature page: MigrationWatch. UK (2008). “Balanced Migration”. On this page we will place major items or sections of items removed for whatever reason from other web pages, and items that are to be altered in a major way on other web pages. News page items are archived in a separate section below all other items. To go to this News section click this button:
List of items on this page (other than News items)(y). The UK section of the Population Trends page before that section was updated at the end of April 2010. y). The UK section of the Population Trends page as it was before the revision at the end of April 2010.Population Growth and Migration: the United KingdomThis is the revised version of the United Kingdom section of the page that was posted up 15th August 2009.
The following two graphs and table get to the heart of the matter.
1) IntroductionThe basic source of information here is the Office for National Statistics (ONS). See the Population and Migration section of the web site http://www.statistics.gov.uk The ONS produces press releases, brief summary reports, and more in depth regular publications such as Population Trends, the Series PP2 National Population Projections and the Series MN International Migration. Other important sources of information include the Government Actuary's Department (GAD) http://www.gad.gov.uk/ , the Home Office (HO) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ and Eurostat, European Commission http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ . In the following account, note that some records refer to Great Britain (GB), that is England, Scotland and Wales, others to the United Kingdom (UK), that is Great Britain together with Northern Ireland. Note however, that in terms of total numbers, the vast majority of people in the UK live in GB (see the following section). Note also that ONS sometimes uses mid-year population estimates, sometimes end of year estimates. It is important to bear this in mind. For example, in Population Trends 123 (Spring 2006) and the article there on national population projections, there is a figure 1 which graphs total net migration over a period of years. Later in the same volume there is a table 7 that gives actual data on total net migration. If one plots the data in this table as a graph, the shape of the graph does not coincide exactly with the shape of the graph in figure 1, although the general trend of total net migration is the same. The reason for the discrepancy is that figure 1 uses mid-year population estimates, whilst table 7 uses end of year estimates. Note on the value of published information on population trends including migration. “All aspects of population statistics in the United Kingdom are in an unsatisfactory state. Even the base population remains uncertain. Despite every effort, the last two censuses have turned out to be unsatisfactory. Even the 2001 census, designed to be infallible, has had to be revised twice and its incompatibilities with other sources patched up with statistical Polyfilla. With present systems the degree of error is unknowable but possibly large. Inappropriate questions are asked, and necessary ones ignored. Immigration flow statistics are estimated on small voluntary samples of intended immigration and emigration, of incomplete coverage and high sampling error. Immigrants' destinations around the country are based initially on their stated intentions on arrival, naturally subject to revision. With these systems we cannot know who is in the country, legally or illegally, when they arrived, where they are or if and when they left. The number of illegal immigrants is anyone's guess although the government has given an estimate of about half a million. Internal migration and local population estimates are based on obsolete and often wrong census counts, sample surveys inadequate for local authority use and indirect and partial estimates from changes in doctors' registrations. Current huge migration flows quickly render estimates out of date”. Professor David Coleman (2007) Memorandum to the House of Commons Treasury Committee December 2007. “. ...THE CENSUS OF POPULATION. ----The last 20 years have been turbulent for population estimates for two reasons. First, society has become more mobile, less accessible and less willing to respond to surveys. And increases in international migration have created major problems in the enumeration of cities and in estimating the migration component of the annual roll-forward. Second, ONS made serious errors in census design and execution in 1991 and 2001, and on present plans will repeat the errors in 2011.---- There was a marked increase in non-response in 2001 in all types of area. A record 4 million people (71/2% of the population) were not entered on census forms. Even in the "best" local authorities (the unitary and county LAs with the lowest levels of non-response and together having 10% of the national population) the non-response rate was about 3%, compared with an average rate among all LAs in 1981 of under 1% ”. Mr. Philip Redfern (2007) Memorandum to the House of Commons Treasury Committee November 2007. For those who would like to look further into the accuracy of population estimates in relation to recent censuses, a paper by Ludi Simpson could be consulted (“Fixing the population: from census to population estimate”. Environment and Planning A 2007, volume 39, pp. 1045-1057). For the rest of this account of population trends in the UK, references in the body of the text are given in the form (Rx) and are detailed before the appendix at the end of the account in the references section.
2) Today's population
Illegal immigrant population An Ageing population Population density (all figures population per sq. km). However, Mr. James Clappison, MP, tabled a question on population density in Parliament on the 7th of January 2008. The question was answered by the National Statistician's office on 18th February. The estimates for 2006 were, for the UK, 250 persons per sq km, and for England, 390 per sq km. And the principal projection gave the figure of 464 persons per sq km for England in 2031, a figure greatly exceeding the present population density of the Netherlands.
3) Population growth in the past(3a). The actual growth in numbersSince around the middle of the 18th Century, the population of the UK has grown massively. The population growth rate increased, then it steadied, and later decreased, producing the S shaped curve in the graph below. During this whole period the population went through what is known as the 'demographic transition' — the transition from a largely rural agrarian society with high fertility and mortality rates, to a predominantly urban industrial society with low fertility and mortality rates. The demographic transition is described in the Global section of the current page.
3b). The causes of population growth — natural increase and migration Population growth is generally primarily caused by natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths. But in any particular region, migration will cause population growth when the amount of immigration exceeds the amount of emigration. The following diagram summarises the causal components of population growth
We look first at natural increase. From around the middle of the 18th century to the present time, births have exceeded deaths, and this has been the principal cause of the the massive growth of the UK population. During this period, death rates decreased first, birth rates decreasing much later. Only very recently has net migration become the main cause of population growth, as we will see shortly. The long term decline in yearly deaths has continued in recent times, although at a lower rate. People are living longer, in other words, life expectancy has increased. The situation with births is quite different: yearly births, which had been declining, have shown a marked upswing, increasing each year since 2001(see the table and figure below and R5). Two terms much used by demographers are the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)and the Replacement Fertility Rate(RFR).
We look, second, at migration The most important source of information about international migration is the ONS periodical “International Migration Series MN”. This compiles data from three sources. First, the International Passenger Survey (IPS), a relatively small questionnaire based sample of persons entering and leaving the UK; second the Home Office data on asylum seekers and their dependants; third the Irish Central Statistics Office estimates of migration twixt the UK and the Irish republic. In the UK, trends in international migration have changed greatly over the period 1965 to the present, the country changing from being a country of net emigration to a country of net immigration. This period from 1965 can be divided into three parts (R7):
The following box shows net migration from 1991 to 2007.
Note. The figures for net immigration in the box above entirely ignore illegal immigration, for the simple reason that no accurate figures are available for such immigration (see previous section). We now look more closely at the period 1994 to the present. There is one feature of the 2007 down–turn in net migration that the above box does not show us. If we look at a break down of net migration in terms of British and non–British, we see that as far as the non–British population is concerned, net immigration in fact continued to increase, not decrease. The reason for the down–turn in total net immigration was solely the massive net migration (net emigration) of the British category (we return to this topic in a later section):
The relative importance of natural increase and international migration for UK population growth Over the last 25 years, the contribution of natural increase to population growth, although varying, has been relatively constant. With international migration, the situation has been very different: “Between mid–1981 and mid–1986, the effect of net migration was to reduce the population slightly. This is in sharp contrast to recent years when net migration has been the predominant driver of population change. Between mid–2001 and mid–2006, net migration and other changes accounted for almost two–thirds of the 1.5 million growth in the UK population (not including the impact that net migration had upon the number of births in the UK)” (R3 p.15). We now look at the bracketed bit of the above quotation, for international migration has indeed contributed to population growth not just directly (the net number of immigrants), but indirectly through its influence on the number of births, in two ways. First, immigrants have a younger age profile than the resident population, a larger proportion of the immigrant population belonging to the breeding age groups than that proportion in the resident population. Secondly, some major immigrant groups (first generation immigrants and descendants of earlier immigrants) originating from countries where fertility rates are much higher than the overall UK fertility rate, have a higher fertility rate than the resident population (R3, R 14). Now recently there has been a rise in the number of births in the UK as we mentioned earlier, increasing by 15.4 per cent between 2001 and 2007. And over the same time period the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) rose rapidly from 1.63 children per woman to 1.9 children per women in 2007. So to what extent has immigration been the cause of these changes? Any attempt to answer this question is hampered by lack of concrete statistical evidence – data that directly gives an answer is not available. Reliance has to be placed on some data that is available, from which an answer may be indirectly inferred, namely the estimated population of women of reproductive age by country of birth and the estimated total fertility rates (TFR) of UK born and foreign born women. But here the numbers of persons born in the UK will include second and third generation immigrants (born to earlier migrants). And a further complication arises from the fact that fertility of immigrant groups tends to decline over generations (first to second to third generation)(R5, R15). A recently published study has attempted to analyse the various causes of the recent rises in number of births and of fertility rate in the UK, and assess the contribution of migration to population growth apart from the direct effect. In considering the contribution of UK born and non-UK born mothers to population changes it must of course be remembered that the UK born population is far larger than the non–UK born population. But bearing in mind the importance of this difference to any population changes, between 2001 and 2007, while the number of births to UK born women increased by only 6.4 per cent, the number of births to foreign born women increased by 65.0 per cent. The rise in births to UK born women was primarily caused by rising fertility rates among UK born women (and remember that a small percentage of these women will be of immigrant descent). While the rise in births to foreign born mothers was primarily caused by the increase in the population of women born outside the UK, “particularly at ages where fertility is highest”. The chief conclusion of the study was: 3c). Effects of recent European enlargement. In May 2004 ten countries joined the European Union (EU). These were the so-called 'A8' countries together with Cyprus and Malta. The A8 countries are:
This enlargement of the EU led to massive inflows of immigrants to the UK from the A8 countries, and received considerable attention in the media. For example, the Sunday Times stated in 2006 that the influx from the A8 during the preceding two years had been estimated as 350,000 (Times Online May 14th 2006), and quoted Professor John Salt of University College London as saying “What we are seeing now...is something unprecedented”.
Unfortunately the currently available series MN data stops short at 2007. so this source does not enable us to see how migration flows might have changed since the economic down turn began, an issue to which we now turn. There has been much media attention to the possible effects of the economic downturn on migration twixt the A8 countries and the UK. However, most of this has been anecdotal. And currently clear statistical evidence is limited. A major source of information is the International Passenger Survey Questionnaire (IPS).This survey collects a variety of information from a sample of passengers entering or leaving the UK. However, the sample size relative to total inflows and outflows is very small. Further the Survey suffers from two other defects. First, it excludes some routes between the Irish Republic and the UK, and most asylum seekers and some dependents of same. Second, the estimates are based on respondents initial intentions. Stated intentions are not necessarily the real ones, and also may change after migration. These qualifications aside, the following graph shows the trend of net migration (immigration to the UK minus out-migration (usually to original home country).
These results strongly suggest that net immigration has been significantly reduced during the current economic downturn. Another major source of information is 'Worker Registration Scheme' (WRS) operated by the the Home Office (HO). Workers coming into the country are expected to register with this scheme. Data shows that from May 1st 2004 to the end of June 2006 there were 447,000 applications — a massive number. The Polish contingent was by far the largest national contingent, making up 62% of the applicants (R16). It must be noted that we cannot equate number of applicants to the WRS to the number of immigrants from the A8 countries. In the first place, workers who are self–employed are not required to register with the WRS. Second, “..there may also be other workers from the accession countries who for or one reason or another do not register and are thus also not included in these (WRS) figures” (R16). Is this rather vague statement referring to illegal immigrants? Third, the WRS data “...they give no clue to the duration of stay in the UK...” (R17). Now on the 24th February 2009, the ONS issued a News Release “Latest migration statistics released”. This stated that initial applications to the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) fell in both 2007 and 2008 – Number of applicants: 2006, 235,000; 2007, 218,000; 2008, 165,000. The News Release also stated that “ there have been falls in National Insurance Number (NINo) applications by foreign nationals and in the number of initial applicants from the A8 EU Accession countries We now look at recent published evidence on applicants approved, summarized in the following graph.
We see that the number of approved applicants fell gradually in 2008 and continued to fall in the first quarter of 2009, mirroring in general terms the economic downturn. To understand the long term impact of recent immigration from the A8 countries on UK population growth it is clearly necessary to consider not only the migration to the UK (in–migration) but also any subsequent emigration from the UK (out–migration, principally return migration to country of origin). Now (2009) the UK Government's Department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) has an obvious need for estimates of migration flows twixt the A8 nations and the UK, and it commissioned the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) to examine the impact of the economic downturn on migration. The CLG March preliminary report (R18) and the final NIESR report (R19) show that immigration to the UK from A8 countries has fallen and emigration from the UK has risen during the economic downturn, and ascribes these changes to the economic downturn. As for the future, the extent that the fall in net immigration will continue is likely to depend in part on how other economies perform in relation to the UK. Migration to the UK is likely to decline further owing to decreasing wage differentials and a less attractive exchange rate. The UK Home office has also provided evidence. Before the accession of the ten new EU member that, it estimated that on average 35 per cent of migrants would return home after the first year. But it was later estimated that on average 60 per cent of migrants from the new accession states returned home (R20). Now a new report (5th August 2009) from the Institute for Public Policy research (IPPR) throws further light on return migration. It claims that the number of immigrants who are subsequently emigrating from the UK has and is increasing. And in the year ending September 2008 emigration of citizens of the A8 accession countries back to Europe doubled (R21). We will return to the question of migration flows between the A8 states and Britain later in section 4. The massive media attention to the flows of persons from the A8 countries should not however be allowed to obscure the fact that much larger net inflows in recent years seem to have been from New Commonwealth Countries (Indian sub–continent countries, former British Africa and Caribbean territories (R22). NB. Since this UK section of the Population Trends page was revised and posted up onto the web in the middle of August 2009, The ONS has released more recent estimates of international migration trends at the end of the same month. We have reported on this on our News page in one of the entries dated 27th August. These new estimates confirm the view, expressed above, that accompanying the economic downturn and recession, there have been changes in immigration and emigration trends twixt A8 countries and the UK: Immigration to the UK from the A8 countries was less in 2008 than in 2007, while emigration from the UK of A8 immigrants ('return migration') was far greater in 2008 than it had been in 2007. We now reproduce the News item just mentioned. UK. “Latest migration statistics published”. Main conclusions about international migration trends to and from the UK in the year ending December 2008 compared with the year ending December 2007:
“Latest migration statistics published”. (end of news item)
4) Projections of future population growth and net immigrationA preliminary note on the nature of projections. One can never know exactly how many people there were in the UK in past years. But the population can be estimated. As far as future populations are concerned, it is possible to estimate what the population size will be (or the net migration will be) if we make any particular set of assumptions about natural increase (fertility and mortality) and migration. But one can make many such estimates, since one can make various alternative assumptions. Every second year a set of projections has been made by the Government Actuary's Department, and more recently by the National Statistics Centre for Demography within the Office of National Statistics: the Principal Projection and Variant Projections. The following account is based on the Principal Projection. A note on the variant projections will be found at the end. Strictly speaking, a projection is a set of calculations which show how a population will develop when certain assumptions about the future course of fertility, mortality and migration are made. A forecast, on the other hand, is a projection in which assumptions are chosen which it is thought will yield a realistic picture of the probable future development of the population (R23). However, government will use projections in its planning, so the makers of projections “must accept the responsibility that (the projections) will be used as forecasts” (R24). It is important to realize the limitations of medium term (such as up to say 2030 in the present case), and especially long term, population projections. As one demographer noted in 1981, we can think of useable forecasts for the next five to 20 years, but virtually no information at all on populations 100 years hence (R25). The latest population projections. The following box summarises the latest (2006–based) principal projections for the UK as a whole and England.
The population of the UK is projected to rise from 60.6 million in 2006 to 69.3 million in 2026, an increase of 8.7 million — more than the present population size of London (7.5 million), the most populous UK city. But between 2006 and 2081, the population is projected to rise by 24.7 million — over three times the London population. To what extent will this future population growth be caused by immigration rather than natural increase? Net migration (gross immigration minus gross emigration) will be the main cause of population growth, as it is already, its share actually growing during the projection period. NB. On the 27th August 2009, i.e. after the updated UK section of this page was posted on the web, the ONS released latest data for population growth and fertility (see News item for 27th August on our News page). For the year to mid–2008, natural increase exceeded immigration as a cause of UK population increase – the first time this has occurred since 1999. In the year to mid–2008 it is estimated natural increase caused 54% of the total population increase. Now to examine the effects of migration in more detail. It is assumed that the annual level of net international migration will decrease from the exceptionally high number in 2004, 223,000, to a long term annual number of 190,000, as follows: Despite this decrease in annual numbers, it is important to realize three things:
But international migration will cause the population of the UK to increase even more than the net international immigration figure As explained in section 3b, the two determinants of population increase, natural increase (births minus deaths) and immigration are not independent of each other. And they interact in the 2006–based projections because the number of future births and deaths is influenced by net immigration. The key fact here is that migrants are concentrated at young adult ages, so the assumed level of migration affects the number of women of child bearing ages and hence the future number of births. Considering the period 2006 to 2031, population growth can be ascribed to the components in the following table.
Uncertainties about future migration The above projections conceal very real uncertainties about the future, to which we now turn. Some general considerations The populations of developing countries, many of them poor, are projected to rise collectively by 2.3 billion people by 2050 (R27). Now global warming is forecast to disrupt global food production in many of these countries, and rising sea levels, to submerged vast areas of agricultural land. So the potential for migration to the developed countries will increase. Rising food prices, caused by rising global food shortages, in turn caused by various factors but perhaps, over the long term, most significantly by climate change and continued population growth, are already causing conflict in many countries especially those that lie in the world's equatorial zone — see for example “The new face of hunger” (R28). While some of this migration will be absorbed by other so–called developing countries, there is bound to be an overspill towards the developed world, and so to the European Union and the UK. As immigrant populations in developed countries have grown, migration through arranged marriages has grown as has the inflow of dependants. Employers in developed countries favour labour migration. And growing migrant populations in these countries, the activities of migrant pressure groups, and human rights considerations, may all make it more difficult to restrict immigration flows, rather, they will stimulate the relaxation of immigration controls (R26). Migration to and from the A8 accession states It seems that inflows of persons from the A8 European countries are slowing down. Further, it has been estimated that on average 60 per cent of migrants from the new accession states returned home after the first year, as we mentioned earlier in the previous section. But how will these migration flows change in the future? What are the intentions of immigrants from the new EU accession states on the question of return migration? At the time of arrival, most immigrants are stated to be not intending to stay permanently in the UK. But researchers in a recent study conclude that, “as may be expected, some migrants who initially intended a temporary stay have decided to stay permanently, typically because they are in employment and economically successful in the UK” (R29). A survey on legal job migrations from Poland to Great Britain carried out in a study by the Center for International Relations, Warsaw, Poland (CIR), founds that 51% of respondents in Britain answered that they wanted to return to Poland, while 23% answered that they were not intending to return. But the study cautions that: Four factors will influence the extent of return migration to Poland and other accession countries, and also the continued flow from these countries to the UK: the extent that the economies of these countries improve, competition for skilled workers throughout the EU and indeed the whole of the developed world, low birth rates in the accession countries, and consequently a reduction in the pool of potential migrants and the devaluation of the Pound Sterling: Economic growth in Accession states. A 2007 report from the Centre for Economic and Business Research, London (CEBR) said that the accession member states were experiencing a period of economic growth that is improving wages and living standards. Therefore, the report concludes, there will be less incentive to emigrate to the UK (R32— see also R33). Competition for skilled workers. As for competition between EU member states, another report from the CIR notes: Birth rates. The proportion of the population in the age groups 15–24 is shrinking in the new member states, and it is just these age groups that have been especially involved in migration to Britain. “As a result, the pool of people likely to migrate to the UK is getting smaller and is set to continue to do so in the coming years” (R33). Devaluation of the Pound The UK's currency has significantly weakened against the currencies of the new member states, and this reduces the value of remittances sent to the home countries, thus making the UK a less attractive migration destination (R33). A NOTE ON VARIANT PROJECTIONS We explained at the beginning of this section, that any projection is based on a set of assumptions concerning future fertility, mortality and migration. A variant projection then is variant because it is based on a different set of these assumptions. We can say that these variant projections give us different future scenarios. It is important to realise that variant projections do not, and are not intended to, provide upper and lower limits to future population growth or of the changes in the two components of this growth, namely natural change and migration. Indeed, the actual method used in making the projections are not of the type that allows the production of probability statements or confidence limits that can be produced with many statistical calculations. Details of the variant projections are given in the ONS publication series PP2, National Population Projections, and in less detail in the ONS publication series Population Trends.
5) Recent past projections: net immigration as a driving force underestimatedThe Government Actuary's Department has made a new set of projections every two years (this task has now been taken over by the Office of National Statistics) and in this section we look at recent past projections. Before we do so, however, it is important to note the effect of the 2001 census on population estimates. Projections in the decade before the 2001 census had been based on the previous, 1991, census. These projections each started with the estimated then current population size (called the base population). The 2001 census provided a means to check the estimated then current (2001) population size. The result showed that this had been significantly over–estimated in past projections. The reason stated was that past net migration (balance of gross immigration and gross emigration) had been overestimated. It was initially concluded that this over-estimation of past net migration was caused by an underestimation of past gross emigration. Some revisions have subsequently been made. Census methodology and analysis of results came in for considerable criticism, which we recorded in the version of this page before our 2004 revision of same ( now archived as item (b) on the archive page). Readers might also like to read a recent and comprehensive review of census population estimates by Ludi Simpson of the Cathie Marsh Centre, Manchester University (R45). We now turn to the post 2001 census population estimates, namely the 2002–based and 2004–based projections, and compare these with the 2006–based projection we have already examined. Post 2001 Census population projections. How did the 2002–based projection compare to the pre–census 2000–based projection? Not surprisingly in view of what we have just noted about the 2001 census, the 2002–based projection for early years was lower than those of the pre–census projection. For example, for the year 2006 we have (thousands) 2000–based: 60,946; 2002–based: 59,995. When we look at the two later projections (2004–based and 2006–based), we find that each increases population growth above the previous projection: With the 2004–based projection, the main reason for the increase was increase in assumptions about future migration, although in the long term a reduction in mortality assumptions becomes increasingly important. With the new 2006–based projection, the increase is ascribed (in order of decreasing significance) to more births, more migrants and fewer deaths. Finally, we would like to draw attention to one feature of projections we have not so far dealt with. In projections made in the 1990s before the 1996–based set, it was assumed that net international migration would tail off to zero in the long term. But starting with the 1996–based projections, this assumption has been dropped and replaced by the assumption that net international immigration would after a few years level off to a constant level in later years. This level is currently set at 190,000 per year, a little under the estimated net flow for 2006 (191 thousand). What are the reasons given by ONS for this constant level assumption? These appears to be merely that it is extremely difficult to predict changes in migration more than a few years ahead and that this assumption is normally made internationally ( for example, R33 page 19 left. See also ONS(1999) National Population Projections PP2 no. 21 1996-based national population projections). These seem to us to be rather weak reasons. First, ONS makes projections for several decades later, so why not several decades for migration? If one has to choose a long term level, would it not be better to use the long term upward trend for guidance, rather than assuming net migration will soon settle to a constant annual level? Second, just because this assumption is normally made internationally, does not mean that the assumption is correct, or that UK circumstances are similar to circumstances in other countries. We wish to emphasise that the 'push' and 'pull' factors for emigration from developing countries and conflict torn countries to developed countries that have been in operation for a long time, now aggravated by increasing wealth disparities between developed and developing countries and continued massive population growth in developing countries where levels of real poverty remain high, combined with government inability to control illegal immigration, let alone get a decent estimate of the extent of same, would suggest that net international migration may continue to increase for some years to come in the absence of government adopting firm immigration reduction measures (unlikely, we think).
6). Population growth and migration in terms of nation of origin and ethnicityIt would be nice if there were available reliable and up–to–date statistics on birth, death, and migration trends in all ethnic groups over the last 50 years in the UK and constituent countries — there should be and could have been —but they are not. Nevertheless, the data that is available enables us to get a general picture of the present situation and how it has developed over the years 6a). Today's population The following histogram shows the estimated sizes of ethnic groups in England in 2007, using the 2001 census classification of ethnic groups.
We see then that, in decreasing size order, the largest minority groups are Other White, Indian, Pakistani, African, followed closely by Irish and Caribbean. 6b). Population growth of ethnic groups in the past Great Britain Since the second world war the transformation of the ethnic composition began with major influxes of people: first came West Indians (1950s), then Indians, then Pakistanis (1960s) later still people from Bangladesh. With the African population, communities were established in seaports in the late 1940s onwards, but substantial inflows came later partly resulting from political instability in Africa in the 1970s (R15, R35). It continued through further immigration, and the high fertility of some ethnic groups that we explore in sub–section 8c below. The consequence has been that “because of high fertility and continued immigration, New Commonwealth minority populations have increased rapidly from negligible numbers in 1945 to about 2.5 million in 1987... This represents an annual growth rate of about 5.2 per cent from 1971 to 1987” (R34 p. 501). If we consider just the 1990s, the total population grew by 4 per cent. England. We first look at look at results from the work of P. Rees and colleague R37, R38). Here are some major conclusions from this work:
We now look at results from the 'experimental statistics' of the ONS. The following table tabulates basic data.
There is just one caveat about the above conclusions, and that concerns the White: Irish group, for there is considerable doubt about its size in 2001 (R35). What is clear from the evidence given in this sub–section 6b, is that after many centuries during which the population was almost entirely White, and mainly White: British, a sudden and massive transformation of society is underway through the growth of ethnic minority populations. To what extent is recent population growth due to natural increase and to what extent is it due to migration?
Not surprisingly in view of the evidence presented above, the White: British group population is seen as declining through emigration. The two graphs illustrate the difference between this group and ethnic minority groups. It is also not surprising that with the Mixed group, growth was mainly caused by natural growth, because most mixing between whites and others occurred in England, not in other countries prior to emigration to England. What is most interesting is the fact that with each of the three minority groups listed, Asian, Black, and Chinese and Other, net migration has been the principle cause of population growth. 6c. Fertility of ethnic groups We give below estimates for England of total fertility rates 2003–2004 from the so-called 'experimental statistics' of the ONS (see the appendix to this page for details of the method). A word first about the black rectangles on the top of the columns. These increases in fertility rate derive from improvements in fertility estimation methodology (“Population estimates by Ethnic Group: 2001 to 2004: Commentary”, accessed from R39). We see that the fertility rates of all three white groups are way below the replacement level of roughly 2.1. The ethnic minority fertility rates vary considerably. Some have a fertility rate below replacement level, like the white groups. The lowest rate is for the Chinese group. Some have a fertility rate above replacement level, sometimes greatly in excess of that level. The highest rate was for the Pakistani group, closely followed by the Bangladeshi group. The Indian group is estimated to have a below replacement fertility level, although an earlier study suggested that this group had a fertility rate a little above replacement level (40). This same earlier study also reported on attitudes to family size. The family size preferences of Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups were higher than the preferred family size of the long-term indigenous population (which were mainly the White: British group).
Now the same authors, using the same methodology as used for 2003 above, published fertility estimates for 2001 (R41). 6d). Age composition of ethnic group populations.
Turning to age structure in 2004 (the histogram above) we look first at the young age groups (0–15 years). What stands out most is the relatively high percentage of the population in these age groups in all the Mixed ethnic groups. All the Asian groups have a higher proportion of their populations in these age groups compared with the White groups, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups a much higher proportion. We note that the Pakistani group has the second largest total population of the non-White groups, much larger than any of the Mixed groups, so its relatively young age structure has obvious implications for the future changes in the ethnic composition of England. Now it is worth noting that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are predominantly Muslim peoples, and we see the significance of religion in the next sub-section. With the working age groups (16-64/59), there is considerable variation between non–White ethnic groups. However, the the Mixed groups all have a lower percentage than the White: British, while the Black Caribbean, Black African and especially the Chinese: Chinese and the Chinese: Other have a much larger percentage. Of particular interest for future changes in ethnic composition in England are the percentages in what we may term the 'breeding age groups'. For present purposes we will take these to include the 15–19 age group through to and including the 40–44 age group (table above for mid–2004). Just considering females (only females produce offspring!) we see that apart from the White: Irish group, all the other ethnic groups have a higher proportion than the White: British, usually a much higher proportion. Considering the older age groups (65/60+), the White: British has the largest percentage of its population in these groups than any other group apart from the White: Irish group. In terms of larger group categories (White, Mixed, Asian, Chinese and other) the Mixed group stands out as having the lowest percentage of its population in this age group. A good way to conceptualize the variation of age structure between populations is to construct what are termed 'age pyramids'. We would prefer the term age profiles since the shapes of some 'pyramids' are decidedly not what one expects of a pyramid! The following diagram shows variation in age profiles. The vertical axis shows age and the horizontal axis shows the proportion of the population that is in each age category. Colour key for the age groups. Green: Pre–working age groups. Orange: working age groups. Grey: post–working age groups. Notice the left-right (make–female) profile asymmetry. This is because women tend to live longer than men.
Actual age profiles of different ethnic groups have been prepared, apart from the 'mixed' and 'other' groups, whose populations are very heterogeneous (R33). Finally, what about the profiles of immigrant groups, that is, the first generation of the immigrants in Britain? Well: “Migrants have a younger age profile than the resident population, around a half of international migrants are aged between 25 and 44” (R7), so they fall within the working and breeding age groups. And the Home Office report on workers from the 10 countries that joined the EU since May 2004 states that the majority are young, between the ages of 18 and 34. But 94% of these workers stated that they had no dependants living with them (R42). 6e). Religion A government article (R43) states: The article goes on the say that while the larger proportion of families with children and larger family sizes partly reflects the younger age structure of the Muslim population (see also R44), it may also reflect the intention of Muslims to have larger families (our bold text). Noting that many Muslims have a Pakistani or Bangladeshi background, the article says that these ethnic groups intend to have on average three children, while the White population intend two. The 2006 ONS report “Focus on Ethnicity and Religion”, reiterates the idea that Muslims tend to have larger families, but it takes the analysis a step further. It notes that differences between religious groups are highly correlated with ethnicity. However, ethnicity does not explain fully the differences between religious groups. “Religion can exert a strong influence, sometimes being more important than ethnic group in determining household characteristics. For example, in all ethnic groups, Muslims tended to have larger average household sizes and a greater number of dependent children” (our bold text) (R43). Now Eric Kaufmann of Birkbeck College, University of London has been studying secularisation in Europe (R46, R47 and personal communication). He notes that religious people tend to have a higher fertility than non-religious people, “consistently choose to have more children, regardless of education, income, nation, denomination or generation”. And in an analysis of data from ten west European countries for the period 1981–2004, Kaufmann found that next to age and marital status, it was a woman's 'religiosity' (it would be better we think to use the less judgemental term 'strength of religious affiliation') that was the strongest predictor of the number of offspring she produced, and he states that many other studies have reached the same conclusion. He also argues that immigrants into Europe tend to be more religious than the host population and he states that several other studies have drawn this conclusion. Moreover, there seems to be little or no decline in 'religiosity' between immigrants and their first and second generation descendants, especially with Muslims. As far as the native Christian population is concerned, secularisation seems to be levelling out. Turning from the Christian population to the overall religious population, Kaufmann argues that there will be a growing religious population well before 2050. This will be through a virtual cessation of apostasy from religion among those born after 1945, Muslim immigration and retention between generations of their 'religiosity', the fertility difference between secular and religious populations, and finally, females are over–represented among those under 45 who remain religious. 6f). Past international migration of ethnic groups Introduction “Modest migration has always been a feature of Great Britain, but much of the ethnic and religious diversity of the current population is a result of large scale migration from the 1950s onwards. Early immigration waves included economic migrants from Ireland, the Caribbean and India, followed by migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh, their wives and dependants. Since the 1980s migration from Africa and China has increased and has included students and asylum–seekers, as well as economic migrants” (R35 page 20). Migrants from Ireland have been coming to Britain for a long time, but this immigration increased in the 1930s to 1961, then increased again in the 1980s onwards. Inflows (gross immigration) Available data allows us to classify immigrants in a variety of ways, each giving us insight into the ethnic composition of immigration flows. One way that is very relevant to current concerns about cultural change is to divide immigrants into those from European nations (i.e. countries with a relatively similar cultural heritage) and non-European nations (that usually have a cultural heritage very different from the European). With this classification, and around the year 2000, nearly 66 per cent of immigrants to Britain were from non-European countries. This, bearing in mind the large size of immigrant flows, presages massive cultural change . Britain is not alone in Europe in experiencing this large inflow of non-Europeans. With the Netherlands it was 62 per cent, and with France, 59 per cent (R49). Some data is now available for a sub–division of the European: non–European level classification, i.e. to the country of origin level. This data was obtained in the UK parliament by Mr. James Clappison MP (question tabled 7th January 2008, answered from the Office of the National Statistician 18th February 2008). Parliamentary questions and answers may be viewed by going to the Parliament web site (http://www.parliament.uk/) then browsing in Hansard). The data was only from the main source of information on immigration, the International Passenger Survey, so does not include some categories of immigrants such as asylum seekers. Nevertheless, it suggests the general way that national immigration flows have been changing over the years. Here we give information about the countries that contributed the most immigrants in each 2 year period.
What stands out most from the trends across the whole period is the change from the situation where most immigrants came from countries with predominantly a white population, to the situation where there is a very significant contribution from countries that have a predominantly non-white population, certain Asian countries. Also noteworthy at this stage is the new entry into the upper reaches of the top ten in the final two year period — Poland: The Times Online May 14th 2006 article we mentioned earlier quoted Professor David Coleman of Oxford University as saying “From one country in a very short space of time, it must be the largest influx we have ever seen” and quoted Professor John Salt of University College London as saying “What we are seeing now...is something unprecedented”. Duration of stay of immigrants. Do they usually stay permanently? Rendall and Ball (R50) studied migration streams in the 1980s and 1990s. They found there was considerable complexity not only in the composition of migration streams in terms of nation of origin of immigrants and the date of their arrival, but also in the extent that immigrants remained in the UK. We focus here on short term immigration and nation of origin. The report shows that short–term immigration is commoner for people from some countries than for others. A rough generalization is expressed by the reports authors in terms of wealth: short term immigration is more associated with higher–income countries than with low–income countries. Immigrants from the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA have relatively high rates of subsequent emigration, over 50 per cent emigrating again within five years. These are the higher–income countries. In contrast, lower–income countries have a lower rate of subsequent emigration, well under twenty per cent for the Indian sub–continent. Rendall and Salt (R51) confirm the general difference between higher and lower–income countries. What Rendall and Ball's report does not draw our attention to however, is the long term consequences in terms of changing ethnic composition of our population. For instead of talking in terms of income, we can talk in terms of ethnic groups and re–phrase the authors conclusion: Return migration is commonest with people who originated in countries where White ethnic groups predominate, groups all of which have their cultural roots in Europe. In contrast, migrants from the Indian sub–continent have a greater tendency to stay in the UK, and they belong to non-White ethnic groups. These results have clear implications for the changing relative size in the UK of groups with a European heritage and groups with a non-European heritage. Now it seems as if migration between the UK and Poland is coming to conform to this generalisation (see Section 4 for changes taking place). Now duration of stay of immigrants affects the age structure of the foreign-born population, affects the old–age dependency ratio, that is the the ratio of people of pensionable age to people of working age. Immigrants are usually relatively young when they arrive. So a consequence of shorter length of stay is the greater youth of the foreign born population. “To have an older immigrant population requires both that immigrants settle and that they arrived a relatively long time ago” . The lowest old–age dependency ratios occur with groups characterised with shorter patterns of stay (Oceania and to a lesser extent North America), and groups where immigration has been more recent (most notably Africa but also the Far East).This relationship between duration of stay and the degree of youthfullness of the foreign born population is clearly relevant to fertility differences between ethnic groups (R51). Now duration of stay affects total net migration, to which we now turn. Net migration An insight into net migration comes from information on the populations of foreign born members of the population, for these populations are likely to be the principal cause of the volume of net migration. Here is information for Great Britain around AD 2000.
What stands out most is the very large population of Asian persons, and the nearly as large population of members of the EU15. Finally, information on births to mothers who were born outside the UK gives another insight into immigrant flows. In 2006, 22 per cent of all births in England and Wales were to mothers born outside the UK. This is the highest proportion since registration of parents' country of birth at birth registration was introduced in 1969. Further, from 1969 to around 1990, the annual percentage was always roughly around 13 per cent. But about 1990 an upward trend developed. So the high value in 2006 has been reached in less than 20 years (R52). Data is available to allow a comparison of migration trends of British versus non-British persons, a comparison we also looked into earlier (section 3b) where we saw that net migration since 2001 has two contrasting components the British and non-British. Now in the following we extend the time period backwards to 1993.
There has been a net outflow of British citizens, and a net inflow of non-British citizens throughout the period from 1993 onwards. But there has been a net gain of population through migration throughout this period (except for 1993). The flows of both groups have generally been substantial. Further, the flows show trends - increasing net immigration of non-British and increasing net emigration of British citizens. Actually the net inflow of non-British and net outflow of British citizens did not begin in the early 1990s. There was in fact a net inflow of non-British citizens in every year from 1981 onwards. With British citizens there was a net outflow in every year in the 1980s except for 1985 (R53). In both 1991 and 1992 there were net outflows of British and net inflows of non-British (TIM tables). So the net outflow of British and the net inflow of non-British citizens has been a feature of UK population change for a long time. All this suggests that in terms of actual ethnic groups (as defined for the census), there has been a massive net outflow from the largest ethnic category, namely the White: British and a large net inflow of ethnic minority persons, but the data just reviewed does not allow us to go further in terms of ethnicity So we turn now to a standard official classification of citizenship used in migration statistics: British, European Union (recently also divided into EU 15 and EUA8), Old Commonwealth, New Commonwealth and 'Other Foreign'. The following graphs summarise the situation for main categories for 2004, 2005, and 2006 (the latest year for which figures are available). As an illustration of the figures used we give the data for 2006 below the graphs.
Note how the shape of the New Commonwealth graph differs from all the other graphs. In contrast to the other groups, relatively few persons left the UK, so that the balance, i.e. the net migration, is similar in size to the net immigration. This suggests that most New Commonwealth immigrants more generally stay permanently in the UK which is consistent with what we found in the previous sub-section. Since we published these graphs in our revision of the UK section of this page in the middle of last year, data has become available in TIM tables for 2007. This data confirms the shape differences between the different categories, and in particular, the distinctive shape of the New Commonwealth graph. We also note that a new report (5th August 2009) by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) draws a conclusion that adds further support to our conclusion about New Commonwealth migrants. The report states that while migrants from more developed countries tend to stay for shorter periods, migrants from poorer countries tend to stay for longer periods or settle permanently (R21). Finally, we now have an estimate of net migration of foreign groups over the last one and a half decades:
This figure comes from House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008) “The economic impact of immigration. Volume 1: Report” HL Paper 82–1 . Now In the media, including the BBC, in recent times, all the emphasis has been on the massive immigration from A8 countries, especially from Poland , since the recent EU enlargement. Rarely, if ever in some media, is the size of the 'Other' and New Commonwealth (NC) categories immigration mentioned. But we see from the above table that the net inflows of both 'Other' and NC migrants greatly exceeds the net inflows of the A8 countries. What is more, the net inflow of the NC group has increased in recent years. In one sense the numerical disparity of net immigration between the A8 and the New Commonwealth groups of nations should come as no surprise, when we recall that there has been a massive outflow again of Polish immigrants to Britain (section 3c) and it is people from poor countries who, having come to Britain, tend to stay here (section 6f). 6g). Relationship between variation of fertility between ethnic groups and total fertility change in the UKSome estimates are available on the fertility rates of residents by country of birth of mother for England and Wales:
Country of birth does not correspond to ethnicity. The 'rest of the world' is a very mixed bag, ethnically speaking. And the UK born will include minority groups as well as the White: British group, although the vast majority of persons will belong to the White: British group. The other groups are ethnically more homogeneous. And the proportion of White: British in these other groups will be small or very small. What stands out most from the above table and graph is that with the exception of the East African group, all the outside of UK groups have fertility rates higher than the group of mothers born in the UK, the Pakistan and Bangladesh born groups having by far the highest fertilities. And we saw (section 6c) that considering the whole ethnic group populations in England and Wales, as distinct from country of birth populations, it is the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups that have the highest fertilities of all ethnic groups. One might expect some correlation between these fertility differences in England and Wales, and the fertilities differences between countries of origin. If we look at fertility in countries of origin (table below), and consider India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the fertility rates in those countries in the period 2000 to 2005 were, respectively, 3.11, 3.99 and 3.22. All these rates are well above replacement level, and well above the rates of the corresponding total populations in England and Wales. But the order of these country of origin estimates is the same as the order of fertility rates in the above table, and the order of fertility rates in the total England and Wales populations, that is, India lowest, Bangladesh intermediate, and Pakistan highest. Another point. The differences between country of origin fertilities and total UK group population fertilities are consistent with the hypothesis that the fertility rates of immigrant populations that have a much higher fertility than the host population, will gradually over generations decrease to that of the host population. Finally, it is interesting that with the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, the fertility rates of the foreign born populations are much higher than the fertility rates in country of origin. Have conditions in England and Wales promoted an increase in fertility? Or is it that immigrants from these two countries are relatively young compared with country of origin total populations?
In an earlier section (3b) we noted that the total UK fertility rate has risen sharply in recent years. So the question arises, to what extent may this be caused by higher fertility of some ethnic groups . We now add the following information about changes in fertility rate (R3):
Now it was concluded that international migration has impacted on the number of births in the UK in recent years. And “although it does not on its own explain the rise in the TFR for the UK over the past five years, analysis suggests that it has indeed contributed to this rise. The higher average fertility of women born overseas, especially in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, is of particular relevance when considered alongside the relatively young adult age structure of the UK population of Asian ethnic origin” ( R3). The Press release on this publication (11th December 2007) stated the overall conclusion of the work quite simply as “Both UK born and non-UK born women have contributed to the consistent rise in fertility rates in the UK between 2001 and 2006” (a similar statement in the following 21st August Press release). Finally, remembering the massive immigration of people from Poland in recent times, we note that the Daily Mail newspaper, 2nd December 2006, was suggesting that the birth rate of Polish immigrants was greater than in many cities in Poland (in general in Poland the fertility rate is well below replacement level). The fertility trends discussed in this sub-section are obviously relevant to any attempt to forecast or to project the future growth of ethnic minority populations in the UK, to which we now turn. 6h). Projections of future population growth of ethnic minority populationsThe information given so far in section 6 provides clear indications about how the size and composition of the ethnic minority population of the UK is likely to change in the future. Some salient facts are:
We now give details of two recent projections of the size and composition of the ethnic minority population. The first looks at the period 2001–2051, the second at the shorter period 2001–2020.
Doubts about how things will change in the future. We think that the two issues over which there is serious doubt about how things will change in the future are fertility rate change and the extent of net immigration. Changes in fertility rate. As far as religion is concerned, we noted in section 6e above how Eric Kaufmann found that next to age and marital status, it was a woman's 'religiosity' that was the strongest predictor of the number of offspring she produced, and immigrants into Europe tend to be more religious than the host population. Moreover, there seems to be little or no decline in 'religiosity' between immigrants and their first and second generation descendants, especially with Muslims. In a recent study he found evidence that religious population growth is outpacing religious apostasy in Europe. “Meanwhile, religious women continue to maintain a 10–15 percent fertility advantage over nonreligious women (even with controls for age, class, education and income). With secularism stalled, religious demography takes over – even in the west European heartland, and our projections suggest that these countries will be more religious in 2100 than they are today”. However, any suggested trajectories of religious observance, fertility and the relationship between these variables are not set in stone; there remain considerable uncertainties as to how things will develop in future (R47). Then we have the possibility of population competition between ethnic groups, and more specifically, competitive breeding - the situation where, unconsciously or consciously, an ethnic group promotes its own breeding. Parsons in his monumental book on population competition (R56 page 281) gave an example from the former Yugoslavia based on work by Kapor-Stanulovic): Now there is no doubt that amongst Muslim groups in the UK there are sizeable numbers of activists who see their mission to be that of jihad, of conquering the country for Islam (jihad in its 'external' aspect rather than the 'internal' aspect, the daily inner struggle to be a better person). And there can equally be no doubt that many Muslims have felt threatened by or discriminated against not only by Whites but by non-Muslim ethnic minority groups. This is just the sort of situation where competitive breeding might develop. And we note that Coleman and Salt (R34 page 513) wrote: “ Where minorities feel threatened by absorption or assimilation, a 'minority effect' may make acceptance of family planning difficult and retard convergence in fertility”. And in his 2006 paper we have referred to earlier, he writes: “Increased inflows of unacculturated populations may conserve or even drive up fertility rates, as among African populations in Sweden and Britain” (R49 page 410). Net Immigration 'Push and Pull' factors (previously discussed in section 4). Government control of borders. Further enlargement of the European Union. If Turkey joins the EU, which even our Head of State seems to support, we are likely to see a significant increase of movement of people between the UK and Turkey. To what extent this will turn out to be net immigration to the UK is difficult to predict. It will partly at least depend on the relative strength of the economies of the two countries when and if Turkey joins the EU. Conclusion Finally, it is worth noting a general point about immigration and fertility rates that Professor David Coleman drew attention to, and which we can apply to the ethnic minority populations of the UK:
7) The ageing of the population and associated problemsPeople are living longer, and at the same time, the number of children born has declined, so the population in ageing. One might expect these changes would greatly increase the old–age dependency ratio. In fact it only increased slightly over this time period. The reason was that there was an increase in the working–age population (caused by the 1960s 'baby boomers' joining the working–age population from the late 70s onwards). But another important index is the ageing index, that is, the ratio of older persons to children. This rose greatly from 1971 to 2006: 64.0 to 97.8 (R9). Two other ratios concern the old age population compared with the working age population. The Potential Support Ratio (PSR)(defined earlier in the European section as the ratio of the number of people in the working age groups (15–64) to the number of people who are 65 or over). During the last (20th) century, in the UK, the PSR has fallen considerably. At the beginning of the 20th century it was 13.3. By 1950 it was down to 6.2. By 1995 it was down to 4.1. And projections tell us that under present conditions, the support ratio will fall steadily further for some time to come (R59). The old age dependency ratio (ODR). This, in effect, is the number of older persons expressed as a percentage of the size of the working–age population. A recent study gave estimates of this ratio for the total UK born population (all ethnic groups), the total overseas–born population and various components of the overseas–born population defined in terms of geographical areas (R50). The authors here defined the older population as the pension age population, which is 65 years old and over for men and 60 years and over for women. The ODR for the UK–born population and the total overseas–born population in 2001 were respectively 30.7 and 23.1 (there were big variations between different immigrant groups but that need not concern us here). Current projections with revised population estimates (the 2006-based projections) have the ODR (UK) changing from 30.1 in 2006 to 34.4 in 2031 , 36.9 in 2061 and 39.6 in 2081 (R60). Now the ageing of the population has raised concerns about how to provide for the needs of older people. So the question was raised — can we maintain or increase the relative size of the working age population – the backbone of economic activity – and hence the support for older people. One way that has been much discussed in recent years is to maintain or increase immigration flows, because immigrants are more concentrated in the working age groups than the population as a whole. However, we need to be careful not to exaggerate the significance of migration flows to maintaining support for the aged. For immigrants are not very much younger on average than the populations they are moving into – roughly ten years on average (R.57). Furthermore, immigrants themselves age, adding to the problem of an increased old-age population. In fact to keep the potential support ratio even at the 2000 level level would require an unimaginably large number of immigrants. The UN estimated this as 524 million ( or 13 million a year) — far far larger annual levels of net migration than has ever been experienced in recent times or the more distant past (R59, R57, R61). See also our essay “What policy should the UK Government adopt towards immigration?” which is attached to our Comment and Analysis page.
8) The changing population distribution within the UK8a. The population ignoring ethnic classification A useful introduction to changing population distribution is provided by the report of Champion et al (1998) on migration flows in England (R62). Perhaps the most significant phenomenon in the last half century has been what is termed the ‘counter-urbanisation cascade', the movement of people from inner cities to suburbs, large cities to small towns, urban areas to rural areas. This must be understood in terms of ‘push' and ‘pull' factors. Push factors include high population density, noise, high crime rates, lack of open green spaces, etc . Pull factors are the reverse of the push factors – low population density, plenty of green space, peace and quiet, perceived lower crime rates. More generally there has been a response to a ‘rural idyll', an idealization of the rural way of life. Another important trend has been the migration of people from the north to the south of Britain, although the magnitude of this trend has fluctuated over the years. Of all regions in England, the South East Region with Greater London has seen the highest level of both in and out migration, but with a net outflow. Net international immigration has come to make a very significant contribution to migration flows. It seems to have been “highly focused on the inner areas of London, and a relatively small number of other places that in turn are losing population to other areas through internal migration”. The report concludes that the various population movements in England are all linked together: “There is clear research evidence of the various population movements being linked together to form a single national urban system, notably in the form of London's pivotal role and in terms of the counter–urbanisation cascade. This is a system in which international migration appears to be playing an increasingly crucial role”. The inter–relationships of international migration and inter–regional migration (migration between the 11 standard statistical regions of GB) were investigated by Hatton and Tani (R63). They conclude that “immigration to a region of foreign nationals generates between a third and two thirds as much out–migration to other regions”. They further conclude that this varies across regions – the effect seems to be larger for the southern regions, especially London, the same regions where the inflow of foreign nationals is greatest. The authors interpret their results in terms of British labour market adjustments. A recently published study by Dorling and Thomas, based on the 1991 and 2001 censuses, paints a fascinating but very complicated picture of changes in distribution of population, household types, employment, occupation, health, poverty, car ownership and other matters between these two dates (R64). The information is primarily presented in a series of very detailed maps of the UK. There has been much talk in recent years of what has been called the north–south divide in England: a poorer north and a wealthier south. Associated with this has been the north to south movement of population already mentioned. The authors of the present report conclude that the north south divide has increased. They identify the dividing line as roughly running from the Severn to the Humber estuaries – it is shown in red on the map on page 187. They conceptualise things in this way. We used to think of the north and south as each consisting of a group of cities, towns, villages and countryside. The divide was to a large extent just a regional one. Now however, the boundary lies between two places even more dissimilar from each other, a Greater London to the south and the rest. The authors use the term city structure: a dense urban core, suburbs, parks, and a rural fringe. To the south the city structures are converging as a single great metropolis (centering on London), while the north is a “provincial archipelago of city islands”. So for example, the old counties of Gloucestershire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Lincolnshire are no longer counties, but rather city limits of London. And the commuter belt of the metropolis extends up to the ends of the M3 and M11, up to Leamington Spa on the M40 and to Chepstow on the M4. Half the population of the UK now lives within the immediate influence of Greater London. “Built–up Greater London now extends as far north as its suburbs of Leicester and Northampton, as far west as its edge suburbs of Bristol and Plymouth. Between these places are green fields, but they are now the parkland of this city. Hardly anyone living near those fields works on the land”. The pattern of population movements is complicated. However, the population of the metropolis has grown, and the population of the UK is slowly moving south. Thinking in terms of population density (number of people living in a district for every hectare in that district), population density has grown nationally. However, as people have moved south, densities have increased most in London and the South East. In contrast, almost all the falls in density in the UK have been outside the South East, with the largest fall being in Manchester in the north. The economic needs of London drive the whole population and economic system. In the metropolis are found the most qualified people and the fewest with no qualifications. Indeed the centre of the metropolis swarms with university graduates. The metropolis is the financial centre, employs the bulk of managers and is the workplace of preference for professionals. “Almost no one in the metropolis is sick or disabled in comparison with the archipelago”. And “it is in the archipelago islands that people are most likely to need to care for family or friends who are ill”, “where most lone parents without work are found, and where the fewest households have two earners”. Yet there are fewer doctors and dentists per head in the archipelago than in the metropolis. The employment picture is complicated, but it is the north that has suffered the great upheaval with the decline in coal mining. The number of people working in skilled trades has declined, mainly in the north. Likewise the number of machine operatives have fallen, also mostly in the north. We return to the flow of people between the north and the south. We noted at the beginning of this section, that in recent decades, the dominant trend has been a movement from the north to the south. However, in some very recent years, this trend has been reversed, and Champion (R65) gives details in his survey of the north-south flows from 1971 to 2003 to which we now turn. Champion notes that the net north to south flow dates back at least to the early 1930s and the Great Depression, and the net flow continued in subsequent decades. In recent decades, the process has fluctuated considerably. The biggest net north to south flows occurred in the late 1970s and most of the 1980s. This was followed by a few years(1989 to 1992) where north–south and south–north flows were roughly in balance – i.e. very little net migration either north or south. Then in the 1990s the net flow north to south developed again, although net flows were not as large as they has been in in the 1970s–1980s. Then in 2001–2003 there was a significant reversal of net flows. And the north's net gain in 2003 was a little over 35,000 people. Finally, a recent study of internal migration in the UK by Dennett and Stillwell looks at population stability in different areas of Britain, using the concepts of population turnover and churn. “Turnover is a measure of the intensity of migration into and out of a district, whereas churn incorporates these flows and also includes the flows that take place within each district”. The authors found that the highest levels of turnover and churn occurred in London and some other urban areas; in contrast, “the lowest levels are found in rural and previously industrial areas”. And rural areas have high stability despite the substantial net in–migration to rural areas (counter–urbanisation). Stability varies between age groups. The least stable age groups are the 16 to 29 age groups, especially the 20–24 age group, the most stable the 45 and over age groups, especially the pensionable age groups (R66). 8b. Ethnic groups We set the stage by something that was in the version of this web page before the May 2008 revision: Ethnic minority groups are heavily concentrated in inner urban areas. However, they have also been taking part in the counter–urbanisation cascade that was mentioned above, and now ethnic minoriy persons are found in all districts of England. The report by Dorling and Thomas (R64) discussed earlier, provides an interesting insight into the distribution of ethnic minority populations in the UK in the section of their work covering both religion and ethnicity. In this report each religious and ethnic group is considered separately. A complicating factor is that the categories offered to people to identify themselves by were not identical in the 1991 and 2001 censuses. In particular, in 2001, several mixed white and other groups were offered as categories. Ethnic minorities remain heavily concentrated in urban areas, particularly in London (however, there has been some spread from cities to more distant suburbs, small towns and more rural areas, and we will return to this movement later). People of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin remain very concentrated in areas of initial settlement. Not only are ethnic minorities concentrated in urban areas, but they are concentrated in just a few particular districts; the magic number here is 13. Again and again we read that roughly fifty per cent of a particular ethnic group live in just 13 districts. These are concentrated in London, but also occur in several midland and northern cities. In terms of religion, the two largest non-Christian religions are Islam and Hinduism. The majority of Muslims live in urban areas in just 20 districts, Hindus live predominantly in suburban areas, and mainly in 13 districts. One thing that stands out in the maps is the changing percentage of the White ethnic group in different districts (nationally the White population decreased from 94.4 per cent to 92.1 per cent). Here it is better to look not at the maps on page 45 but the replacement maps given in the replacement map pages supplied separately to the main document. Compare these maps with any map of the UK showing the size and distribution of cities and towns. You can then see that the greatest falls in the white percentages have occurred in larger urban areas. A final word about how the report describes the distribution of ethnic groups in the UK. The introductory section of the chapter on religion and ethnicity says: We turn now to a report by Lupton and Power (R36), as it provides detailed information on the distribution of the ethnic minority populations in GB at the time of the 2001 census and changes in these populations since the 1991 census: In 2001, ethnic minorities were concentrated in large urban areas. However, each ethnic group was, in geographical terms, concentrated differently. For example, the Pakistani population was strongly represented in Manchester, Lancashire, West Yorkshire, and midland cities, with a smaller proportion of the population in London than was the case for Indians. In contrast, the Black Caribbean population was heavily concentrated in London, and to a lesser extent in Birmigham. Through this concentration of ethnic minorities in large urban areas, most local authorities in GB had minority populations at, or more usually below, the national average. Since 1991, the increase in the number of people from ethnic minorities has been widespread in GB, occurring in virtually every local authority area. However, in numerical terms, the greatest increases have occurred where minorities were already concentrated, that is mainly inner urban areas. “This has led to the greatest percentage point increases in minority ethnic groups as a share of population in the areas where they were already well established. In inner urban areas, this trend has been accompanied by a continuing decline in white population, leading to significant changes in overall ethnic composition ”. The authors were unable to say to what extent settlement patterns of ethnic minorities were through choice or constraint. “Nor can we say how much of the loss of white populations from inner urban areas is 'white flight' from areas that are becoming dominated by minority groups, or a product of the natural ageing of white communities, or a product of out-movement for other reasons ”. Champion (65) confirms that the increase in the number of people from ethnic minorities has been widespread. In terms of the UK's 434 districts in 2001, 244 registered an increase in non–White population due to within–UK migration. However, he points out that things are more complicated than the simple generalisation of Whites moving out of areas as non–Whites move in, and the associated notion of 'white flight'. He writes that “many of these 244 districts also had net inflows of White people”. Further, “a fair number of districts — but especially London boroughs — that lost White population through their migration exchanges with the rest of the UK during this one-year period were also losing non–Whites through this process”. A paper by Large and Ghosh (R68) adds further information about recent (2003) ethnic population structure in different areas and change over the period mid–2001 to mid–2003, with particular reference to the main regions of England. These regions ('Government Office Regions' or GORs) are nine in number: London still has the greatest number, the greatest concentration of peoples of the non–'White British' population, although the proportion of the total non–'White British' that is found in London fell from 44.7 per cent in 2001 to 42.5 per cent in 2003. Of all the nine regions of England, London has shown the lowest annual growth rate of the non–'White British' population. The two regions with the highest growth rate of the non-'White British', North East and South West, are the regions with the smallest base of that population. Perhaps the most interesting and important facts to note about London, however are, first that there has been a pattern of net internal migration of the non-'White British' population out from London very similar in magnitude to the net international migration of this group into London. Second, while the non–'White British' population has grown in all regions, a distinction can be made between more and less urban areas. There is a pattern of the non-'White British' population growth being driven by international in-migration in the more urban areas, and, in the more rural areas, largely by migration from the more urban areas. Large and Ghosh went on to discuss different measurements of the ethnic diversity of different areas, a topic very relevant to current concerns about multiculturalism and segregation. One measure of diversity showed (as the authors say, not surprisingly) that in terms of Local Authority Districts (LADs), the most ethnically diverse LADs are concentrated in London, with Birmingham and Leicester also showing a very high diversity. Using a different measure of diversity, they found that Asian Pakistani, Asian Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African groups showed the greatest degree of segregation, the Mixed Groups and the Chinese the lowest. If we link this information with the information we presented earlier in section 6c. we see that Muslim groups tend to be highly segregated from the rest of the population. Finally, Nissa Finney and Ludi Simpson at the Cathie Marsh Centre, University of Manchester, conclude from their analyses that most differences in migration patterns between ethnic groups within Britain are not primarily differences between ethnic groups per se, but rather they are caused by socioeconomic and demographic factors that operate with white groups as well as with non–white groups (R69, R70). Further, despite some marked differences in migration patterns between whites and non–whites, “counter–urbanisation, a north–south shift and dispersal from areas of co–ethnic concentration are common to all ethnic groups. If 'white flight' is to be identified, 'non-white flight' should be also”. (R69 And see also R70). However, we think the causation of movement of white and minority groups and the idea of 'white flight' mentioned above, deserve further examination. More specifically, and despite the conclusions of Finney and Simpson, we ask the question, has internal migration of whites been partly caused by a wish to move away from areas of high or increasing ethnic minority concentration, either through fear of possible adverse effects on society of this concentration or because of a simple dislike of 'others', of ethnic minorities? 8c. White flight Until recently, the analysis of movement in terms of ethnicity has received more attention in the USA than in the UK. A key figure here is W.H. Frey. In his 1995 paper (R71) he looked at the possible influences of international migration (immigration) on internal migration. In the course of this paper he refers to ‘flight' (pages 733, 736 and 755, and, more specifically, ‘white flight' page754). Frey divided the States of the USA into three categories: high immigration states, high internal migration states and high out–migration states. He notes that one consequence of migration patterns for high immigration states “is an increase in their minority populations resulting from immigration dominated by new minorities – Latinos and Asians and, in some cases, an out–migration that is largely white”. In writing about urban change (what he terms the ‘urban revival') he says that there are “sharp spatial disparities in the growth patterns between the nation's white population and its racial and ethnic minorities”. He concludes that his findings “suggest that the immigration and internal migration processes are leading to a greater demographic balkanisation – a spatial segmentation of the population by race–ethnicity and socio–economic status across metropolitan areas” (see our footnote on 'balkanisation'). Frey notes that in addition to ‘racial selectivity distinctions in migration', previous research has shown other important distinctions for between–area migrations, namely education level and income level. Thus with the out–migration from high immigration states: “the out–migration from these states tends to select on the lower socio–economic ranks. Their out–migration rates tend to be highest for whites with below–poverty incomes, and with low college graduate education attainment levels”. In a later paper (R72), the conclusion was reached that the ethnic displacements examined could be explained in terms of immigrants being labour substitutes for domestic migrants who could take advantage of opportunities in other areas. They could also be explained in terms of “less well–off, longer-term residents in high immigration areas...reacting to perceived increases in social costs” caused by immigration – higher crime rates, reduced services or increased local taxes”. But “in addition, one cannot ignore the possibility that race and ethnic prejudice may enter into decisions of native residents, especially whites, to relocate away from increasingly multiethnic areas in much the same manner that such prejudice prompted ‘suburban flight' in many American cities in the 1950s and 1960s” (our bold text). All this gives us some insight into the complicated relationships between economic, social, and ethnic/racial differences that may characterise internal migration streams, and the extent these different factors may possibly be causal factors, i.e. ‘drivers' of population movement. These complicated relationships are also found in the UK, to which country we now turn. We will however, not attempt to survey the literature on economic and social factors. Rather we look for evidence that ‘white flight' in the UK cannot be explained entirely in terms of socio–economic ranking, but that one cause is the movement of whites, for whatever specific reason, away from areas of high or increasing ethnic minority concentration. If we look first at the media, and confine ourselves just to recent times, we note that early in 2008, Church of England Bishop Michael Nazir–Ali was saying that Islamic extremism has made some areas of Britain ‘no–go' areas for non-Muslims (Telegraph 15th January and 24th February). The black chairman of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Trevor Phillips, supported the bishop, telling the BBC's Radio 4 programme that “there are areas in which there is no contact or very little contact between different ethnic and cultural groups. White flight is accelerating, schools are becoming more segregated” (Daily Mail 15th January 2008). Turning to the academic literature, Gordon and Whitehead (R73) studied the impact of immigration on the population of London. In considering how international migration may have displacement effects on other Londoners, they wrote that these effects “may include (i.e. select) a ‘white flight' element”, and later, Whitehead 2008 (R74): “may include a ‘white/established household flight' element”. Stillwell and Duke-Williams (R75), examined international migration and internal migration of ethnic groups on the basis of 2001 census data. One question they asked was: is there a relationship between non–white immigration and white internal migration? They compared white ethnic groups with the amalgamated non–white ethnic groups.. Examining all census districts, they selected the 113 districts in which the non–white share of the population was over 5 per cent of the total population. They found that white internal net migration – movement out of districts – was highest where non–white (international) migration was greatest, and the correlation was significant. The relationship was shown graphically in their figure 10. However, the authors state that they were not able to claim a cause and effect relationship. This illustrates an important general fact, namely, correlation does not prove causation. The most direct evidence of ‘white flight' away from areas of high or increasing ethnic minority concentration comes from interviews, to which we now turn. Halfacree (R76) studied attitudes to urban-rural migration, making use of interviews. The key perceived positive social features of the destination (rural areas) are summarised in table 10 of his paper. This lists seven points. One is “there were far fewer 'non–white' people in the area”. Neal (R77) drew attention to various pieces of evidence provided by other researchers: Increasingly the perception of an idyllic English countryside has become associated with white ‘safety', safety from an urban malaise – English cities that have “become increasingly diverse ('unEnglish') and synonymous with an undesirable black/Other presence”. Now we think that ‘white flight' from areas of high or increasing ethnic minority concentration, is probably much more extensive than is generally recognised simply because in the present politically correct climate, where if any white person expresses any concern about the effects of ethnic minority immigration they are immediately labelled as racist or fascist, most people will not talk openly about white flight. This opinion was shared by the BBC reporter Vivian White who, after interviewing residents in the Lancashire town of Blackburn, concluded that as Asian communities expanded in Blackburn, many whites moved out in response. But, he said “... the whole subject of 'white flight' and why it's happening is something people find difficult to discuss. They're afraid that if they do, they'll be labelled as racist” (BBC Panorama programme 7–5–07 , both the BBC transcript and the 'straight report'). We want to point out that ‘white flight' is not confined to Great Britain and the USA. It probably occurs widely across Europe. An example comes from The Netherlands. Zorlu and Latten concluded from their study: “The propensity to move is relatively high among natives who reside in neighbourhoods with a higher share of non–western migrants. The estimates indicate a segregatory tendency among non–western migrants and natives. The native movers tend to choose neighbourhoods with a higher share of natives, while non-western migrants are less likely to choose native neighbourhoods”. (R78). Finally, however, we note some very recently published work (2009) by Simpson and Finney (R79) in which they reach a different conclusion about white flight. These authors examined net migration in terms of percentage of the 2001 population, to and from areas defined in terms of degree of concentration of different ethnic groups – lowest concentration, low concentration, medium concentration, high concentration and highest concentration. Considering areas classified as having the highest concentration of ethnic minority groups, both White and minority groups moved out of these areas at a similar rate. This suggests to the authors that to focus on white flight from areas of high ethnic minority concentration is misleading, for ethnic minorities are engaging in the same type of flight. They think that the movement out of areas of highest minority concentration “could be considered as non–racial movement from poor housing”. Further for areas defined in terms of concentration of Whites, and the highest concentration areas, minorities show a significant net out–migration while Whites show a low degree of net in–migration. However, looking at the table where they summarise the flight data, if one looks again at areas defined in terms of the concentration of ethnic minorities, and in particular areas classified as medium and high concentration of ethnic minorities, while both Whites and minorities show net out–migration, the rate of out–migration is far greater for Whites than for minorities. This surely suggests white flight as generally understood. And the authors do admit that “the White movement, however, is greater from the medium quintiles with a lower proportion of minority residents”.
Footnote. Balkanization. ‘Balkanization' means to “divide (a region or body) into smaller mutually hostile states or groups” (The New Oxford Dictionary of English). The term derives from the area of south-east Europe known as the Balkans, an area long known for racial, ethnic and religious tensions and conflict. Parsons (R 56) wrote about these tensions and conflicts. He pointed out that there is good reason to think that change in the proportion of different ethnic or religious groups in a population can considerably increase inter–ethnic tensions and be one of the causes of the outbreak of conflict between groups. He noted that the former Yugoslavia (part of the Balkans) provides an example. Before the civil wars which led to the break up of Yugoslavia, the country had five official nationalities, 12 ethnic minorities and three major religions; and deep and longstanding rivalries between Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and other ethnic groups, were present long before the beginning of these wars. There were also differences between the groups in birth and growth rates, and Parsons speaks of population competition and competitive breeding .
Abbreviations: PT (Population Trends); ONS (Office of National Statistics); HO (Home Office); UN (United Nations).
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Appendix to UK section of this page
Experimental statistics and fertility estimation. The fertility estimates of Large and Ghosh are part of 'experimental statistics' about which the acknowledged limitations of the methodology must be borne in mind when interpreting the estimates. In particular, the methodology is based on reliance on 2001 Census data for parameter estimation. The methodology papers associated with the statistics give full details of these 'limitations' and the problems faced in attempting to estimate ethnic group fertility rates. On the 2001 Census and sizes of ethnic populations we read that the method used in the experimental statistics “places great reliance on using the results of the 2001 Census to identify differences between ethnic groups”, and estimates of ethnic population size produced as standard output from the Census “necessarily fail to reflect rapid growth in some groups since 2001”. We now add our own comment that there were considerable criticisms of the Census methodology and results, following the release of these results. We gave details of the criticisms on the version of the UK section of this page that was on the web prior to July 2004. This version can still be read on our Archive page (item (b) “The United Kingdom section of the Population Trends page, as it was before the July 2004 revision of that page”). On the fertility estimates, Large has written in e-mail correspondence with us that “ The Population Trends article describing the methodology underlying the Population Estimates by Ethnic Group (PEEG) pointed out that our estimates of the TPFR showed less variation between ethnic groups than estimated by other researchers, and that this might be attributable to convergence of rates over time (our estimates are based on results from the 2001 Census while other studies use earlier data sources) or an artefact of the different methodologies” (our italics). “ A specific aspect of the methodology which was identified as an issue in the documents supporting the January 2006 release was the use of mother-infant ratios to estimate age-specific fertility rates. As was acknowledged at the time, this approach did not allow for differences between ethnic groups in patterns of children not linked with their mother “Following the publication of the Population Trends article (which described the methodology used in that initial release), revised Population Estimates by Ethnic Group were published on 17 August 2006. The revised estimates used an improved methodology which, amongst other things, does take account of these 'unlinked' children. The various changes, together with estimates of their impact on the estimates, are detailed in the Changes to Methodology and Revisions paper available at Finally, in later correspondence where Large kindly supplied us with the revised fertility estimates he writes “Can I emphasise that the implied estimates do not reflect any direct knowledge of fertility within each ethnic group since the 2001 Census”. x). The Home page.Human Population Growth and Migrationhave serious consequences, globally and for the United KingdomPopulation Growth, Natural Increase and MigrationPopulation growth is primarily caused by natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths. But in any particular region, migration will cause population growth when the amount of immigration exceeds the amount of emigration. And in the United Kingdom at present, migration is a greater cause of population growth than natural increase. Both population growth and migration can affect the quality of the natural environment, the likelihood of conflict, and social cohesion between ethnic groups. In our view, the significance of both population growth and migration are often underestimated by governments and non-governmental organisations.
Population Growth and Migration: GLOBAL ASPECTSAt the global level, human population growth is one significant cause of environmental problems, for two reasons. First, Population growth has necessitated global increase in food production. More and more land has been taken over for food production to feed the growing population, to provide housing and infrastructure for that population and now, to provide land for energy crop production. And oceanic fishing has increased in intensity. The consequences are manifold. On land there has been a move from systems of food production dependent upon fertility maintained by natural processes governed by soil organisms, to systems dependent on an exogenous source of fertility – nitrogenous fertilisers, allowing massive albeit unsustainable increases in yield per unit area. The results have been destruction of soil structure and soil organisms, depletion of essential trace elements, poisoning of the soil, and nitrogenous substances run–off into streams and rivers with harmful effects on aquatic life there and in coastal waters. In many sub–Saharan countries and some other countries, crop yields per unit area have fallen greatly because of over–intensive agricultural practices causing decrease in soil fertility, aggravated by using cow dung as fuel, dung that should have been ploughed back into the land as fertiliser. Soil erosion and salinisation of groundwater through irrigation has greatly reduced the productivity of large areas of agricultural land. Fresh water aquifers have and continue to be depleted and groundwater levels fall in major agricultural areas. Ocean fish stocks have been seriously depleted and the ecological balance of the oceanic food chains severely damaged. There has been a steady and massive decrease in the size of tropical rainforests and other natural or semi–natural ecosystems. These systems provide services to mankind, including the absorption of the climate change inducing carbon dioxide. Second, much attention has been given to the high per capita levels of consumption and waste production in industrial countries, leading to increased climate changing emissions. But the fact is that the massive population increase in these countries has greatly increased this harmful effect. Now in developing countries, per capita consumption is generally far less than in industrialised countries. However, massive population growth there – and most future population growth will be in these countries – has at the very least still significantly increased global emissions and will continue to do so since there will be more consuming people. Further, in China and India, the two most populous countries in the world, population growth is contributing to the massive growth of the middle class population where consumption and waste production has risen towards or to the levels in industrialised countries. And the massive growth of livestock in the developing world – partly caused by human population growth, is massively increasing emissions of climate changing gases. Population growth has in our view, already taken the human population beyond the carrying capacity of the planet. Continued growth will only make things worse. While improving technology and reducing consumption could improve the situation, we think it is also imperative to take measures to slow down population growth and hasten the day when the global population shrinks. Through its adverse effect on the environment, population growth is a significant cause of the increase in the number of environmental refugees (people who can no longer secure a livelihood in their own areas because of environmental problems such as desertification). The number of environmental refugees will be greatly inflated if, as expected, global warming causes sea levels to rise, inundating vast areas of densely populated land. In the past, abrupt climate temperature changes have occurred. If they occur in the future, agricultural systems may be unable to adapt fast enough, causing massive decreases in food production, which in turn will swell the number of environmental refugees. Environmental refugees may simply be displaced within a country, or they may by international migration move between nations or continents. Such disruptive movements can impede attempts to achieve sustainable development. And the great affluence gap between the rich and poor countries has implications for migration: it fuels the desire to emigrate from poor countries, a desire which is likely to be increased as massive population growth continues in these poor countries. We believe population growth in crowded countries can contribute to political instability and conflict. And increased international migration, described above, increases the potential for demographically fuelled international conflict. Declining natural resources will probably increase the incidence and severity of 'resource wars'. And current conflicts in the Middle East could lead to even greater and more widespread conflict. In parenthesis, we believe these Middle East conflicts are not simply a matter of terrorism, but also of western hegemony and western desire to secure oil supplies; continued depletion of these supplies is likely to fuel such conflicts in the near future. So population growth and migration are very important matters when considering the well being of the planet. Books reviewed on our Book Reviews page and the comments on these books given in our Comment and Analysis page, show how total collapse of global human society is a very real possibility, and massive further loss of biodiversity is likely. Population Growth and Migration: The United KingdomTurning from the global to the local level, we note that the United Kingdom is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe, its population, we argue, already exceeding carrying capacity. And the latest (2006) set of population projections have the population, 60.6 million in 2006, rising to reach 72.7 million in 2036, an increase of twelve million. This increase is far greater than the present size of Greater London (7.6 million in 2007). Beyond 2031 the population is projected to continue to rise reaching 85.3 million in 2081, a massive increase of nearly 25 million from 2006, an increase three times the present size of Greater London! As we noted earlier, population growth is caused by natural change (excess of births over deaths) and net international migration. Now current official projections have nearly 60 per cent of the population growth 2004–2031 being caused by net international migration. But later, deaths will come to exceed births, and the continued population growth will then be maintained only by net international migration. This continued population growth will push the population even further above carrying capacity. The immigration component will, we think, increasingly threaten social cohesion. And the extent that Government relies on immigration to solve skill shortages and labour needs, will in our view, delay the development of a radical policy on participation in the workforce, adequate payment in the low–skilled job sector, further raising or abolishing of the retirement age, and pension reform, which will ultimately be required to deal effectively with employment problems including providing adequate support for the ageing population. The likely global increase in environmental and political refugees, will, in our view, maintain or increase the immigration pressure on the UK. Clearly population growth and migration (both immigration and emigration) are very important matters for policy making in the United Kingdom. We invite our readers to think for themselves how population growth and migration may have affected the quality of their lives. Interaction with our readers – an invitation.
Gaia Watch. Private Limited Company registered in Cardiff, Company No. 3190710. Registered office address: 33, Bingham Park Crescent, Sheffield, South Yorkshire S11 7BH.Registered Charity (UK) No. 1060769. Charity Objectives: To advance the education of the public by conducting research into (1) the growth and movements of human populations and the relationships of these factors to all aspects of environmental health and social well-being (2) all aspects of mans impact on the environment (3) the ecology of remaining natural and semi-natural areas in the world, and to disseminate the useful results of such research. e-mail address: jbarker@population-growth-migration.info
w). The Europe section of the Population Tends page.Europe
1) Key Points
References in the text are given in the form Rx. 2) IntroductionEurope may be variously defined, but it certainly consists of more countries than are included in the European Union (EU). First of all there are those countries in western Europe that are not included in the EU, most notably, Norway and Switzerland. Then there are Eastern European countries – Belarus, Moldova, and the Ukraine, and many would included the western part of the Soviet Union. And the Council of Europe, consisting of 47 countries, includes other countries, most notably Turkey, yet most of Turkey lies outside of what most people regard as Europe. In this section we will mainly deal with the European Union. We will refer to:
The countries in the EU 15 and the countries that joined in May 2004 are shown in the following table. We will also refer to one other country grouping, the Euro zone – countries that have adopted the Euro currency. We will refer to this grouping as EA.
3) The global contextFor a long time, the population of Europe (defined in the second table below), although increasing, has fallen as a percentage of the world population. The same is true of the EU27 as the following graph shows.
If we now look at the growth of the European population and compare it with the growth of countries outside Europe, we can see why despite its growth, its proportion of world population has been falling. Consider just China and India – by far the most populous countries in the world. The growth rates of these two countries have been much greater than the growth rate of Europe, or indeed of the USA. More widely, the growth rates of all World regions apart from Europe (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America, Oceania) have been greater that the growth rate of Europe.
4) The present populationBy the beginning of 2008, the population of the EU 27 had grown to nearly 500 million.
5) Past growth of the population and its components – natural increase and net international migration5a). Actual population growth The growth rates of all four European country groupings slowed after the mid 1960s, steadied in the 1980s, but picked up a little later (especially in the EU 27 and EU25 in the last few years):
(5b).The components of population growth – natural increase and net migration Population growth is generally primarily caused by natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths. But in any particular region, migration will cause population growth when the amount of immigration exceeds the amount of emigration. The following diagram summarises the causal components of population growth
Considering the EU 27, if we look at live births and deaths, we find that annual births have decreased progressively since the mid–1960s (although there has been a slight increase this century). But deaths have increased during most of the same period. Consequently the gap between births and deaths has gradually decreased considerably since the mid–1960s, in other words, natural increase has decreased.. On the other hand, net migration in the EU27 has increased considerably since the mid–1980s. And in 2007, 80 per cent of the EU 27 population growth was caused by net migration. And this was an increase of 16.4 per cent compared with 2006. (R1). The following two graphs summarise the position for the EU 25.
In fact migration contributes more to population growth than the mere net migration figures indicate. This is for two reasons. First, some of the live births recorded are births to migrants. Second, migrants are usually younger than the host population and so contribute less to mortality than the indigenous population does. Considering Fertility rates, the average fertility rate in Europe fell steadily since the mid 1960s, falling below replacement level (roughly 2.1) in the mid 1970s and reaching roughly 1.4 by the end of the recent century. Europe was here defined as the EU27 together with Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Liechstenstein, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Moldava, Montenegro, Norway and the Russian Federation, Serbia, Switzerland and the Ukraine (R2). Here are some examples of total fertility rates in 1995. UK, 1.7; Norway, 1.9; Germany, 1.2; Spain 1.2; Russia, 1.3 (R3). Presently, in terms of regions, fertility rates are lowest in eastern and southern Europe (R4). These fertility rates being so low, why is it that natural increase, although declining, has continued to exist? The answer lies primarily in population momentum: 6) Past changes in population composition – age structure, proportion of foreigners, ethnic groups and religion(6a). Change in age structure The age structure of the EU 25 population has changed considerably since 1965. In 1965 it was the younger age groups that dominated the age structure picture, with a gradual and fairly regular reduction in size of age groups from the 0–4 age group to the 95+ age group. So the largest age group was the 0–4 years age group. All the post retirement age groups (65+) were then much smaller than the pre–working age groups (usually taken to be 0–14, but also true for the 15–19 age group). Now the situation is very different. Birth rates have been falling and life expectancy increasing, so the population has been ageing. The proportion of the population aged 65 and above in both the present EU 25 group of countries and the present EU27 countries has increased from a little under 14 per cent in 1990 to around 17 per cent today (R20). In 2003, the largest age group was the 35 to 39 age group, closely followed by the 20–34 and the 40–54 age groups so there was a bulge in the 'population pyramid', with a comparatively large working age population (R4, fig 1.2). As these working age persons move towards retirement, the proportion of older people in the EU will continue to increase. This has caused fears about the ability of the working age population to provide the health services required by the elderly population in the future. These fears are strengthened by consideration of the changes in total fertility rate (TFR) that we have just described. We return to the ageing of the population in section 6c. It is conventional in helping to quantify the support needed for the elderly population, and also the support for the population of young persons, to construct support ratios.
(6b). Changes in the Composition of European populations in terms of the number of foreigners, different ethnic groups and religions. Immigration into both Western Europe and the USA has greatly increased since the 1950s. As a result, over 10% of the total population around the year 2000 had been born abroad in some Western European countries (R5). Further, “in some European countries around 2000, almost two–thirds of immigrants were from non–European countries (66 per cent in Britain, 62 per cent in the Netherlands, 59 per cent in France). In others such as Belgium and Sweden, those proportions are reversed” (R5). In 2006, just under 6% of the EU27 population was composed of foreigners (that is non–nationals). The proportion ranged from 39.5% of the total population in Luxembourg, to less than 1% in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. There was a sex difference – in the whole EU male non-nationals made up 5.9% of the total population, compared with 5.3% with women. The foreigners originated from other EU countries and countries outside the EU. The geographical proximity of countries plays a role in determining the pattern of intra–Community patterns of migration. In Hungary, over 70% of non–nationals are EU citizens from another member state. The total number of non–nationals in the EU 27 at the beginning of 2006 was estimated to be nearly 28 million persons (R6). In the EU15 the foreign population increased from 4.19 to 5.33% of the total population between 1990 and 2000. Between 1997 and 2001, most member states experienced steady increases in the inflow of foreign nationals, with some countries experiencing massive increases. Thus with Italy, the inflow of foreigners more than doubled between 1998 and 1999, while with Spain, the inflow more than tripled between 1999 and 2000. Around 2000 there were large differences between states in the percentage of foreigners in the population. Roughly a third of all foreigners were citizens of another EU member state, two–thirds coming from outside the EU15. If we look at those countries that have received the most foreign nationals, Turkish nationals (ethnic Turks and Kurds) made up the largest foreigner group. Roughly three million Turkish citizens were living in one or other of the EU 15 member states. The second largest group were citizens of the former Yugoslavia – mainly Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and ethnic Albanians. The third largest group was Moroccans, the fourth, Algerians (R7). The inflow of immigrants has had a major effect on population size change in the EU15. Indeed several countries would by now have had a falling population for many years in the absence of this inflow, Germany Italy and Spain from 1986, 1993 and 1997 respectively (R7). More recently, 16 EU27 countries actually did report a fall in their populations 2006 to 2007 (R1). As previously mentioned, it is not just that immigrants boost the population directly by their inflow. It is also because immigrants reproduce and are on average younger than the host population. Births to foreign and foreign born nationals are a significant portion of total births – in the late 1990s, between 10 and 13% of all births in the UK, France and Germany. Now immigrant populations can, because they have a slightly younger age structure, help to slow down population ageing. But it has been concluded that so far the effect has been weak (R7). The increase in non–nationals and their descendants from the middle of the recent century onwards has created multicultural societies. And in terms of ethnicity and religion as distinct from nationality there has been a large growth of non–Western ethnic groups (such as Blacks and Asians) and religious groups (especially Islam). In England, the country with probably the best information available, it has been estimated that the total of all non–White ethnic groups was already over 10% of the national population in 2005 (R8).
7) Future changes in the population7a). The global context As we have already seen, the global world population has grown massively in recent decades. And it is projected to continue to grow for some decades to come. But most of the growth will take place in the less developed regions (LDR) of the world, while population growth in the more developed regions (MDR), including Europe as a whole, will flatten out. The graph below summarises the population growth situation.
Narrowing our focus to Europe as a whole, around the end of the recent millennium, Europe achieved its biggest ever share of the World population. But as we saw earlier, Europe's share of world population is falling, and it is projected to fall from about twenty per cent now to about 7 per cent by the end of the present century. This is virtually inevitable (R9). However, if we consider absolute numbers rather than percentages, there is a large variation between European regions and countries in their contribution to future population change in Europe and hence the EU's proportion of total world population growth. Looking at the period to 2050, decline is likely to be greatest in eastern Europe, followed by southern Europe (R9). Variation between individual countries is well illustrated by France and Germany. In France there is likely to be a considerable increase, in Germany a considerable drop in population (R21). (7b). EU Population Projections To investigate how populations may change size in the future, projections are made to cover a given time period. For such projections assumptions are first made about the principle factors affecting population size change, namely fertility (births), mortality (deaths, life expectancy) and migration (immigration and emigration). Assumptions may also be made about other factors, sometimes to investigate a specific hypothesis. The European Communities Eurostat has prepared what they call a 'convergence scenario' projection for the EU27. The additional assumption here it that demographic parameters will converge between member states through decreasing socio–economic and cultural differences between the member states, and Norway and Sweden (not in the EU):
As the graph shows, according to this scenario, the EU27 population will continue to increase, but at an ever decreasing rate, up to 2035, after which it will begin to fall, and soon fall quite rapidly. And at the end of the projection period, its proportion of the world population will be hardly any different from the roughly 7.4% in 2008. This scenario reflects the gradual continued reduction in natural increase, indeed from 2015, natural change is projected to be negative, as deaths are projected to outnumber births (R11). Eurostat has also produced projections ('Trend Series') of future population size change for the EU 25 and the EU 15. We give here a summary of the assumptions made for all seven scenarios, based on Table 6 in this reference.
Of the seven scenarios, five show the EU population declining within the first half of the present century. And the EU's overall conclusion was that “the EU Population is likely to decline” (R12). In the following graphs we summarise the results of the three main scenarios and the zero migration scenario. The zero migration scenario reflects the fact that at present, net immigration is the main driver of continued population growth in the EU. And migration will soon be the only population growth factor, because the number of deaths will come to outnumber the number of births as already mentioned. The EU concludes that continued net immigration will not be sufficient to prevent the EU population decreasing (R12).
Projections are not forecasts; nevertheless, they will be used by various parties to help them plan for the future. Yet projections become less and less reliable, the further into the future they are made, so beyond about 20 years they are very unreliable (R13). There are various causes of uncertainty as to how the EU population is likely to change, as we know far too little about known or possible causal factors to assess their influence. As far as fertility is concerned, immigration by persons from high fertility ethnic groups will obviously help to further the growth of populations. But what happens to the fertility of these groups in the second, third and beyond offspring generations? It is generally accepted that the fertility of high fertility groups will fairly rapidly converge to the fertility of the host population. And with the UK there is certainly evidence that this has happened for some groups in the past, most notably with the Indian national group. However, while there may be convergence, there are features of society in the countries of origin which, carried over into the UK, may at least slow convergence for particular groups. Thus in the 1992 book by Coleman and Salt (R14) we read (pages 512–513): More widely in Europe, Coleman in a 2006 paper notes “But fertility differences may persist if immigrant groups do not achieve socioeconomic equality, if they retain strong attachment to religious or other elements of foreign culture, and if they continue to be numerically and culturally reinforced by large-scale migration, especially through importing unacculturated spouses from high–fertility countries” (R5 page 410). As far as religion is concerned, we noted in the UK section of present page (section 6e) that next to age and marital status, it was a woman's 'religiosity' that was the strongest predictor of the number of offspring she produced, and immigrants into Europe tend to be more religious than the host population. Moreover, there seems to be little or no decline in 'religiosity' between immigrants and their first and second generation descendants, especially with Muslims. Another uncertainty stems from the possibility of Turkey joining the EU. Turkey has some dissimilar demographic characteristics to the EU. Most importantly, the fertility rate in Turkey is higher than fertility rate in the EU. Freedom of movement in the EU could mean that the entry of Turkey into the EU will, through migration, have a significant effect on EU fertility rate. Possible Population competition, driving up fertility where their are rival ethnic or religious groups in the population, is another source of uncertainty. There is no doubt that amongst Muslim groups in Europe there are sizeable numbers of activists who see their mission to be that of jihad, of conquering the country for Islam (jihad in its 'external' aspect rather than the 'internal' aspect, the daily inner struggle to be a better person). And there can equally be no doubt that many Muslims have felt threatened by or discriminated against not only by Whites but by non–Muslim ethnic minority groups. This is just the sort of situation where competitive breeding might develop. And we note that Coleman and Salt (R14 page 513) wrote: “ Where minorities feel threatened by absorption or assimilation, a 'minority effect' may make acceptance of family planning difficult and retard convergence in fertility”. And in a 2006 paper we have referred to earlier, he writes: “Increased inflows of unacculturated populations may conserve or even drive up fertility rates, as among African populations in Sweden and Britain” (R5, page 410). Parsons in his monumental book on population competition (R16 page 281, based on work by Kapor–Stanulovic) gave details of one example of population competition, that which occurred in the former Yugoslavia: Turning to migration, we note again that most of the future projected massive growth in the world population will take place in 'developing' countries, including the poorer countries of the world. World food supplies are already stretched to the limit, and climate change is likely, on balance, to have an adverse effect on food production. And already, some major regions of the world are experiencing severe reduction in water reserves needed for agriculture. So the 'push' factor for migration from these countries is likely to be stronger in the future. We think it is also likely that conflict, already widespread in some parts of the world, is likely to increase as a consequence of limitations on food production, and this will enhance the movement of peoples trying to escape from the difficult conditions in their countries. So the pressure to admit more migrants into Europe is likely to increase. At the same time, EU migration policy is still evolving, and the ability of the EU to regulate immigration is open to question. Overall, we remain rather sceptical about the conclusion that the European population will decline this century, although if, as is very possible, economic conditions in Europe get considerably worse, this would reduce the attractiveness of Europe as a destination for migrants. (7c). Projected ageing of European societies. The population is projected to become older in European countries, including all members of the EU27, and two important north–west European Countries outside the EU, Norway and Switzerland. Two good ways to show this are first, looking at the change in the median (not mean) age. This is projected to rise in all EU27 countries together with Norway and Switzerland. For the EU27 as a whole, the median age is projected to rise from 40.4 years in 2008 to 47.9 years in 2060. There is however considerable variation in the extent of this rise between countries. At one extreme are Poland and Slovakia when the increase is over 15 years. In contrast it is less than 5 years in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK (R17). The second way comes from looking at the changing age structure of the population. The percentage share of the total population for people aged 65 and over is projected to rise in all EU 27 countries plus Norway and Switzerland, and in only 6 countries is the projected share less than 10 percentage points. Further, considering the older old population, that is the population aged 80 and over, that population is projected to increase in all EU27 countries, not only in terms of percentage points but also in absolute numbers (R17). As mentioned earlier, this increase in the population of older persons is of great concern to European governments, as it implies a large increase in spending on the services required to sustain this elderly population. We look now at dependency ratios (defined above in section 6a) . The projected dependency ratios for the EU27 are shown in the following histograms. While the dependency ratio for both young as well as old persons is projected to increase, a glance at the scales on the histograms shows that the young age dependency ratio is much smaller than the old age dependency ratio in the later part of the projection period, its increase since present times being relatively small.
We saw earlier that immigrant populations can in theory help to slow down population ageing because of their slightly younger age structure. But how big is this effect likely to be in the future? Lutz and Scherbov investigated a number of scenarios that combined different assumptions in order to produce fertility and immigration rates. They concluded that even quite extreme combinations of these assumptions would only affect the ageing process quite slowly (in R7, page 199). And Coleman in his 2001 Royal Society paper noted that various studies already made point to the conclusion that to maintain the then existing old age dependency ratio would require unimaginably high levels of immigration: With the EU15 a net immigration of 4.5 million per year by 2007 would be needed, and seven million per year by 2024! And it must be remembered that immigrants themselves age and come to require support (R19). (7d). Projected change in the number of foreigners and ethnic composition As we point out in the UK section of the present page, projections of ethnic change, very limited in scope, have been produced for England and Wales for the period 2001 to 2051. These show the 'White British and Irish' group decreasing from 88.7 to 63.9 per cent, the 'White non–British' group increasing from 2.7 to 11.6 per cent, and the 'non–White' ethnic minorities increasing from 8.7 to a massive 24.5 per cent! (This points to a massive ethnic transformation of England and Wales) (R5). Unfortunately, projections of ethnic change are not a common feature in other European countries. As Coleman observed: “The criteria of ethnicity—self–ascribed but potentially perpetual — employed in the English–speaking world have no counterpart in Europe outside the UK. But concerns about integration have moved a number of European statistical offices to define as of 'foreign origin' or of 'foreign background' those belonging to the first or second generation of immigrant origin”. But he also observes that such definitions are not equivalent to ethnicity criteria just mentioned. And it is generally assumed that individuals in the third immigrant generation become part of the indigenous population and so do not contribute to the foreign origin population (R18, page 117). So what is available for some countries are projections of persons of 'foreign origin' or 'foreign background'. Here, for England and Wales, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Austria, the percentage foreign will rise in the period to 2050, and the rise is considerable to between 15 percent and over 30 per cent (R5 and see also R9). For example, in Germany (2000 to 2050), the projected rise is from roughly 10 to 24 per cent, in Sweden (2004 to 2050) roughly 16 to 32 per cent. Further, if the percent foreign is divided into the categories per cent Western and per cent non–Western, in most countries the percentage increase is much greater in the latter than in the former. And Coleman points out that in all the continental projections the assumption is made that all or most of third generation immigrants, that is grandchildren of immigrants, become assimilated and are actually counted as native, not foreign origin. He writes “that approach tends to produce linear, not exponential, growth in the proportion of the population of foreign origin”. Furthermore, the projections ignore one significant component of populations, that is, persons of 'mixed origin' (R5 page 415). It is clear then, that most likely there will be a large increase in the total ethnic minority population proportion of the total EU population. Finally, it is worth noting a general point about immigration and fertility rates that Professor David Coleman (Oxford) drew attention to, and which we can apply to the ethnic minority populations of Europe:
8) References1. Eurostat (2008). Statistics in focus. 72/2008. Ageing characterises the demographic perspectives of the European Societies. European Commission. 2. Eurostat (2008). Europe in figures. Eurostat Yearbook 2008. European Commission. 3. US Census Bureau (2008). International Data Base. 4. Lutz, W. & Wilson, C. (2006). Chapter 1 (pages 3–17) in The New Generations of Europeans. Demography and families in the enlarged European Union. Eds. Lutz, W. et al. Earthscan. 5. Coleman, D. (2006). Immigration and ethnic change in low–fertility countries: a third demographic transition. Population and Development Review 32,3: 401–446. 6. Eurostat. (2008). Statistics report of the European Union 2008. European Commission. 7. Pflegerl, J. (2006). Migration, migrants and their families in the EU15 member states. Chapter 9 (pages 191–221) in The New Generations of Europeans. Demography and families in the enlarged European Union. Eds. Lutz, W. et al. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Earthscan. 8. ONS. (2006 ). Experimental Statistics. Population estimates by ethnic group 2001–2005. 9. Coleman, D. (2007). The shape of things to come: world population to 2050. In Empire and the future world order, eds. Almqvist, K & Thomas, I., Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, Sweden. 10. United Nations (2007). World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision. United Nations. 11. Eurostat (2008). News release 119/2008, 26th August 2008. European Commission. 12. Eurostat (2006). Statistics in focus. 3/2006. Long–term population projections at national level. European Commission. 13. Keyfitz, N. (1981). The limits of population forecasting. Population and Development Review 7, 4: 579–593. 14. Coleman, D. & Salt, J. (1992). The British population. Patterns, trends, and processes. Oxford University Press. 15. Lutz, W. (1994). Future fertility and mortality in industrialized countries. In The future population of the world. What can we assume today? International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Earthscan. 16. Parsons, J. (1998). Human population competition. A study of the pursuit of power through numbers. Edwin Mellen Press, Lampeter, Wales. More recently the fourth edition has been available as “Population competition for security or attack. A study of the perilous pursuit of power through weight of numbers”. Population Policy Press, Llantrisant, Pontyclun, RCT. 17. Eurostat (2008). Statistics in focus. 72/2008. Ageing characterises the demographic perspectives of the European societies. European Commission. 18. Coleman, D. (2008). New Europe, new diversity. Population Studies 62, 1: 113–120. 19. Coleman, D. A. (2001) . Replacement migration, or why everyone is going to have to live in Korea: a fable for our times from the United Nations. Philosophicl Transactions: Biological Sciences (The Royal Society) volume 357 number 1420 (2002). 20. Eurostat (2008). Data base: demo_pjanind. 21. Eurostat (2008). Population – Population Projections – Site 3 TGM table. We thank EU Statistics UK at ONS for clarification of certain EU statistics information. v). Human population growth and migration.Human Population Growth and Migrationhave serious consequences, globally and for the United KingdomPopulation Growth, Natural Increase and MigrationPopulation growth is primarily caused by natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths. But in any particular region, migration will cause population growth when the amount of immigration exceeds the amount of emigration. And in the United Kingdom at present, migration is a greater cause of population growth than natural increase. Both population growth and migration can affect the quality of the natural environment, the likelihood of conflict, and social cohesion between ethnic groups. In our view, the significance of both population growth and migration are often underestimated by governments and non-governmental organisations.
Population Growth and Migration: Global AspectsAt the global level, human population growth is one significant cause of environmental problems - destruction of natural ecosystems, increased rate of species extinction, soil erosion, falling water tables and depletion of aquifers, pollution of rivers, seas and coastal waters, increase of harmful emissions to the atmosphere. Population growth has in our view, already taken the human population beyond the carrying capacity of the planet.Through its adverse effect on the environment, population growth is a significant cause of the increase in the number of environmental refugees (people who can no longer secure a livelihood in their own area because of environmental problems such as desertification). The number of environmental refugees will be greatly inflated if, as expected, global warming causes sea levels to rise, inundating vast areas of densely populated land. In the past, abrupt climate temperature changes have occurred. If they occur in the future, agricultural systems may be unable to adapt fast enough, causing massive decrease in food production, which in turn will swell the number of environmental refugees. Environmental refugees may simply be displaced within a country, or they may by international migration move between nations or continents. Such disruptive movements can impede attempts to achieve sustainable development.We believe population growth can contribute to political instability and conflict. And the great affluence gap between the rich and poor countries has implications for migration: it fuels the desire to emigrate from poor countries, a desire which is likely to be increased as massive population growth continues in these countries. Such migration increases the potential for demographically fuelled international conflict. And declining natural resources will probably increase ‘resource wars’.Current conflicts in the Middle East could lead to even greater and more widespread conflict. In parenthesis, we believe these Middle East conflicts are not simply a matter of terrorism, but also of western hegemony and western desire to secure oil supplies; continued depletion of these supplies is likely to fuel such conflicts in the near future. So population growth and migration are very important matters when considering the well being of the planet. Books reviewed on our Book Reviews page and the comments on these books given in our Comment and Analysis page, show how total collapse of global human society is a very real possibility, and massive further loss of biodiversity is likely. Population Growth and Migration: the United KingdomTurning from the global to the local level, we note that the United Kingdom is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe, its population, we argue, already exceeding carrying capacity.And the latest (2006) set of population projections have the population, 60.6 million in 2006, rising to reach 72.7 million in 2036, an increase of twelve million. This increase is far greater than the present size of of Greater London (7.6 million in 2007). Beyond 2031 the population is projected to continue to rise reaching 85.3 million in 2081, a massive increase of nearly 25 million from 2006, an increase three times the present size of Greater London!As we noted earlier, population growth is caused by natural change (excess of births over deaths) and net international migration. Now nearly 60 per cent of the population growth 2004-2031 is attributable to net international migration. But later, deaths will come to exceed births, the continued population growth then being maintained only by net international migration.This continued population growth will push the population even further above carrying capacity. The immigration component will, we think, increasingly threaten social cohesion. And the extent that Government relies on immigration to solve skill shortages and labour needs, will in our view, delay the development of a radical policy on participation in the workforce, adequate payment in the low-skilled job sector and pension reform, which will ultimately be required to deal effectively with employment problems including providing adequate support for the ageing population.The likely global increase in environmental and political refugees, will, in our view, maintain or increase the immigration pressure on the UK. Clearly population growth and migration (both immigration and emigration) are very important matters for policy making in the United Kingdom. We invite our readers to think for themselves how population growth and migration may have affected the quality of their lives. Interaction with our readers- an invitation. Most recent alterations/additions to the web site (not including additions to the News page)15th August 2009. The UK section of the Population Trends page was updated.
Gaia Watch. Private Limited Company registered in Cardiff, Company No. 3190710. Registered office address: 33, Bingham Park Crescent, Sheffield, South Yorkshire S11 7BH.Registered Charity (UK) No. 1060769. Charity Objectives. To advance the education of the public by conducting research into (1) the growth and movements of human populations and the relationships of these factors to all aspects of environmental health and social well-being (2) all aspects of mans impact on the environment (3) the ecology of remaining natural and semi-natural areas in the world, and to disseminate the useful results of such research.e-mail address: jbarker@population-growth-migration.info u). The UK section of the Population Trends page before that page was updated 15th August 2009.Population Growth and Migration: the United KingdomThis is the revised version of the United Kingdom section of the page that was posted up 18th May 2008.
The following two graphs and table get to the heart of the matter.
1) IntroductionThe basic source of information here is the Office for National Statistics (ONS). See the Population and Migration section of the web site http://www.statistics.gov.uk The ONS produces press releases, brief summary reports, and more in depth regular publications such as Population Trends, the Series PP2 National Population Projections and the Series MN International Migration. Other important sources of information include the Government Actuary's Department (GAD) http://www.gad.gov.uk/ , the Home Office (HO) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ and Eurostat, European Commission http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ . In the following account, note that some records refer to Great Britain (GB), that is England, Scotland and Wales, others to the United Kingdom (UK), that is Great Britain together with Northern Ireland. Note however, that in terms of total numbers, the vast majority of people in the UK live in GB (see the following section). Note also that ONS sometimes uses mid-year population estimates, sometimes end of year estimates. It is important to bear this in mind. For example, in Population Trends 123 (Spring 2006) and the article there on national population projections, there is a figure 1 which graphs total net migration over a period of years. Later in the same volume there is a table 7 that gives actual data on total net migration. If one plots the data in this table as a graph, the shape of the graph does not coincide exactly with the shape of the graph in figure 1, although the general trend of total net migration is the same. The reason for the discrepancy is that figure 1 uses mid-year population estimates, whilst table 7 uses end of year estimates. Note on the value of published information on population trends including migration. “All aspects of population statistics in the United Kingdom are in an unsatisfactory state. Even the base population remains uncertain. Despite every effort, the last two censuses have turned out to be unsatisfactory. Even the 2001 census, designed to be infallible, has had to be revised twice and its incompatibilities with other sources patched up with statistical Polyfilla. With present systems the degree of error is unknowable but possibly large. Inappropriate questions are asked, and necessary ones ignored. Immigration flow statistics are estimated on small voluntary samples of intended immigration and emigration, of incomplete coverage and high sampling error. Immigrants' destinations around the country are based initially on their stated intentions on arrival, naturally subject to revision. With these systems we cannot know who is in the country, legally or illegally, when they arrived, where they are or if and when they left. The number of illegal immigrants is anyone's guess although the government has given an estimate of about half a million. Internal migration and local population estimates are based on obsolete and often wrong census counts, sample surveys inadequate for local authority use and indirect and partial estimates from changes in doctors' registrations. Current huge migration flows quickly render estimates out of date”. Professor David Coleman (2007) Memorandum to the House of Commons Treasury Committee December 2007. “. ...THE CENSUS OF POPULATION. ----The last 20 years have been turbulent for population estimates for two reasons. First, society has become more mobile, less accessible and less willing to respond to surveys. And increases in international migration have created major problems in the enumeration of cities and in estimating the migration component of the annual roll-forward. Second, ONS made serious errors in census design and execution in 1991 and 2001, and on present plans will repeat the errors in 2011.---- There was a marked increase in non-response in 2001 in all types of area. A record 4 million people (71/2% of the population) were not entered on census forms. Even in the "best" local authorities (the unitary and county LAs with the lowest levels of non-response and together having 10% of the national population) the non-response rate was about 3%, compared with an average rate among all LAs in 1981 of under 1% ”. Mr. Philip Redfern (2007) Memorandum to the House of Commons Treasury Committee November 2007. For those who would like to look further into the accuracy of population estimates in relation to recent censuses, a paper by Ludi Simpson could be consulted (“Fixing the population: from census to population estimate”. Environment and Planning A 2007, volume 39, pp. 1045-1057). For the rest of this account of population trends in the UK, references in the body of the text are given in the form (Rx) and are detailed before the appendix at the end of the account in the references section.
Today's population
Illegal immigrant population An Ageing population Population density (all figures population per sq. km). However, Mr. James Clappison, MP, tabled a question on population density in Parliament on the 7th of January 2008. The question was answered by the National Statistician's office on 18th February. The estimates for 2006 were, for the UK, 250 persons per sq km, and for England, 390 per sq km. And the principal projection gave the figure of 464 persons per sq km for England in 2031, a figure greatly exceeding the present population density of the Netherlands.
3) Population growth in the past(3a). The actual growth in numbers Since around the middle of the 18th Century, the population of the UK has grown massively. The population growth rate increased, then it steadied, and later decreased, producing the S shaped curve in the graph below. During this whole period the population went through what is known as the 'demographic transition' — the transition from a largely rural agrarian society with high fertility and mortality rates, to a predominantly urban industrial society with low fertility and mortality rates. The demographic transition is described in the Global section of the current page. It remains to be seen if the increased growth rate since mid–2001, mentioned in the previous section, will be maintained.
3b). The causes of population growth — natural increase and migration Population growth is generally primarily caused by natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths. But in any particular region, migration will cause population growth when the amount of immigration exceeds the amount of emigration. The following diagram summarises the causal components of population growth
We look first at natural increase. From around the middle of the 18th century to the present time, births have exceeded deaths, and this has been the principal cause of the the massive growth of the UK population. During this period, death rates decreased first, birth rates decreasing much later. Only very recently has net migration become the main cause of population growth, as we will see shortly. The long term decline in yearly deaths has continued in recent times, although at a lower rate. People are living longer, in other words, life expectancy has increased. The situation with births is quite different: yearly births, which had been declining, have shown a marked upswing (see the table and figure below). Two terms much used by demographers are the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)and the Replacement Fertility Rate(RFR).
We look, second, at migration In the UK, trends in international migration have changed greatly over the period 1965 to the present, the country changing from being a country of net emigration to a country of net immigration. This period from 1965 can be divided into three parts (R5):
The following box shows net migration from 1991 to 2006.
Note. The figures for net immigration in the box above entirely ignore illegal immigration, for the simple reason that no accurate figures are available for such immigration (see previous section). We now look more closely at the period 1994 to the present. Now the above box shows a very recent down–turn in net international migration — whether or not this will continue in the next few years remains to be seen. But there is one important fact this box does not show us. If we look at a break down of net migration in terms of British and non-British, we see that as far as the non–British population is concerned, net immigration has in fact continued to increase, not decrease. The reason for the down turn in total net immigration is solely the massive net migration (net emigration) of the British category (we return to this topic in a later section):
A dissident view Finally, we mention a dissident view of net international migration that comes from Ludi Simpson and colleagues at the Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research, Manchester University (R15). They used a different method from ONS to estimate net international migration in Great Britain. For the period 1991–2001 their estimate of total net international migration was considerably lower than the official ONS estimate. This would have a considerable effect on the total UK net international migration during this period that was documented in the table and graph at the beginning of the present sub–section. In correspondence with us Simpson wrote about the TIM series of data — the official ONS data we have been using in the present subsection and he also referred to a paper by himself (R16) that he calls the 'EPA paper': We look, finally at the relative importance of natural increase and migration for UK population growth Over the last 25 years, the contribution of natural increase to population growth, although varying, has been relatively constant. With international migration, the situation has been very different: “Between mid-1981 and mid-1986, the effect of net migration was to reduce the population slightly. This is in sharp contrast to recent years when net migration has been the predominant driver of population change. Between mid-2001 and mid-2006, net migration and other changes accounted for almost two-thirds of the 1.5 million growth in the UK population (not including the impact that net migration had upon the number of births in the UK)” (R17 p.15) . We now look at the bracketed bit of the above quotation, and we will see that this means international migration has contributed significantly to population growth apart from its direct effect. The reason is that migration impacts both directly on population growth — net immigration numbers, and indirectly — through its effect on births. Migration affects birth rates and hence population growth for two reasons. First, it is obvious that the age composition of immigrants is highly relevant to population growth. An immigrant flow of predominantly young and working age persons will tend to have more impact on population growth than an ageing population simply because it contains a greater proportion of breeding age and soon–to– be breeding age persons. Second, the impact of immigrants on population growth will depend on how many children they eventually have, on the fertility rate of the immigrant group. What then do we know about these indirect effects? As far as age composition is concerned, immigrants have a younger age profile than the resident population, around a half of international migrants are aged between 25 and 44, so they fall within the working and breeding age groups (R14). Now between mid–2005 and mid–2006 net international migration increased the number of births in 2006 by 7,400 solely because of the impact of immigration and emigration on the size and age structure of the UK population (R17). But this estimate makes the assumption that immigrants, emigrants and the UK population have the same fertility rate, which is not so as we will now see. But first, one complicating factor with age composition. Not all immigrants stay. We shall see in a later section that the extent that immigrants settle permanently affects the age structure of the population. As far as births are concerned we note the following. In 2006, in England and Wales, the estimated fertility rate of women born outside the UK was much higher than that of UK born women: 2.5 compared with 1.7 for UK born women (R17). We will return to this subject in section 6. 3c). Effects of recent European enlargement.In May 2004 ten countries joined the European Union (EU). These were the so-called 'A8' countries together with Cyprus and Malta . The A8 countries are:
This enlargement of the EU led to massive inflows of immigrants to the UK from the A8 countries, and received considerable attention in the media. For example, the Sunday Times stated in 2006 that the influx from the A8 during the preceeding two years had been estimated as 350,000 (Times Online May 14th 2006), and quoted Professor John Salt of University College London as saying “What we are seeing now...is something unprecedented”. A major source of information about immigration from the A8 countries is the 'Worker Registration Scheme' (WRS) operated by the the Home Office (HO). Workers coming into the country are expected to register with this scheme. Data shows that from May 1st 2004 to the end of June 2006 there were 447,000 applications — a massive number. The Polish contingent was by far the largest national contingent, making up 62% of the applicants (R18). It must be noted that we cannot equate number of applicants to the WRS to the number of immigrants from the A8 countries. In the first place, workers who are self–employed are not required to register with the WRS. Second, “..there may also be other workers from the accession countries who for or one reason or another do not register and are thus also not included in these (WRS) figures” (R18). Is this rather vague statement referring to illegal immigrants? Third, the WRS data “...they give no clue to the duration of stay in the UK.. ...” (R19). Here are some details of applicants approved from May 2004 to early 2009.
We see that the number of approved applicants fell gradually in 2008 and continued to fall in the first quarter of 2009, mirroring in general terms the economic downturn. (suggesting that the total inflow to the UK from the A8 countries has recently decreased). Whether or not the decrease will continue is unknown, but Danny Sriskandarajah, head of migration at the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), said “Migration from Poland is very unlikely to continue at the levels we have seen in the first few years we have seen after enlargement. It has always been a question of when these flows started drying up, rather than whether they would”. Some other estimates of numbers. Two other important sources of information about numbers of immigrants from the A8 countries are the International Passenger Survey and the Labour force survey. For details of inflows from these sources see R19 and R20. We simply note here that the IPPR, on the basis of all available sources of information concluded that since 2004 around one million migrant workers came to Britiain from A8 countries (R20). And finally In November 2007 the ONS released some detailed information on A8 migration.
In–migration and out–migration. To understand the long term impact of recent immigration from the A8 countries on UK population growth it is clearly then necessary to consider not only the migration to the UK (in–migration) but also any subsequent emigration from the UK (out–migration, principally return migration to country of origin). UK Home Office estimated before the accession of the ten new EU member that, on average 35 per cent of migrants would return home after the first year. But it was later estimated that on average 60 per cent of migrants from the new accession states returned home after the first year (R22). Now the report from the IPPR mentioned above concludes that about a half of the persons immigrating from the A8 countries since EU enlargement in 2004 have already returned home. We will return to the question of migration flows between the A8 states and Britain later in section 6f. The massive media attention to the flows of persons from the A8 countries should not however be allowed to obscure the fact that much larger net inflows in recent years seem to have been from New Commonwealth Countries (Indian sub–continent countries, former British Africa and Caribbean territories (R23).
4) Projections of future population growth and net immigrationA preliminary note on the nature of projections. One can never know exactly how many people there were in the UK in past years. But the population can be estimated. As far as future populations are concerned, it is possible to estimate what the population size will be (or the net migration will be) if we make any particular set of assumptions about natural increase (fertility and mortality) and migration. But one can make many such estimates, since one can make various alternative assumptions. Every second year a set of projections has been made by the Government Actuary's Department , and more recently by the National Statistics Centre for Demography within the Office of National Statistics: the Principal Projection and Variant Projections. The following account is based on the Principal Projection. A note on the variant projections will be found at the end. Strictly speaking, a projection is a set of calculations which show how a population will develop when certain assumptions about the future course of fertility, mortality and migration are made. A forecast, on the other hand, is a projection in which assumptions are chosen which it is thought will yield a realistic picture of the probable future development of the population (R24). However, government will use projections in its planning, so the makers of projections “must accept the responsibility that (the projections) will be used as forecasts” (R25). It is important to realize the limitations of medium term (such as up to say 2030 in the present case), and especially long term, population projections. As one demographer noted in 1981, we can think of useable forecasts for the next five to 20 years, but virtually no information at all on populations 100 years hence (R26). The latest population projections. The following box summarises the latest (2006–based) principal projections for the UK as a whole and England.
The population of the UK is projected to rise from 60.6 million in 2006 to 69.3 million in 2026, an increase of 8.7 million — more than the present population size of London (7.5 million), the most populous UK city. But between 2006 and 2081, the population is projected to rise by 24.7 million — over three times the London population. The assumed levels of net international migration It is assumed that the annual level of net international migration will decrease from the exceptionally high number in 2004, 223,000, to a long term annual number of 190,000, as follows: To try to grasp the signifcance of 190,000, we take the current population size of one UK major city, Sheffield, namely about 526,000. It will take less than three years for net immigration to add to the UK population as many people as now are found in Sheffield. But international migration will cause the population of the UK to increase even more than the net international immigration figure As explained in section 3, the two determinants of population increase, natural increase (births minus deaths) and immigration are not independent of each other. And they interact in the 2006–based projections because the number of future births and deaths is influenced by net immigration. The key fact here is that migrants are concentrated at young adult ages, so the assumed level of migration affects the number of women of child bearing ages and hence the future number of births. Considering the period 2006 to 2031, population growth can be ascribed to the components in the following table.
Uncertainties about future migration The above projections conceal very real uncertainties about the future, to which we now turn. Migration to and from the A8 accession states It seems that inflows of persons from the A8 European countries are slowing down. Further, it has been estimated that on average 60 per cent of migrants from the new accession states returned home after the first year, as we mentioned earlier in the previous section. But how will these migration flows change in the future? What are the intentions of immigrants from the new EU accession states on the question of return migration? At the time of arrival, most immigrants are stated to be not intending to stay permanantly in the UK. But researchers in a recent study conclude that, “as may be expected, some migrants who initially intended a temporary stay have decided to stay permanently, typically because they are in employment and economically successful in the UK” (R27). A survey on legal job migrations from Poland to Great Britain carried out in a study by the Center for International Relations, Warsaw, Poland (CIR), founds that 51 % of respondents in Britain answered that they wanted to return to Poland, while 23% answered that they were not intending to return. But the study cautions that: Four factors will influence the extent of return migration to Poland and other accession countries, and also the continued flow from these countries to the UK: the extent that the economies of these countries improve, competition for skilled workers throughout the EU and indeed the whole of the developed world, low birth rates in the accession countries, and consequently a reduction in the pool of potential migrants and the devaluation of the Pound Sterling. Economic growth in Accession states. A 2007 report from the Centre for Economic and Business Research, London (CEBR) said that the accession member states were experiencing a period of economic growth that is improving wages and living standards. Therefore, the report concludes, there will be less incentive to emigrate to the UK (R22 — see also R20). Competition for skilled workers. As for competition between EU member states, another report from the CIR notes: Birth rates. The proportion of the population in the age groups 15–24 is shrinking in the new member states, and it is just these age groups that have been especially involved in migration to Britain. “As a result, the pool of people likely to migrate to the UK is getting smaller and is set to continue to do so in the coming years” (R20). Devaluation of the Pound The UK's currency has significantly weakened against the currencies of the new member states, and this reduces the value of remittances sent to the home countries, thus making the UK a less attractive migration destination (R20). Emigration from the developing world We just here highlight what is potentially the greatest driver of out-migration (emigration) in the poor countries of the world. Rising food prices, caused by rising global food shortages, in turn caused by various factors but perhaps, over the long term, most significantly by climate change and continued population growth, are already causing conflict in many countries especially those that lie in the world's equatorial zone — see for example “The new face of hunger” The Economist, briefing April 17th 20008). While some of this migration will be absorbed by other so–called developing countries, there is bound to be an overspill towards the developed world, and so to the European Union and the UK. Variation of fertility rate between ethnic groups In a later section (6c) we will look at the fertility rate of different ethnic groups. As these groups have now grown in size significantly in the last few decades in the UK, their fertility and how it changes, will have increasingly important repercussions on UK population growth. Some groups have a significantly higher fertility rate than the presently still dominant White: British group. While it is generally thought that the fertilities of ethnic groups will converge towards that of the UK mean, there is uncertainty as to the speed of this convergence. A NOTE ON VARIANT PROJECTIONS We explained at the beginning of this section, that any projection is based on a set of assumptions concerning future fertility, mortality and migration. A variant projection then is variant because it is based on a different set of these assumptions. We can say that these variant projections give us different future scenarios. It is important to realise that variant projections do not, and are not intended to, provide upper and lower limits to future population growth or of the changes in the two components of this growth, namely natural change and migration. Indeed, the actual method used in making the projections are not of the type that allows the production of probability statements or confidence limits that can be produced with many statistical calculations (R28). Details of the variant projections are given in the ONS publication series PP2, National Population Projections, and in less detail in the ONS publication series Population Trends.
5) Recent past projections: net immigration as a driving force underestimatedThe Government Actuary's Department has made a new set of projections every two years (this task has now been taken over by the Office of National Statistics) and in this section we look at recent past projections. Before we do so, however, it is important to note the effect of the 2001 census on population estimates. Projections in the decade before the 2001 census had been based on the previous, 1991, census. These projections each started with the estimated then current population size (called the base population). The 2001 census provided a means to check the estimated then current (2001) population size. The result showed that this had been significantly over–estimated in past projections. The reason stated was that past net migration (balance of gross immigration and gross emigration) had been overestimated (R28). It was initially concluded that this over-estimation of past net migration was caused by an underestimation of past gross emigration. Some revisions have subsequently been made. Census methodology and analysis of results came in for considerable criticism, which we recorded in the version of this page before our 2004 revision of same ( now archived as item (b) on the archive page). Readers might also like to read a recent and comprehensive review of census population estimates by Ludi Simpson of the Cathie Marsh Centre, Manchester University (R16). We now turn to the post 2001 census population estimates, namely the 2002–based and 2004–based projections, and compare these with the 2006–based projection we have already examined. Post 2001 Census population projections. How did the 2002–based projection compare to the pre–census 2000–based projection? Not surprisingly in view of what we have just noted about the 2001 census, the 2002–based projection for early years was lower than those of the pre–census projection. For example, for the year 2006 we have (thousands) 2000–based: 60,946; 2002–based: 59,995. When we look at the two later projections (2004–based and 2006–based), we find that each increases population growth above the previous projection: With the 2004–based projection, the main reason for the increase was increase in assumptions about future migration, although in the long term a reduction in mortality assumptions becomes increasingly important. With the new 2006–based projection, the increase is ascribed (in order of decreasing significance) to more births, more migrants and fewer deaths. Finally, we would like to draw attention to one feature of projections we have not so far dealt with. In projections made in the 1990s before the 1996–based set, it was assumed that net international migration would tail off to zero in the long term. But starting with the 1996–based projections, this assumption has been dropped and replaced by the assumption that net international immigration would after a few years level off to a constant level in later years. This level is currently set at 190,000 per year, a little under the estimated net flow for 2006 (191 thousand). What are the reasons given by ONS for this constant level assumption? These appears to be merely that it is extremely difficult to predict changes in migration more than a few years ahead and that this assumption is normally made internationally ( for example, R30 page 19 left. See also ONS(1999) National Population Projections PP2 no. 21 1996-based national population projections). These seem to us to be rather weak reasons. First, ONS makes projections for several decades later, so why not several decades for migration? If one has to choose a long term level, would it not be better to use the long term upward trend for guidance, rather than assuming net migration will soon settle to a constant annual level? Second, just because this assumption is normally made internationally, does not mean that the assumption is correct, or that UK circumstances are similar to circumstances in other countries. We wish to emphasise that the 'push' and 'pull' factors for emigration from developing countries and conflict torn countries to developed countries that have been in operation for a long time, now aggravated by increasing wealth disparities between developed and developing countries and continued massive population growth in developing countries where levels of real poverty remain high, combined with government inability to control illegal immigration, let alone get a decent estimate of the extent of same, would suggest that net international migration may continue to increase for some years to come in the absence of government adopting firm immigration reduction measures (unlikely, we think).
6). Population growth and migration in terms of nation of origin and ethnicityIt would be nice if there were available reliable and up–to–date statistics on birth, death, and migration trends in all ethnic groups over the last 50 years in the UK and constituent countries — there should be and could have been —but they are not. Nevertheless, the data that is available enables us to get a general picture of the present situation and how it has developed over the years 6a). Today's population The following histogram shows the estimated sizes of ethnic groups in England in 2005, using the 2001 census classification of ethnic groups.
We see then that, in decreasing size order, the largest minority groups are Other White, Indian, Pakistani, African, followed closely by Irish and Caribbean. 6b). Population growth of ethnic groups in the past Great Britain Since the second world war the transformation of the ethnic composition began with major influxes of people: first came West Indians (1950s), then Indians, then Pakistanis (1960s) later still people from Bangladesh. With the African population, communities were established in seaports in the late 1940s onwards, but substantial inflows came later partly resulting from political instability in Africa in the 1970s (R32, R33). It continued through further immigration, and the high fertility of some ethnic groups that we explore in sub–section 8c below. The consequence has been that “because of high fertility and continued immigration, New Commonwealth minority populations have increased rapidly from negligible numbers in 1945 to about 2.5 million in 1987... This represents an annual growth rate of about 5.2 per cent from 1971 to 1987” (R31 p. 501). If we consider just the 1990s, the total population grew by 4 per cent. England.
We now look at recent changes in England, base on 'experimental statistics' (see appendix).
There is just one caveat about the above conclusions, and that concerns the White: Irish group, for there is considerable doubt about its size in 2001(R33). The following graphs illustrate the growth of the largest ethnic minority groups.
6c. Fertility of ethnic groups We give below estimates for England of total fertility rates 2003–2004 from the so-called 'experimental statstics' of the ONS (see the appendix to this page for details of the method). A word first about the black rectangles on the top of the columns. These increases in fertility rate derive from improvements in fertility estimation methodology (“Population estimates by Ethnic Group: 2001 to 2004: Commentary”, accessed from R36). We see that the fertility rates of all three white groups are way below the replacement level of roughly 2.1. The ethnic minority fertility rates vary considerably. Some have a fertility rate below replacement level, like the white groups. The lowest rate is for the Chinese group. Some have a fertility rate above replacement level, sometimes greatly in excess of that level. The highest rate was for the Pakistani group, closely followed by the Bangladeshi group. The Indian group is estimated to have a below replacement fertility level, although an earlier study suggested that this group had a fertility rate a little above replacement level (37). This same earlier study also reported on attitudes to family size. The family size preferences of Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups were higher than the prefered family size of the long-term indigenous population (which were mainly the White: British group).
Now the same authors, using the same methodology as used for 2003 above, published fertility estimates for 2001 (R38). 6d). Age composition of ethnic group populations.
Turning to age structure in 2004 (the histogram above) we look first at the young age groups (0–15 years). What stands out most is the relatively high percentage of the population in these age groups in all the Mixed ethnic groups. All the Asian groups have a higher proportion of their populations in these age groups compared with the White groups, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups a much higher proportion. We note that the Pakistani group has the second largest total population of the non-White groups, much larger than any of the Mixed groups, so its relatively young age structure has obvious implications for the future changes in the ethnic composition of England. Now it is worth noting that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are predominantly Muslim peoples, and we see the significance of religion in the next sub-section. With the working age groups (16-64/59), there is considerable variation between non–White ethnic groups. However, the the Mixed groups all have a lower percentage than the White: British, while the Black Caribbean, Black African and especially the Chinese: Chinese and the Chinese: Other have a much larger percentage. Of particular interest for future changes in ethnic composition in England are the percentages in what we may term the 'breeding age groups'. For present purposes we will take these to include the 15–19 age group through to and including the 40–44 age group (table above for mid–2004). Just considering females (only females produce offspring!) we see that apart from the White: Irish group, all the other ethnic groups have a higher proportion than the White: British, usually a much higher proportion. Considering the older age groups (65/60+), the White: British has the largest percentage of its population in these groups than any other group apart from the White: Irish group. In terms of larger group categories (White, Mixed, Asian, Chinese and other) the Mixed group stands out as having the lowest percentage of its population in this age group. A good way to conceptualize the variation of age structure between populations is to construct what are termed 'age pyramids'. We would prefer the term age profiles since the shapes of some 'pyramids' are decidedly not what one expects of a pyramid! The following diagram shows variation in age profiles. The vertical axis shows age and the horixontal axis shows the proportion of the population that is in each age category. Colour key for the age groups. Green: Pre–working age groups. Orange: working age groups. Grey: post–working age groups. Notice the left-right (make–female) profile asymmetry. This is because women tend to live longer than men.
Actual age profiles of different ethnic groups have been prepared, apart from the 'mixed' and 'other' groups, whose populations are very heterogeneous (R39). Finally, what about the profiles of immigrant groups, that is, the first generation of the immigrants in Britain? Well: “Migrants have a younger age profile than the resident population, around a half of international migrants are aged between 25 and 44” (R5), so they fall within the working and breeding age groups. And the Home Office report on workers from the 10 countries that joined the EU since May 2004 states that the majority are young, between the ages of 18 and 34. But 94% of these workers stated that they had no dependants living with them (R40). 6e). ReligionA government article (R41) states: The article goes on the say that while the larger proportion of families with children and larger family sizes partly reflects the younger age structure of the Muslim population (see also R42), it may also reflect the intention of Muslims to have larger families (our bold text). Noting that many Muslims have a Pakistani or Bangladeshi background, the article says that these ethnic groups intend to have on average three children, while the White population intend two. The 2006 ONS report “Focus on Eethnicity and Religion”, reiterates the idea that Muslims tend to have larger families, but it takes the analysis a step furtheer. It notes that differences between religious groups are highly correlated with ethnicity. However, ethnicity does not explain fully the differences between religious groups. “Religion can exert a strong influence, sometimes being more important than ethnic group in determining household characterisitcs. For example, in all ethnic groups, Muslims tended to have larger average household sizes and a greater number of dependent children” (our bold text) (R43). Now Eric Kaufmann of Birkbeck College, University of London has been studying secularisation in Europe (R38). He notes that religious people tend to have a higher fertility than non-religious people. And in an analysis of data from ten west European countries for the period 1981–2004, Kaufmann found that next to age and marital status, it was a woman's 'religiosity' (it would be better we think to use the less judgemental term 'strength of religious affiliation') that was the strongest predictor of the number of offspring she produced, and he states that many other studies have reached the same conclusion. He also argues that immigrants into Europe tend to be more religious than the host population and he states that several other studies have drawn this conclusion. Moreover, there seems to be little or no decline in 'religiosity' between immigrants and their first and second generation descendants, especially with Muslims. As far as the native Christian population is concerned, secularisation seems to be levelling out. Turning from the Christian population to the overall religious population, Kaufmann argues that there will be a growing religious population well before 2050. This will be through a virtual cessation of apostasy from religion among those born after 1945, Muslim immigration and retention between generations of their 'religiosity', the fertility difference between secular and religious populations, and finally, females are over–represented among those under 45 who remain religious. 6f). Past international migration of ethnic groupsIntroduction “Modest migration has always been a feature of Great Britain, but much of the ethnic and religious diversity of the current population is a result of large scale migration from the 1950s onwards. Early immigration waves included economic migrants from Ireland, the Caribbean and India, followed by migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh, their wives and dependants. Since the 1980s migration from Africa and China has increased and has included students and asylum–seekers, as well as economic migrants” (R33 page 20). Migrants from Ireland have been coming to Britain for a long time, but this immigration increased in the 1930s to 1961, then increased again in the 1980s onwards. Inflows (gross immigration) Available data allows us to classify immigrants in a variety of ways, each giving us insight into the ethnic composition of immigration flows. One way that is very relevant to current concerns about cultural change is to divide immigrants into those from European nations (i.e. countries with a relatively similar cultural heritage) and non-European nations (that usually have a cultural heritage very different from the European). With this classification, and around the year 2000, nearly 66 per cent of immigrants to Britian were from non-European countries. This, bearing in mind the large size of immigrant flows, presages massive cultural change . Britain is not alone in Europe in experiencing this large inflow of non-Europeans. With the Netherlands it was 62 per cent, and with France, 59 per cent (R45). Some data is now available for a sub–division of the European: non–European level classification, i.e. to the country of origin level. This data was obtained in the UK parliament by Mr. James Clappison MP (question tabled 7th January 2008, answered from the Office of the National Statistician 18th February 2008). Parliamentary questions and answers may be viewed by going to the Parliament web site (http://www.parliament.uk/) then browsing in Hansard). The data was only from the main source of information on immigration, the International Passenger Survey, so does not include some categories of immigrants such as asylum seekers. Nevertheless, it suggests the general way that national immigration flows have been changing over the years. Here we give information about the countries that contributed the most immigrants in each 2 year period.
What stands out most from the trends across the whole period is the change from the situation where most immigrants came from countries with predominantly a white population, to the situation where there is a very significant contribution from countries that have a predominantly non-white population, certain Asian countries. Also noteworthy at this stage is the new entry into the upper reaches of the top ten in the final two year period — Poland. The Times Online May 14th 2006 article we mentioned earlier quoted Professor David Coleman of Oxford University as saying “From one country in a very short space of time, it must be the largest influx we have ever seen” and quoted Professor John Salt of University College London as saying “What we are seeing now...is something unprecedented”. Duration of stay of immigrants. Do they usually stay permanently? Rendall and Ball (R46) studied migration streams in the 1980s and 1990s. They found there was considerable complexity not only in the composition of migration streams in terms of nation of origin of immigrants and the date of their arrival, but also in the extent that immigrants remained in the UK. We focus here on short term immigration and nation of origin. The report shows that short–term immigration is commoner for people from some countries than for others. A rough generalization is expressed by the reports authors in terms of wealth: short term immigration is more associated with higher–income countries than with low–income countries. Immigrants from the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA have relatively high rates of subsequent emigration, over 50 per cent emigrating again within five years. These are the higher–income countries. In contrast, lower–income countries have a lower rate of subsequent emigration, well under twenty per cent for the Indian sub–continent. Rendall and Salt (R47) confirm the general difference between higher and lower–income countries. What Rendall and Ball's report does not draw our attention to however, is the long term consequences in terms of changing ethnic composition of our population. For instead of talking in terms of income, we can talk in terms of ethnic groups and re–phrase the authors conclusion: Return migration is commonest with people who originated in countries where White ethnic groups predominate, groups all of which have their cultural roots in Europe. In contrast, migrants from the Indian sub–continent have a greater tendency to stay in the UK, and they belong to non-White ethnic groups. These results have clear implications for the changing relative size in the UK of groups with a European heritage and groups with a non-European heritage. Now it seems as if migration between the UK and Poland is coming to conform to this generalisation (see Section 4 for changes taking place). Now duration of stay of immigrants affects the age structure of the foreign-born population, affects the old–age dependency ratio, that is the the ratio of people of pensionable age to people of working age. Immigrants are usually relatively young when they arrive. So a consequence of shorter length of stay is the greater youth of the foreign born population. “To have an older immigrant population requires both that immigrants settle and that they arrived a relatively long time ago” . The lowest old–age dependency ratios occur with groups characterised with shorter patterns of stay (Oceania and to a lesser extent North America), and groups where immigration has been more recent (most notably Africa but also the Far East).This relationship between duration of stay and the degree of youthfullness of the foreign born population is clearly relevant to fertility differences between ethnic groups (R47). Now duration of stay affects total net migration, to which we now turn. Net migration An insight into net migration comes from information on the populations of foreign born members of the population, for these populations are likely to be the pricipal cause of the volume of net migration. Here is information for Great Britain around AD 2000.
What stands out most is the very large population of Asian persons, and the nearly as large population of members of the EU15. Finally, information on births to mothers who were born outside the UK gives another insight into immigrant flows. In 2006, 22 per cent of all births in England and Wales were to mothers born outside the UK. This is the highest proportion since registration of parents' country of birth at birth registration was introduced in 1969. Further, from 1969 to around 1990, the annual percentage was always roughly around 13 per cent. But about 1990 an upward trend developed. So the high value in 2006 has been reached in less than 20 years (R48). Data is available to allow a comparison of migration trends of British versus non-British persons, a comparison we also looked into earlier (section 3b) where we saw that net migration since 2001 has two contrasting components the British and non-British. Now in the following we extend the time period backwards to 1993.
There has been a net outflow of British citizens, and a net inflow of non-British citizens throughout the period from 1993 onwards. But there has been a net gain of population through migration throughout this period (except for 1993). The flows of both groups have generally been substantial. Further, the flows show clear trends - increasing net immigration of non-British and increasing net emigration of British citizens. Actually the net inflow of non-British and net outflow of British citizens did not begin in the early 1990s. There was in fact a net inflow of non-British citizens in every year from 1981 onwards. With British citizens there was a net outflow in every year in the 1980s except for 1985 (R49). So the net outflow of British and the net inflow of non-British citizens has been a feature of UK population change for a long time. All this suggests that in terms of actual ethnic groups (as defined for the census), there has been a massive net outflow from the largest ethnic category, namely the White: British and a large net inflow of ethnic minority persons, but the data just reviewed does not allow us to go further in terms of ethnicity So we turn now to a standard official classification of citizenship used in migration statistics: British, European Union (recently also divided into EU 15 and EUA8), Old Commonwealth, New Commonwealth and 'Other Foreign'. The following graphs summarise the situation for main categories for 2004, 2005, and 2006 (the latest year for which figures are available). As an illustration of the figures used we give the data for 2006 below the graphs.
Note how the shape of the New Commonwealth graph differs from all the other graphs. In contrast to the other groups, relatively few persons left the UK, so that the balance, i.e. the net migration, is similar in size to the net immigration. This suggests that most New Commonwealth immigrants more generally stay permanently in the UK which is consistent with what we found in the previous sub-section. Finally, we now have an estimate of net migration of foreign groups over the last one and a half decades:
This figure comes from House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008) “The economic impact of immigration. Volume 1: Report” HL Paper 82–1 . Now In the media, including the BBC, in recent times, all the emphasis has been on the massive immigration from A8 countries, especially from Poland , since the recent EU enlargement. Rarely, if ever in some media, is the size of the 'Other' and New Commonwealth (NC) categories immigration mentioned. But we see from the above table that the net inflows of both 'Other' and NC migrants greatly exceeds the net inflows of the A8 countries. What is more, the net inflow of the NC group has increased in recent years. In one sense the numerical disparity of net immigration between the A8 and the New Commonwealth groups of nations should come as no surprise, when we recall that there has been a massive outflow again of Polish immigrants to Britain (section 3c) and it is people from poor countries who, having come to Britain, tend to stay here (section 6f). 6g). Relationship between variation of fertility between ethnic groups and total fertility change in the UKSome estimates are available on the fertility rates of UK residents by country of birth of mother:
Country of birth does not correspond to ethnicity. The 'rest of the world' is a very mixed bag, ethnically speaking. And the UK born will include minority groups as well as the White: British group, although the vast majority of persons will belong to the White: British group. The other groups are ethnically more homogeneous. And the proportion of White: British in these other groups will be small or very small. What stands out most from the above table and graph is that with the exception of the East African group, all the outside of UK groups have fertility rates higher than the group of mothers born in the UK, the Pakistan and Bangladesh born groups having by far the highest fertilities. And we saw (section 6c) that considering the whole ethnic group populations in England and Wales, as distinct from country of birth populations, it is the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups that have the highest fertilities of all ethnic groups. One might expect some correlation between these fertility differences in England and Wales, and the fertilities differences between countries of origin. If we look at fertility in countries of origin (table below), and consider India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the fertility rates in those countries in the period 2000 to 2005 were, respectively, 3.11, 3.99 and 3.22. All these rates are well above replacement level, and well above the rates of the corresponding total populations in England and Wales. But the order of these country of origin estimates is the same as the order of fertility rates in the above table, and the order of fertility rates in the total England and Wales populations, that is, India lowest, Bangladesh intermediate, and Pakistan highest. Another point. The differences between country of origin fertilities and total UK group population fertilities are consistent with the hypothesis that the fertility rates of immigrant populations that have a much higher fertility than the host population, will gradually over generations decrease to that of the host population. Finally, it is interesting that with the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, the fertility rates of the foreign born populations are much higher than the fertility rates in country of origin. Have conditions in England and Wales promoted an increase in fertility? Or is it that immigrants from these two countries are relatively young compared with country of origin total populations?
In an earlier section (3b) we noted that the total UK fertility rate has risen sharply in recent years. So the question arises, to what extent may this be caused by higher fertility of some ethnic groups . We now add the following information about changes in fertility rate (R17):
Now it was concluded that international migration has impacted on the number of births in the UK in recent years. And “although it does not on its own explain the rise in the TFR for the UK over the past five years, analysis suggests that it has indeed contributed to this rise. The higher average fertility of women born overseas, especially in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, is of particular relevance when considered alongside the relatively young adult age structure of the UK population of Asian ethnic origin” ( R17). The Press release on this publication (11th December 2007) stated the overall conclusion of the work quite simply as “Both UK born and non-UK born women have contributed to the consistent rise in fertility rates in the UK between 2001 and 2006”. Finally, remembering the massive immigration of people from Poland in recent times, we note that the Daily Mail newspaper, 2nd December 2006, was suggesting that the birth rate of Polish immigrants was greater than in many cities in Poland (in general in Poland the fertility rate is well below replacement level). The fertility trends discussed in this sub-section are obviously relevant to any attempt to forecast or to project the future growth of ethnic minority populations in the UK, to which we now turn. 6h). Projections of future population growth of ethnic minority populationsThe information given so far in section 6 provides clear indications about how the size and composition of the ethnic minority population of the UK is likely to change in the future. Some salient facts are:
We give now details of two recent projections of the size and composition of the ethnic minority population. The first looks at the period 2001–2051, the second at the shorter period 2001–2020.
Doubts about how things will change in the future. We think that the two issues over which there is serious doubt about how things will change in the future are fertility rate change and the extent of net immigration. Changes in fertility rate. As far as religion is concerned, we noted in section 6e above that next to age and marital status, it was a woman's 'religiosity' that was the strongest predictor of the number of offspring she produced, and immigrants into Europe tend to be more religious than the host population. Moreover, there seems to be little or no decline in 'religiosity' between immigrants and their first and second generation descendants, especially with Muslims. Then we have the possibility of population competition between ethnic groups, and more specifically, competitive breeding - the situation where, unconsciously or consciously, an ethnic group promotes its own breeding. Parsons in his monumental book on population competition (R53 page 281) gave an example from the former Yugoslavia based on work by Kapor-Stanulovic): Now there is no doubt that amongst Muslim groups in the UK there are sizeable numbers of activists who see their mission to be that of jihad, of conquering the country for Islam (jihad in its 'external' aspect rather than the 'internal' aspect, the daily inner struggle to be a better person). And there can equally be no doubt that many Muslims have felt threatened by or discriminated against not only by Whites but by non-Muslim ethnic minority groups. This is just the s | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
